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Abstract 
Relative Absolutes: Alexandre Kojève and Russian Philosophy Abroad 
 
Trevor Wilson, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Standard accounts of twentieth century Russian emigration often describe stages of 
adaptation for those in exile: first, an effort to maintain continuity with pre-revolutionary Russia, 
followed by attempts to adopt cultural models of their new countries, and finishing with varying 
degrees of self-definition and integration. Studies of the Russian diaspora have largely, however, 
confined themselves to artistic texts. This dissertation rethinks standard models of Russian 
diasporic culture through the lens of philosophy and intellectual history in Europe more broadly. 
It examines the work of the philosopher Alexandre Kojève as a thematic bridge, connecting the 
philosophical activity of Russian émigrés (such as Sergei Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdiaev, and Lev 
Karsavin) with major figures in French and German intellectual history (Jacques Lacan, Georges 
Bataille, Carl Schmitt, among others). Although Kojève began his career in Russian philosophical 
circles (in Moscow, then émigré Paris), he only emerged as a respected philosophical figure after 
having “denationalized” his philosophical practice. This denationalization notably took place in 
his influential seminars on Hegel, held in Paris from 1933 to 1939. The dissertation traces Kojève’s 
transferal of ideas from the Russian tradition to a French, philosophically “universalized” one. The 
first chapter discusses the shift within consecutive generations of émigré Russian philosophers 
from religiously inflected work to atheist philosophy. The second chapter identifies the origins of 
Kojève’s theorization of desire in Russian philosophical debates on love in the fin-de-siècle period. 
The third chapter examines Kojève’s philosophy through political theory, examining his influence 
in debates on political conflict and the end of history on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The last 
 v 
chapter “returns” the philosopher to post-Soviet Russia and examines citation of Kojève amongst 
contemporary Russian philosophers writing today. The dissertation concludes by arguing for a 
new understanding of Russian philosophy within a transnational exchange of texts and ideas. In 
particular, it signals to more liminal figures of Russian philosophy, including Kojève and his 
colleague Alexandre Koyré, as those who introduced problematics germane to Russian thought 
into broader, pan-European philosophy, thereby disrupting the habit of thinking of Russian 
intellectual history within an essentialized national context.  
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Introduction 
“How does newness come into the world? How is it born?”  
The novelist Salman Rushdie asked this question in his The Satanic Verses as an attempt 
to shed light on the productive “third space” of South Asian immigrants to London, neither “fully” 
British nor “fully” Indian. Something new was born in this interstitial space of diaspora, something 
that could not fit comfortably into either national category. Later, postcolonialist theorist Homi 
Bhabha invoked Rushdie in his theory of the global postcolonial subject, claiming that “[c]ultural 
globality is figured in the in-between spaces of double-frames: its historical originality marked by 
a cognitive obscurity; its decentered ‘subject’ signified in the nervous temporality of the 
transitional, or the emergent provisionality of the ‘present’” (309). This dissertation is an attempt 
to find yet another kind of diasporic newness emerging from a decentered subject: in the work of 
Russo-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, and in the philosophical circles of the Russian 
émigré communities in the early twentieth-century.  
Various models of world literature have sought to understand the connection between the 
global circulation of texts and their consequent aggregation of cultural capital. Pascale Casanova, 
for example, has argued that we think of world literature as a “world republic of letters,” a mapped 
continuum of literary spaces in which certain older cultural traditions are able to dominate lesser 
established ones globally: those “oldest literary fields are therefore the most autonomous as well, 
which is to say the most exclusively devoted to literary as an activity having no need of justification 
beyond itself” (85). Other, more marginal literary spaces are more subject to processes of literary 
nationalization, where, following the legacy of Herder, their literary output is thought to play some 
generative role in the building of the nation. Casanova is concerned in particular with how certain 
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authors “succeed” in denationalization, become cosmopolitan figures of world culture, and are no 
longer limited in their perception as “merely” representative of national literary traditions: “the 
writers who seek greater freedom for their work are those who know the laws of world literary 
space and who make use of them in trying to subvert the dominant forms of their respective 
national fields” (109). In Russian literature, for example, one could argue that a figure such as 
Vladimir Nabokov has denationalized, whereas Vladislav Khodasevich, for example, or even Ivan 
Bunin, despite winning the Nobel Prize in Literature, remain stubbornly “Russian” authors in the 
global literary imagination. 
While Casanova lists several major metropoles and dominant literary cultures (notably 
including Moscow), the most obvious dominant space in the twentieth century is Paris. It was 
there, at the epicenter of the great modernist experiment, that an ever-changing cast of émigrés 
figures came to experiment in form and challenge the doxa of their home traditions. Thus, the 
modernist art critic Harold Rosenberg described interwar Paris as the following: 
 Yet up to the day of the occupation, Paris had been the Holy Place of our time. The only 
one. Not because of its affirmative genius alone, but perhaps, on the contrary, through its 
passivity, which allowed it to be possessed by the searchers of every nation. By Picasso 
and Juan Gris, Spaniards; by Modigliani, Boccioni and Severini, Italians; by Brancusi, 
Romanian; by Joyce, Irishman; by Mondrian, Dutchman; by Lipchitz, Polish Lithuanian; 
by Archipenko, Kandinsky, Diaghilev, Larionov, Russians; by Calder, Pound, Gertrude 
Stein, Man Ray, Americans; by Kupka, Czechoslovak; Lehmbruck and Max Ernst, 
Germans; by Wyndham Lewis and T. E. Hulme, Englishmen…by all artists, students, 
refugees. (209-210) 
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It was only in the most dominating cultural metropoles that figures of less cosmopolitan origin 
were able to achieve the sought-after designation of the “universal” — “in the ‘School of Paris,’ 
belonging to no one country, but world-wide and world-timed and pertinent everywhere, the mind 
of the twentieth-century projected itself into possibilities that will occupy mankind during many 
cycles of social adventure to come” (Rosenberg 211). 
Casanova has made the case for a mapping of cultural capital for literature. I argue that 
similar models can and ought to be considered for the circulation of philosophical texts. Resistance 
to this method in the study of philosophy perhaps lies in the very nature of philosophy as a 
discipline, where truth claims are often thought, at least theoretically, to transcend any allegiances 
to cultural specificity. Any scholar of Russian philosophy, however, understands all too well the 
role that politics and the censorship of publication, the choice of language and reading audience, 
and the specificity of cultural citations play in the proliferation and estimation of philosophical 
works. In the context of interwar Paris, moreover, one is faced with the historical fact of a nearly 
complete expulsion of the Russian philosophical tradition from Russia and into diasporic France. 
These expelled Russian philosophers would not cease their work, but instead left behind an 
astonishingly productive legacy that still informs most definitions of Russian philosophy as a 
discipline. It is almost certainly in this window of time, between the waves of Russian emigration 
post-revolution and the Second World War, that one can best see how a world republic of 
philosophical letters informs our ideas of what (and who) constitute a national philosophy. The 
topic of this dissertation, Alexandre Kojève, born Aleksandr Kozhevnikov in Moscow, has 
transcended the designation of a national philosopher; numerous Russian philosophers with him 
in Paris and Heidelberg, several of the most prolific in Russian history and the most respected in 
Russia today, have not. Underneath this paradox lies not a question of individual talent but instead 
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an intricate story of the circulation, proliferation, and translation of the work of these philosophers, 
complicated all the more so by the cultural politics of the Cold War. 
This dissertation is therefore an attempt to make sense of that story. I approach the 
philosophy of Alexandre Kojève through the liminal exchanges laid bare in his work—I have tried, 
in varying degrees, to unearth how a transferal of ideas across cultural, and political, borders gave 
birth to Kojève’s unique philosophical legacy. These transferals are broad and (sometimes) 
multidirectional. They include the Russian philosophical canon’s adoption of (and reaction 
against) the German philosophical tradition at the moment of its modern emergence; the distancing 
of Kojève’s philosophical generation from its more religious, arguably more “Russian” 
predecessors; the absorption of Russian philosophical problematics into French post-war 
philosophy through Kojève; and the reintegration of Kojève and diasporic Russian philosophy into 
contemporary Russian cultural life in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
Each of these exchanges has in some way involved questions of translation, transnational 
publication, and even geopolitical intrigue. They illustrate how an understanding of national 
(Russian) philosophy has informed Kojève’s legacy, even if, for him, the question of writing for a 
nationally-defined audience never seemed particularly important. Instead, one can see parallel 
developments with Russian philosophers writing in the diaspora: some, writing in Russian, 
referencing explicitly their Russian legacy, continued to develop a national tradition in exile, their 
works written in the shadow of a country they no longer recognized. Others, including Kojève, 
successfully entered into the evasive “denationalized space” of cosmopolitan Paris, a world 
republic of philosophical letters in which their works were perceived as universal and uninformed 
by any limiting national context. In what follows, I am interested in both the affinities between 
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these two loosely defined groups of Russian philosophers, as well as the geopolitical and historical 
factors that continue to separate them. 
The dissertation is divided into two halves: the first half discusses Kojève’s legacy from a 
philosophical perspective, whereas the second half is devoted to Kojève through the lens of 
twentieth and twenty-first century political thought. I have decided on this division given an 
already existent bifurcation in his legacy: some know of Kojève solely through his philosophy, 
while others are aware of him from his influence in politics, and only rarely are these two groups 
placed in dialogue with one another. Arguably this, too, has prevented an adequate assessment of 
his work. 
The first chapter addresses the question of Kojève and Russian philosophy more broadly. 
I discuss the challenges in delineating a Russian philosophical canon, as well as debates 
surrounding “which” Russian philosophy one can find in Kojève’s writings. I have chosen to 
approach this problematic through an analysis of Kojève’s work on atheism, as I have found one 
of the greatest paradoxes of his status in the Russian émigré community in Paris to be his atheist 
philosophy, in comparison to the vast majority of Russian philosophers working through the 
theological tradition of Russian Orthodoxy. The question of secular versus theist philosophy has 
long haunted Russian philosophical history, and the return to it in diaspora with Kojève is fitting. 
The second chapter is devoted to Kojève’s most famous legacy: his seminars on Hegel, 
delivered in Paris in the 1930s. I compare here the long tradition of non-erotic desire in Russian 
religious philosophy to the unique philosophy of desire inaugurated by Kojève in these seminars. 
This chapter is devoted to the question of a transposition of themes germane to Russian philosophy 
into the circles surrounding Kojève’s seminars in interwar France. Of particular concern there is 
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the question of intersubjectivity, the Self and the Other, and how this could move from Russian 
religious thought into a reigning paradigm for French philosophy in Kojève’s wake. 
In the third chapter, I move to the question of politics. Kojève’s reception in political 
thought has been somewhat controversial. He is viewed in according with two lines of thought: 
through his citation by Francis Fukuyama, he has become the reigning ideologue of teleological 
political thinking, where history is understood as a singular trajectory toward a final political 
system (for Fukuyama, neoliberal democracy). Nearly simultaneously, however, Kojève is often 
cited in the spiritual lineage of Carl Schmitt, who understood the very essence of politics as an 
insurmountable conflict between “us” and “them,” thereby denying the possibility of an end of 
history. I examine Kojève’s role in these two competing views, particularly as they are expressed 
within and across the geopolitical divide of the Cold War. Indeed, as I illustrate, the most 
fascinating aspect of Kojève’s participation in this split is his capacity to speak to these positions 
in both Russo-Soviet and American/Western debates. 
The final chapter is an attempt to look beyond these political formulations of the Cold War. 
I examine here the use of Kojève in Russian philosophy today, as seen in the works of Artemy 
Magun, Sergei Prozorov, Alexey Rutkevich, and Oksana Timofeeva. I am particularly interested 
here in the attempt to overcome teleological aspects of Kojève’s work, given a widespread cultural 
exhaustion with the idea of historical utopianism. Since I am discussing here the contemporary, 
this chapter is necessarily the most speculative. I nevertheless claim that an examination of Kojève 
and philosophy in a post-socialist context is particularly apt for identifying the current challenges 
in thinking a radical politics more globally: disintegration of overarching political narratives of the 
twentieth century becomes fully expressed in the need for Russian philosophers to rethink 
traditional Marxist narratives of emancipation. 
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Lastly, this dissertation should not be thought of as a comprehensive study of Alexandre 
Kojève as a philosopher. In researching his legacy, I have often thought that an exhaustive study 
of Kojève would necessitate a study of the entirety of twentieth century thought itself. Instead, I 
have hoped to reflect the impressive diversity of interpretations of this admittedly difficult 
philosopher, who consistently seems to evade facile definitions and challenge our base 
assumptions. If I have left any gaps or have been inattentive to certain aspects of Kojève’s legacy, 
it has been done in order to express more fully the productive tension between national and 
transnational thinking in Kojève and his philosophy. 
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1.0 Kojève, Russian Philosophy, and the Atheist Religion 
What is Alexandre Kojève’s relationship to Russian philosophy in diaspora? To answer the 
question, one must pose another: which Russian philosophy? The challenges of defining Russian 
philosophy have long plagued Russian intellectual history: indeed, Russian philosophy is not only 
a mythological tradition of introspection on the “Russian soul,” a tradition whose religious 
speculation has led to both its enduring appeal as an alternative to allegedly more rationalist 
Western thought and as well as its denigration as an exoticized national stereotype. Alyssa 
DeBlasio defines this specific definition of Russian philosophy as the following:  
 First, it is always religious, never secular. Second, its style of inquiry is literary, not 
analytic. Third, we are told that the Russian philosophical tradition has roots as far back as 
Byzantium. Deviations along the way, such as the Soviet period, are seen as a result of 
external or hostile forces rather than as part of a broader intellectual continuity. (End of 
Russian Philosophy 16) 
DeBlasio, however, makes the pragmatic distinction of delineating this tradition (“Russian 
philosophy”) from the larger category of “philosophy practiced in Russia,” which can usefully 
incorporate arguably less characteristic philosophical schools (e.g., analytic philosophy, or the 
large and diverse corpus of dialectical materialism) in its description of the discipline.  
This dissertation does not lay claim to a new or even concrete definition of Russian 
philosophy and the competing canonical traditions within it. Instead, I argue that the history of a 
philosopher such as Alexandre Kojève brings to light the very challenges in delineating a national 
intellectual tradition. Is Russian philosophy, for example, philosophy conducted in the Russian 
language, or on the territory of the (past/present) Russian empire or Soviet Union? Kojève would 
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fail this litmus test in both respects, yet curiously enough so would some of the most canonical 
figures of the Russian tradition—be it the Russian philosophers writing in French or German in 
the nineteenth-century (Chaadaev, Belinskii, Herzen), or the prolific modern Russian philosophers 
of the early twentieth-century, who frequently wrote in Russian but in the position of forced 
emigration, in Berlin, Paris, or Harbin. This is to say nothing of the inclusion in the Russian 
philosophical canon of ethnically non-Russian philosophers from Russian or Soviet spheres of 
influence, such as the Georgian Merab Mamardashvili,1 or the recent controversy surrounding 
Immanuel Kant’s birthplace in Kaliningrad (then Königsberg, Prussia) and the very suitability of 
recognizing his origins in a now Russian city.2 
The “question” of Russian philosophy, and Kojève’s inheritance of it, must therefore be 
addressed thematically, rather than ethnically, geographically, or linguistically. G.M. Hamburg 
and Randall Poole, for example, argue that Russian philosophy is thematically best understood as 
a rich tradition of “religious humanism,” while admitting that several canonical Russian 
philosophers must therefore be excluded from this definition (5).  This thematic approach, too, 
however, poses difficulties with respect to Kojève. In his recent work on Kojève and Russian 
philosophy, Jeff Love has found this thematic influence in the “Platonic notion of perfection or 
divinization that has played such an important role in Russian religious thought,” using the concept 
of humanist, spiritual perfection as a springboard to analyze Kojève’s inheritance of Russian 
concerns for Sophia and divine humanity (Black Circle 3-4). Love has in mind the tradition 
                                                 
1 DeBlasio has recently published a book devoted to Mamardashvili and his legacy as it relates to a generation of 
Russian film production. See Alyssa DeBlasio, The Filmmaker's Philosopher: Merab Mamardashvili and Russian 
Cinema (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019). 
2 Various Russian inhabitants of Kaliningrad rejected efforts to rename the local airport in honor of the philosopher. 
While public opinion seemed split on the issue, critics claimed (without evidence) that Kant had at one point 
disparaged Russia, and a plaque commemorating his former home in the city was vandalized. “No you Kant: Russians 
reject German thinker’s name for airport.” BBC, 4 December 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
46440713. Accessed 20 May 2019. 
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described by DeBlasio above, moving from Neo-Platonism within Russian Orthodox theology into 
the eschatological religious philosophies of such figures as Vladimir Solov'ev and Nikolai 
Fedorov. Love’s analysis of Russian influences, however, largely ends with the nineteenth-
century, leaving the field to future scholars who would address the prolific output of Russian 
religious philosophy in the early twentieth-century and Kojève’s presumed direct contact with both 
these works and the philosophers who wrote them. 
Furthermore, when juxtaposing Kojève to his Russian contemporaries, both first in Russia 
and later in diaspora, one is struck by the incongruency of Kojève’s atheism and anti-humanism 
in comparison to the deeply religious Russian circles in which the philosopher began his 
development. The renaissance of early twentieth-century Russian philosophy, linked intimately to 
a modern reevaluation of Orthodox theology, was largely religious in nature and in direct 
opposition to dominant materialist trends in the nineteenth century. Kojève’s philosophy, however, 
is neither religious nor, to borrow Antoine Arjakovsky’s term, mytho-logical.3 It nevertheless 
borrows heavily from this tradition, responding directly to Russian religious philosophy’s debates 
on love, eschatology, and subjectivity, all germane to the writings of his fin-de-siècle peers.  
In the broader context of Russian philosophy’s relationship to theology, Kojève’s 
philosophy, as a transition from religiously oriented Russian thought toward atheism, is 
particularly telling. DeBlasio borrows from Tomáš Masaryk the assumption of a “split” between 
competing religious and secular narratives in Russian intellectual history, each with its own cast 
of characters and ideological parameters, and indeed the history of modern Russian philosophy 
                                                 
3 Arjakovsky defines the “epistemological stance of Russian religious thought” as a synthesis of mythos, understood 
here as intuitive, collective symbolism, and logos: “[t]he mytho-logy of Russian thought, then, is a personal and 
generational immersion in the space that stretches between poetic or religious myth, and thought. Mytho-logy is the 
living relationship of myth and thought, that is, an event, or in Russian, so-bytie—‘a being-with,’ an encounter” (32). 
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has often been marked by oscillations and contestations between theism, atheism, and back again. 
Kojève appears to take inspiration from these disparate lineages, both operative in Russian 
philosophy, leaving the question of theological influence on his work a continuous, and 
unresolved, source of tension in critical literature on the atheist philosopher. In order therefore to 
approach Kojève’s relationship to Russian philosophy as a thematic question, this chapter is 
structured around a deceptively facile question: why did Alexandre Kojève become an atheist 
philosopher? 
1.1 Kojève and the Two-Faced Janus 
In what is frequently cited as one genesis of modern Russian philosophy in the early 
nineteenth-century, two philosophical camps emerged in response to an infamous letter by Petr 
Chaadaev, in which the Russian philosopher criticized Russia’s national ambivalence toward 
larger (European) intellectual and sociopolitical history. Chaadaev’s provocation that “we 
[Russians] belong to none of the great families of mankind; we are neither of the West nor of the 
East, and we possess the traditions of neither” led to the formation of two major camps amongst 
Russian figures of the 1830-40s, each of which sought to explain Russian intellectual history’s 
particular divergences from Europe (323).4 
In one camp, those who came to be known as “Westernizers,” such as Aleksandr Herzen 
and Vissarion Belinskii, developed a materialist, socially critical, realist tradition which involved 
an entire generation’s disavowal of their previous theological training—many adherents of this 
                                                 
4 “мы не принадлежим ни к одному из известных семейств человеческого рода, ни к Западу, ни к Востоку, и 
не имеем традиций ни того, ни другого.” 
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“line,” such as Nikolai Chernyshevskii and Nikolai Dobroliubov, were educated in seminaries, yet 
came only later to prominence in (proto-) socialist intellectual circles and publications.  In the 
looming shadow of the 1848 revolutions, and taking inspiration from Fourier, Saint Simon, and 
the still-emerging Left Hegelians, Westernizers sought pan-European solutions to stagnancy in the 
Russian Empire, understanding the particularities of Russian social conditions as historic and 
economic rather than nationally or spiritually essentialist. 
In opposition, Slavophiles, such as Ivan Aksakov, Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevskii, 
would advocate for an organicist model of Russian culture and society grounded in an 
“authentically Russian” spiritualism. Often choosing Schelling instead of Hegel as their 
philosophical interlocutor, their political posturing frequently eschewed rationalism and secular 
individualism as categories contingent to European history and therefore inapplicable to Russia 
and its unique development. They emphasized instead brotherhood and mystic unity in what 
Sergey Horujy refers to, tongue in cheek, as Slavophilism’s “cult of the commune” (“Slavophiles, 
Westernizers” 33). Slavophile ideas would regain prevalence several decades later in the 
renaissance of Russian religious philosophy, when, in the “crisis of positivism” at the fin-de-siècle, 
several leading members of the intelligentsia, including Kojève’s direct predecessors and 
interlocutors, would again reverse course, this time abandoning Marxism and materialism in the 
pursuit of a modernized understanding of Orthodox Christian idealism with its respect for love and 
personhood.  
While untold ink has since been spilled on this division between Westernizers and 
Slavophiles, and its generative role in Russian intellectual history, not only do the two lineages 
share a common point of origin, but their ideological borders were and remain porous, with figures 
in both camps regularly undergoing ideological (and, quite literally, religious) conversion and 
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undermining the proclaimed unifying principles of the respective movements. For this reason, 
Herzen once aptly referred to the Westernizer/Slavophile divide as “like the two-faced Janus or 
the two-headed eagle, which stared into opposite sides while its heart beat as one” (Byloe i dumy 
170).5  
Herzen’s own career is a telling example of such oscillation. Often referred to as the “father 
of Russian socialism,” Herzen’s philosophical development parallels the larger evolution amongst 
Russian intelligentsia toward critical, materialist atheism in the “Remarkable Decade.”6 His 
evolution through German idealist philosophers reflects a trajectory typical of many of his 
Westernizer peers in the first half of the nineteenth-century, gradually with each new influence 
losing any theological inflections to his work: Herzen first moved from Schiller, through Schelling, 
and ultimately to Hegel and Feuerbach, at which point he transitioned toward what Martin Malia 
refers to as his “realist” philosophy: 
 By its very structure, Hegel’s thought lent itself to a breakdown of [German] idealism in a 
way the philosophies of his predecessors did not. Hence the problem of his role in 
idealism’s collapse in Russia is simply a special case of his role in its disintegration all of 
Europe east of the Rhine. Bakunin, Belinski, and Herzen in their use of Hegel were simply 
paralleling the similar, although more complex, developments of Strauss, Bauer, 
Feuerbach, Ruge, Stirner, and ultimately Marx during the same period in Germany. An 
identical problem is posed by the same development in both countries: why could a turn to 
realism be effected only through the circuitous path of idealism; why should social 
                                                 
5 “как двуликий Янус или как двуглавый орел, смотрели в разные стороны, в то время как сердце билось одно.” 
6 The term “Remarkable Decade” (“Znamichatel'noe desiatiletie”) refers to the 1830-40s and its incredibly productive 
intellectual contributions, producing some of the most significant Russian thinkers of the nineteenth century. Pavel 
Annenkov coined the term in his memoirs published in 1880. 
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radicalism take its origin in metaphysics rather than in direct examination of the ills of 
society? The relation between the two problems is more than fortuitous, and the fact that 
social radicalism in both countries had to be sublimated into metaphysics before it could 
become an active movement left an indelible mark on that movement once it finally 
emerged. (228-229, emphasis added) 
As Malia argues, Herzen’s route to materialism had necessarily passed through a “breakdown” of 
German idealism, from which the Russian materialist tradition ultimately was unable to divorce 
itself fully. This incomplete move from a (very often) religiously inflected idealism into an 
explicitly atheist materialism left its “indelible mark” in the equivocal exchanges between religious 
and non-religious trends in Russian philosophy more broadly.  
In Herzen’s most characteristically Hegelian phase, namely his “On Dilettantism in 
Science” (1842-43) and “Letters on the Study of Nature” (1845), the Russian philosopher heralds 
Hegel as the “first instance of a scientific exposition of natural science” who is nevertheless still 
tethered to the supremacy of reason and idealism’s predilection toward a unification of subjective 
thought and being:  
 The idealism with which Hegel was raised, which he drank in with his mother’s milk, drags 
him back to that one-sidedness which he himself had executed. He attempts to suppress 
nature through logic, through spirit […] Hegel begins with the abstract sphere so as to 
arrive at concrete spheres; but the abstract presupposes the concrete from which they have 
been abstracted. […] Hegel treated however nature and history as applied logic rather than 
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logic as the abstract wisdom of nature and history. (“Diletantizm” 119-120, emphasis in 
original)7 
Hegel, Herzen argues, progressed significantly toward understanding nature and history 
materially, that is, as determined by its own concrete laws, yet Hegel’s philosophy ultimately 
deferred to reason and therefore was insufficiently materialist in its analysis: the abstract still 
presupposed the concrete rather than vice versa, so that Hegel remained an idealist in the strictest 
sense of the word. 
Herzen’s ultimate break with Hegel reflected a larger, pan-European break with a 
philosophical Weltanschauung that was unwilling to distinguish fully the outer world and nature 
from a subjective mind that constituted it. Put differently, Malia argues that Hegel’s flirtation with 
materialism proved dissatisfactory for his inheritors, who would acknowledge his influence on 
their own work while simultaneously using him as a stepping stone away from idealism and into 
materialism: “[i]n Herzen’s hands idealism was transformed from a philosophy of withdrawal into 
a philosophy of action” (238).  In this regard, the particularly warm, if still critical, reception of 
Herzen’s philosophy amongst later Russian Marxists is particularly telling. As Lenin described 
him, Herzen “assimilated Hegel’s dialectics. He understood that it was the ‘algebra of revolution.’ 
He went further than Hegel, following Feuerbach to materialism” (256).8 Lenin nonetheless 
chastised Herzen for not moving beyond the bourgeois mentality that tainted the minds of those 
who would interpret Hegel as a reflection of the ideology of the French revolution (a mentality, 
                                                 
7 “идеализм, в котором он был воспитан, который он всосал с молоком, срывает его в односторонность, 
казненную им самим, — и он старается подавить духом, логикою — природу. […] Гегель начинает с 
отвлеченных сфер для того, чтоб дойти до конкретных; но отвлеченные сферы предполагают конкретное, от 
которого они отвлечены […] Но Гегель хотел природу и историю как прикладную логику, а не логику как 
отвлеченную разумность природы и истории.” 
8 “Он усвоил диалектику Гегеля. Он понял, что она представляет из себя «алгебру революции». Он пошел 
дальше Гегеля, к материализму, вслед за Фейербахом.” 
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for that matter, similar to Kojève’s). Georgii Plekhanov also heralded Herzen’s development of 
dialectics, but he criticized the philosopher’s uncritical adherence to Hegel’s logical absolute 
idealism: “[f]rom time to time he [Herzen] happens to place his footing on firm ‘realistic’ 
grounding, but more often than not he places it on the very grounding of idealism, which he 
considers necessary to abandon” (360).9 He stated further that: 
 Under the impression of these excerpts [from Herzen] it is easy to think that they were 
written not in the early 1840s but in the second half of the 1870s, and moreover not by 
Herzen but by Engels. To this extent the ideas of the first resemble the ideas of the second. 
This striking resemblance illustrates that Herzen’s thought was working toward the same 
direction as Engels and, thus, Marx. Not without reason did Herzen pass through the same 
school of Hegelianism through which the founders of scientific socialism passed nearly 
simultaneously. The main difference, a considerable one, is that Herzen’s dialectics 
remained idealist, whereas Engels and Marx’s were already materialist. (377)10 
Kojève’s relationship to Herzen and the “Westernizer” tradition begun in the mid-nineteenth-
century is rather obscure, given that the Franco-Russian philosopher never directly cites the lineage 
in his work. What unites Kojève with figures such as Herzen is nevertheless a direct, if incomplete, 
opposition to and evolution from the idealist trends in Russian philosophy directly preceding them. 
Alexey Rutkevich, for example, affiliates Kojève with this line of Russian Young Hegelians: 
                                                 
9 “Время от времени ему случается поставить ногу на твердую «реалистическую» почву; но чаще всего он 
ставит ее на ту самую почву идеализма, которую он находит нужным покинуть.” 
10 “Под впечатлением всех этих отрывков легко можно подумать, что они написаны не в начале 40-х годов, а 
во второй половине 70-х, и притом не Герценом, а Энгельсом. До такой степени мысли первого похожи на 
мысли второго. А это поразительное сходство показывает, что ум Герцена работал в том самом направлении, 
в каком работал ум Энгельса, а, стало быть, и Маркса. Недаром Герцен проходил ту же школу Гегеля, через 
которую прошли почти одновременно с ним основатели научного социализма. Разница лишь в том, — и это, 
конечно, весьма существенная разница, — что диалектика Герцена оставалась идеалистической, а диалектика 
Энгельса-Маркса была уже материалистической.” 
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“Russian Young Hegelianism, in the works of representatives such as Alexander Herzen (a reader 
of Phenomenology of Spirit) and Mikhail Bakunin, at least partially finds echo in Kojève’s Neo-
Hegelianism […] Kojève was an inheritor specifically of Left Young Hegelianism, and not the 
German but Russian version” (“Formirovanie,” 15-16).11 He cites12 as support Annett Jubara’s 
claim that Kojève “defends Left Hegelianism from Solov'evian rebuke,” namely the Silver Age 
effort led by philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev to wrench Russian philosophy away from its decades-
long recalcitrant positivism (Jubara, 398).13   
These claims to camaraderie of thought between Kojève and the Russian materialist 
Hegelians are considerably complicated, however, not only by Kojève’s silence on the issue but 
also by the consistency with which Kojève engages instead with Russian religious philosophy: it 
is, after all, Vladimir Solov'ev, and neither Herzen, Bakunin, nor any other materialist Russian 
philosophers, whom Kojève chooses as his argumentative intertexts, most importantly devoting 
his university dissertation to the religious philosopher. Kojève is both a rejection of the religious 
metaphysics found in modern Russian philosophy before him as well as a continuation of Russian 
philosophy’s cyclical movement through idealism and materialism, secularism and religiosity. It 
is necessary therefore to position Kojève within this larger negotiation in Russian thought, 
beginning in the late nineteenth-century and culminating in the early twentieth, between a 
theologically-inflected (Orthodox) philosophical tradition and an atheist, materialist one. Kojève’s 
work, I argue, signals a “secularization” of Russian philosophical categories that had, in the 
                                                 
11 “Русское младогегельянство, представленное трудами как А. И. Герцена (почитателя «Феноменологии 
духа»), так и М. А. Бакунина, хотя бы отчасти нашло отзвук в неогегельянстве Кожева. […] А Кожев был 
наследником именно левого младогегельянства, причем не столько немецкой, сколько русской его версии.” 
12 In perhaps a telling citational error, Rutkevich mistakenly identifies Jubara’s work as that of Boris Groys, whose 
work on Kojève has also attempted to discuss Kojève’s radicalism vis-à-vis his religious philosophy interlocutors. 
13 “Идея конца истории Кожева фактически реабилитирует левогегельянское понимание истории, защищая 
его от упреков со стороны соловьевской критики, доказывающей, что такое понимание не является 
человекобожеством.” 
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preceding generation, been elaborated theologically, in a sense sublating the divisions that had 
defined Russian intellectual history more broadly before him.  
Perhaps most significantly, this sublation emerges at a pivotal crossroads in early 
twentieth-century thought: the interwar Russian diaspora, a “third space” both between Russian 
and Soviet philosophical discourses as well as between Western and Eastern intellectual traditions 
in the aftermath of mass emigration and social upheaval. The theological shift represented in 
Kojève’s thought is particularly significant for understanding his legacy in modern intellectual 
history: it is indeed impossible to grasp the uniqueness of his formulation of the end of history, the 
disappearance or death of man, and his articulation of the desire of the Other without addressing 
their connection to larger debates, germane to modern Russian thought, on the border of the secular 
and theological. 
1.2 The Theology of Revolutions, 1905 & 1917 
Before emigrating to Western Europe (Germany, then France) in 1921, Kojève’s youth was 
spent in the intellectual circles of Moscow and St. Petersburg. These circles were fueled by the 
cultural flourishing of what Nicolas Zernov famously termed the “Russian Religious Renaissance” 
of the fin-die-siècle. Zernov argued that the Russian intelligentsia had been largely opposed, both 
historically and sociologically, to the Orthodox church, which it dismissed as “part of the old order 
which had failed to check the growth of autocracy and so had perpetuated the injustice and 
inequality of Russia’s political system” (6). To borrow Isaiah Berlin’s characterization of the 
historical intelligentsia, it was: 
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 a small group of littérateurs, both professional and amateur, conscious of being alone in a 
bleak world, with a hostile and arbitrary government on the one hand, and a completely 
uncomprehending mass of oppressed and articulate peasants on the other, conceiving of 
themselves as a kind of self-conscious army, carrying a banner for all to see—of reason 
and science, of liberty, of a better life. (Russian Thinkers 126) 
The intelligentsia, at least traditionally, found itself in a position of institutional critique in the 
nineteenth century, with the church, and by extension religion, a frequent target for its complicity 
with corrupt governmental rule. The shape of the intelligentsia would undergo a massive 
transformation, however, at the end of the century, with the growing realization of its own 
estrangement from the very Russian masses for which it claimed to speak. A result of this shift 
became a dramatic reevaluation of their long-held religious skepticism. 
In Saint Petersburg, the Religio-Philosophical Society (1901-1903), formed by Dmitrii 
Merezhkovsky and Zinaida Gippius, became a significant meeting place for these two intellectual 
lineages, “where the spokesmen of the Church met representatives of the intelligentsia for frank 
discussions of topics never raised before on public occasions” (Zernov 95). The culminative event, 
however, of this shift toward religious consciousness within the Russian intelligentsia became the 
publication of Problems of Idealism (Problemy idealizma, 1902) and Signposts (Vekhi, 1909), two 
widely read essay collections that declared openly their disapproval of socialism and revolutionary 
fervor, promoting instead a new, conciliatory liberalism bound up in “religious humanism.” The 
writers, with few exceptions the same for both publications, argued that socialism had largely 
failed in its effort to bridge the wide gap between intelligentsia and the masses in Russian civil 
society, and that part of its failure lay in a refusal to speak to the (spiritual) values of the average 
Russian or narod. In the preface to the first edition of Signposts, editor Mikhail Gershenzon 
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attributes the volume’s emergence to the “defeat of the intelligentsia” in the failed 1905 revolution 
several years earlier: 
 The revolution of 1905-06 and the events that followed it served as a nation-wide test of 
those values which our social thought had preserved for more than half a century as 
something of the utmost sanctity. Long before the revolution, a few minds, working 
deductively, had clearly perceived the error of these spiritual principles. (46)14 
Gershenzon had in mind specifically “those spiritual values” upheld by the Russian intelligentsia’s 
tradition of materialism, socialism, and secular critique. The time had come, so the volume’s 
writers argued, for a midway point between the excesses of autocratic rule and that of radical social 
thought unintelligible to the masses. The result was a brief, if impactful, re-articulation of liberal 
democracy within the Russian intelligentsia of the early twentieth century. Indeed, these two 
volumes, taken with the later Out of the Depths (Iz glubiny, 1918), “bring into focus the issues the 
liberal intelligentsia confronted in its bid to overcome the obstacles presented, on the one hand, by 
the tradition of autocratic rule, and by the lure of positive liberty and Bolshevik utopianism, on the 
other” (Nethercott 252).  
On a political level, the perceived failures of 1905 signaled that the confidence with which 
the socially-minded Russian intelligentsia had heralded political reform was dramatically 
misplaced. On a philosophical and religious level, moreover, the contributors to the volumes called 
for a radical break from entrenched materialist philosophy, with larger repercussions for the role 
of “intellectual life” in Russia more broadly. In a fashion both remarkably self-aware and self-
                                                 
14 “Революция 1905-6 гг. и последовавшие за нею события явились как бы всенародным испытанием тех 
ценностей, которые более полувека как высшую святыню блюла наша общественная мысль. Отдельные умы 
уже задолго до революции ясно видели ошибочность этих духовных начал, исходя из априорных 
соображений.” 
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aggrandizing, the contributors to Signposts set for themselves the task of rethinking the role of the 
intelligentsia, and its erroneously non-spiritual values, in:  
 the recognition of the theoretical and practical primacy of spiritual life over the external 
forms of community, in the sense that the individual’s inner life is the sole creative force 
of human existence, and that this inner life, and not the self-sufficient principles of the 
political order, constitutes the only solid basis on which a society can be built. From this 
point of view, the Russian intelligentsia’s ideology, which rests entirely on the opposite 
principle — on the recognition of the unconditional primacy of social forms — appears to 
the contributors to this volume as inherently erroneous and futile in practice. That is, it 
contradicts the nature of the human spirit and is practically incapable of achieving the goal 
which the intelligentsia has set for itself, the emancipation of the people. (Gershenzon 46-
47)15 
While the volumes are often thought of as a turning point in Russian intellectual history, the shift 
to which they lay claim had been fermented much early. Well before both Russian revolutions, 
members of the Russian intelligentsia had already significantly shifted from materialist positivism 
in a return to philosophical idealism.  
The philosophy of Vladimir Solov'ev, on whom Kojève wrote his university dissertation, 
was an important early transition in this direction. In his time, Solov'ev’s religious philosophy was 
relatively marginal, yet in the years after his death his philosophy would come to define the unique 
                                                 
15 “признание теоретического и практического первенства духовной жизни над внешними формами 
общежития, в том смысле, что внутренняя жизнь личности есть единственная творческая сила человеческого 
бытия и что она, а не самодовлеющие начала политического порядка является единственно прочным базисом 
для всякого общественного строительства. С этой точкой зрения идеология русской интеллигенции, всецело 
покоящаяся на противоположном принципе — на признании безусловного примата общественных форм, — 
представляется участникам книги внутренне ошибочной, т.е. противоречащей естеству человеческого духа, и 
практически бесплодной, т.е. неспособной привести к той цели, которую ставила себе сама интеллигенция, 
— к особождению народа.” 
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contours of Russian religious philosophy, for both his followers and critics alike. His first major 
work, The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists (1874), was described by Nikolai 
Lossky as one of the earliest formulations of Russian philosophy’s unique features: “an exhaustive 
knowledge of reality as a whole and the concreteness of metaphysical conceptions” (95). Kojève 
himself described the Crisis as aiming “toward a religious-metaphysical, comprehensive 
philosophical system, the formation of which is anticipated in the near future and on Russian soil” 
(“Die Geschichtsphilosophie” 4).16 Solovʹev in this work, his Master’s thesis, characterized 
Western philosophy as a historical progression toward rationalism, culminating in Hegel, and 
dissolving into the positivist/empiricist trends of the late nineteenth-century. Solovʹev criticized 
what he saw as the one-sidedness of Hegel’s rational idealism, which in Solovʹev’s view led to an 
equally unbalanced approach amongst the Left Hegelians and empiricists who inverted the 
Hegelian dialectic: 
Hegel, rejecting all immediate content, recognized only the formal or logical side to be 
real. Such a clear one-sidedness inevitably provoked, as we have already shown, a reaction 
in the opposite, just as one-sided, direction. Considering the absolute form of logical 
philosophy to be an empty abstraction, one began to search for a purely immediate, 
empirically given content, without understanding that content taken separately from its 
logical form is just as empty an abstraction, and to recognize it as that which truly exists is 
a similar hypostasization of an abstraction. (“Krizis” 99)17 
                                                 
16 “ein religiös metaphysisches allumfassendes philosophisches System […], dessen Entstehung in naher Zukunft, und 
zwar auf russischem Boden zu erwarten ist.” 
17 “Гегель сознательно признал действительность за одною формальной или логическою стороною, отрицая 
всякое непосредственное содержание. Такая слишком ясная односторонность, как было прежде нами 
показано, необходимо вызвала реакцию в противоположном, столь же одностороннем, направлении: 
признавши абсолютную форму логической филосфоии за пустую отвлеченность, стали искать чисто 
непосредственного, эмпиричеси-данного содержания, не понимая, что содердание отдельно от своей 
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One can easily see Solov'ev’s critique leveled at the materialist philosophy developed by 
philosophers such as Herzen. While not a Slavophile (Losev, Vladimir Solovʹev 120-121), Solovʹev 
nonetheless reiterates Slavophile Khomiakov’s own accusations of “abstract panlogism” in Hegel 
(Lossky, History 32).18 Like Khomiakov and Kireevskii before him, Solovʹev sought an Orthodox-
based Hegelian Absolute, this time described by Solovʹev as the all-in-oneness or pan-unity 
(vseedinstvo): as Judith Deutsch Kornblatt describes, “the multiple elements (vse, or all) retain 
their integrity while creating a new whole (edinstvo, or oneness/wholeness)” (33). Inspired by the 
Slavophile critique of Kant’s epistemological turn, where reason cannot know noumena as they 
are in themselves, Solovʹev relied on a Hegel-inspired system of “concretized” idealism, in order 
to return to Russian thought the totality of experience. 
At stake for Solov'ev was a renewed interest in the individual personality as integral and 
comprehensive, resistant to the compartmentalizing metrics of either empirical or positivist 
thought. This, as I will discuss in depth later, led to his most lasting development of Divine 
Humanity or bogochelovechestvo. Spiritual integrality of the individual became the cri de coeur of 
the Russian philosophers of the Religious Renaissance. As Marco Filoni, biographer of Kojève, 
describes it:  
 the religious-philosophical interest of the generation saddling the two centuries was spurred 
by the fact that its intellectuals became aware of a new and transformed conception of 
religion. Religion was no longer an act or a profession of faith in the Christian sense, but 
                                                 
логической формы есть такая же пустая отвлеченность, и признание ее за действительно сущее есть такое же 
гипостазирование абстракта.” 
18 Indeed, in both Westernizer and Slavophile traditions Hegel is accused of one-sidedness, with the former tradition 
advocating for an inversion of Hegel’s dialectic, the material over the abstract, and the latter relying on (religiously 
inflected) intuition and creativity, rather than logic, as a marker of subjectivity and the collective. It is an intriguing 
particularity of Russian religious philosophy that its emphasis on immanent spirituality could so easily align with the 
materialist refutation of Hegelian rationalism found within Marx and other Left Hegelians. Both traditions emphasize 
the totality/wholeness frequently encountered in definitions of Russian philosophy, religious and non-religious. 
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rather was abandoned in favor of a new form of religious feeling linked to the relationship 
of the singular individual to the universal. At the heart of this ‘renaissance’ one finds 
aspects of Schopenhauer and Kant’s aesthetics as well as a growing and enthusiastic 
interest in Nietzsche. (40-41)19  
The vast majority of this generation of Russian philosophers working in Solov'ev’s tradition would 
be, if not executed or internally exiled, forced to leave the Soviet Union for Western Europe—they 
were expelled in 1922 on the infamous “Philosophers’ Ships,” a series of ships that relocated 
hundreds of ideologically anathematic intellectuals from Petrograd to Germany.20 While, even 
before exile, their philosophical activity could not be divorced from its political context, the 
disruptive split from their home country greatly amplified the political implications of Russian 
religious philosophy conducted abroad. 
1.3 Russian Philosophy Moves Abroad 
In this light, Russian philosophy in diaspora, as an immediate interlocutor with Kojève’s 
own work, should be viewed within two political lenses: first, the integration, or lack thereof, of 
Russian philosophers and their work into political debates within Western European intellectual 
                                                 
19 “l’intérêt philosophico-religieux de la génération à cheval entre les deux siècles s’animait du fait que ses intellectuels 
prenaient conscience d’une conception de la religion nouvelle et transformée. Celle-ci n’était plus un acte ou une 
profession de foi, au sens chrétien ; au contraire elle était abandonnée en faveur d’une nouvelle forme de sentiment 
religieux lié au rapport de l’individu singulier avec l’universel. À la base de cette « renaissance » on retrouvait des 
éléments de l’esthétique de Schopenhauer et de Kant, ainsi qu’un intérêt croissant et enthousiaste pour Nietzsche.” 
20 While Kojève fled the Soviet Union in fear of ideological persecution, he was not on board any of the “philosophers’ 
ships.” For more on the “Philosophers’ Ships,” see Lesley Chamberlain, Lenin’s Private War: The Voyage of the 
Philosophy Steamer and the Exile of the Intelligentsia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006). 
 25 
life. Second, and undoubtedly more pervasive, the implicit understanding of their work as a 
response to philosophical and political changes underway in the Soviet Union.  
In the case of the first, one finds Russian religious philosophy’s “entrance” into Western 
European intellectual life at a time of dramatic renegotiation of the relationship between 
Christianity (in particular, Catholicism) and social thought. From Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum 
(On Capital and Labor) in 1891, which expressed support for workers’ rights and labor unions, 
through to the proto-emergence of liberation theology, a fusing of Catholic teachings with Marxist 
thought, in Belgium and France in the 1920s, francophone Catholic thinkers were fully immersed 
in theological debates on labor. Certainly, these debates were in part spurred on by the threat of 
social change posed by the revolutions in Russia, so that the arrival of Russian religious 
philosophers, who themselves had long been negotiating middle ground between autocracy and 
socialism, proved an important and intriguing point of comparison.  
Jacques Maritain, undoubtedly one of the most significant Catholic philosophers of 
twentieth-century France, frequently wrote works inspired by and in direct response to the work 
of émigré philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev, with the two conducting a lively intellectual exchange 
from 1925 until Berdiaev’s death in 1948. In 1926, Pope Pius XI denounced the right-wing 
political movement Action française, which had been advocating for a return to monarchy in 
France and Catholicism as an official state religion. Maritain had long been affiliated with the 
group and was therefore made a subject of scandal in Catholic circles after the Pope’s 
condemnation. In an attempt to make amends with more liberal Catholic theologians, Maritain 
published his Primauté du spiritual (1927), in which he openly declared his break with the 
monarchist group and devoted an entire chapter to the invigorating, democratic spiritualism of 
Russian Orthodoxy and theologians such as Berdiaev (Arjakovsky 156). Arjakovsky argues that 
 26 
Berdiaev, one of the most prolific diasporic Russian philosophers, ironically became for French 
theologians such as Maritain an expert on the intersection of religion and communism—from 
1932-1934 alone, four anthologies of Berdiaev’s works were published in French, and in 1933 he 
was invited to give a talk entitled “Communism and Christianity” to a packed hall of students from 
the Institute of Engineering in Paris (327). 
One of Maritain’s most well-known works, Humanisme intégral (1936), sought, as the 
name suggests, a return to an integral understanding of humanism, one which would connect both 
transcendental (spiritual) and immanent (secular) beliefs in human dignity. Maritain sought in 
anthropological terms “the practical and concrete position of the human creature before God and 
his destiny,” which would come to bridge the gap between merely atheism and merely Christianity 
in the modern world21 (8, emphasis in original). As Maritain describes it: 
 For this Christians must have a sound social philosophy and a sound philosophy of modern 
history. They would therefore work to substitute for the inhuman regime in agony before 
our eyes a new form of civilization, which would be characterized by an integral humanism 
and which would represent for them a new Christendom, no longer sacral but secular or 
lay. (6, emphasis in original)22 
Maritain’s vision of “secular” Christendom bears a strong resemblance to the Solov'ev’s own 
concretized spiritualism. In the conclusion to his Crisis of Western Philosophy, Solov'ev states 
that: 
                                                 
21 “la position pratique et concrète de la créature humaine devant Dieu et devant sa destinée” 
22 “Une saine philosophie sociale et une saine philosophie de l’histoire moderne leur seraient nécessaires pour cela. 
Ils travailleraient alors à substituer au régime inhumain qui agonise sous nos yeux un nouveau régime de civilisation 
qui se caractériserait par un humanisme intégral, et qui représenterait à leurs yeux une nouvelle chrétienté non plus 
sacrale, mais profane, ainsi que nous essayons de le montrer dans les études ici réunies.” 
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 [t]he realization of this universal synthesis of science, philosophy, and religion […] must 
be the supreme goal and ultimate result of intellectual development. The attainment of this 
goal will be the restoration of the complete inner unity of the intellectual world in the 
fulfillment of the testament of ancient wisdom: “Couples are things whole and not whole, 
what is drawn together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and discordant. The 
one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the one.”  (143-144)23 
These thoughts are reiterated, moreover, in Berdiaev’s own numerous writings on spirituality and 
humanism. For example, in his The New Middle Ages, which Arjakovsky describes (147) as 
influencing Maritain so intensely that Maritain himself arranged for its publication in French 
translation, Berdiaev advocates for integral humanist identity as the following: 
 Human identity, like any authentic reality, is only bestowed in spiritual concretization 
acting as a seal of divine unity on all of human multiplicity. It disappears in abstraction and 
isolation. The process of humanism in modern times is man’s passage away from spiritual 
concretization, where everything is organically linked, to divisive abstraction, where man 
transforms into an isolated atom. (41)24 
Berdiaev’s relatively democratic political views, articulated through the post-Solov'ev tradition, 
should not be seen as universal to all Russian religious philosophers working in diaspora. Indeed, 
Russian émigrés professed a dazzlingly diverse set of politic beliefs that would be difficult to 
                                                 
23 “Осуществление этого универсального синтеза науки, философии и релгигии […] должно быть высшею 
целью и последним результатом умственного развития. Достижение этой цели будет востановлением 
совершенного внутреннего единства умственного мира во исполнение завета древней мудрости: Συνάψιες ὅλα 
καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.” The last quotation 
is an apparently well-known fragment from Heraclitus. 
24 “L’identité humaine, comme toute réalité authentique, n’est conférée que dans la concrétion spirituelle qui imprime 
le sceau de l’unité divine sur toute la multiplicité humaine; elle disparaît dans l’abstraction et dans l’isolement. Le 
processus de l’humanisme aux temps modernes est le passage de l’homme de la concrétion spirituelle, où tout est 
organiquement lié, à l’abstraction divisante, où l’homme se transforme en un atome isolé.” 
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generalize, yet what I wish to stress here is the articulation of these political beliefs through a 
specific tradition of Russian religious philosophy. As Arjakovsky correctly argues in regard to the 
Parisian émigré journal The Way, of which Berdiaev served as editor, “the contributors […] 
whether they were monarchists […] or republicans […] fundamentally agreed, at least until 1927, 
on the recognition of the religious sources of the revolution and, hence, the need to vanquish 
Bolshevism by deepening the spirituality of the Russian religious conscience” (53). 
The second, therefore, and far more pervasive political context of Russian émigré 
philosophy abroad was naturally the events underway in the Soviet Union. In Gleb Struve’s 
canonical work on Russian émigré literature, Struve divided the literary activity of the Russian 
diaspora into two waves, the First (1920-24) and Second (1925-1939). Struve argued that the First 
Wave of Russian diaspora was largely concerned with historical continuity with its now-lost 
cultural past. The result was a “cultural contingency plan,” where certain literary, artistic, and 
musical practices could continue, albeit abroad, unbroken by the revolution. Arguably the same 
claim must be made for philosophical production in the Russian diaspora as well—the Russian 
religious philosophers in Paris and France in the early 1920s actively continued their work in the 
pursuit of an unbroken tradition with Russia’s unique philosophical contributions. The opening 
editorial of The Way, for example, defined the goals of the Russian philosophical community in 
Paris as follows: 
 The Russian émigré community, faced with a long tenure outside of its homeland, is at risk 
of dispersion, denationalization, the loss of a link to Russia, to the Russian land and to the 
Russian people. […] Russian émigrés are called to preserve continuity with Russian 
spiritual culture and, to the best of its abilities, contribute to its creative development. […] 
The journal The Way aims to be a spokesperson for the spiritual and religious tasks of the 
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Russian émigré community. It is an Orthodox body and moreover linked to the traditions 
of Russian creative religious thought. The names of Khomiakov, Dostoevsky, Vl. Solov'ev, 
Bukharev, V. Nesmelov, and N. Fyodorov are close and dear to the managers of this 
journal. The idea of Christian freedom was brought to bear by Russian religious thought of 
the nineteenth century, and we must be loyal to it. (“Dukhovnye zadachi,” 10-13)25 
Although the journal began in 1925, later than the period defined by Struve as the First Wave, its 
prerogatives mirror those of the older generation of Russian émigrés, including those exiled on the 
Philosophers’ Ships, who were generally born in the 1870-80s and had already entered a more 
mature phase in their career at the time of relocation.  
By contrast, the Russian Second Wave took on a more autonomous identity. As Leonid 
Livak describes it, “[b]y 1925 it became clear that the new order in Russia was a long-term 
phenomenon […] the need for self-definition grew sharper in the literary diaspora” (5). Conditions 
were quite difficult for the younger generation of Russian writers coming of age, and although 
many grew up and were educated in Western Europe, and were thus bilingual and bicultural, they 
often found themselves working menial jobs. Feeling isolated from the senior cultural 
establishment and their journals, they were often called the “unnoticed generation” of Russian 
emigration (Slobin 27). 
Struve likewise identifies a difference in age, with many of the Second Wave writers, 
having been born around the turn of the century (192). In transitioning now to Kojève’s early 
                                                 
25 “Русской эмиграции при длительном пребывании вне родины грозит распыление, денационализация, потеря 
связи с Россией, с русской землей и русским народом. […] Русская эмиграция призвана хранить 
преемственность русской духовной культуры и в меру сил своих способствовать ее творческому развитию. 
[…] Журнал «Путь» стремится быть выразителем духовных и религиозных задач русской эмиграции. Это есть 
орган православный и вместе с тем связанный с традициями русской творческой религиозной мысли. Имена 
Хомякова, Достоевского, Вл. Соловьева, Бухарева, В. Несмелова, Н. Федорова близки и дороги 
руководителям этого журнала. Идея христианской свободы была выношена русской религиозной мыслью 
XIX века и мы должны быть ей верны.” 
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philosophical work, and its relationship to the Russian diaspora, one must stress the generational 
gap that divides Kojève from figures such as Berdiaev, Sergei Bulgakov, and other philosophers 
of the Philosophers’ Ships generation, including from even his close friend Lev Karsavin. Indeed, 
Kojève’s younger age (born in 1902), the less coercive circumstances of his emigration, and the 
chance therefore at an education abroad must come to bear on any understanding of Kojève’s 
similarities and differences with other Russian philosophers in diaspora.  
I will therefore argue that Kojève, as well as other philosophers of Russian extraction 
working in Western Europe in the period, such as his peer Alexandre Koyré (born 1892), belong 
to a so-called Second Wave of Russian philosophers with a unique set of prerogatives operative in 
their work. One could add, furthermore, a significant addendum to the normative framework of 
diaspora studies, formulated here by Greta Slobin. Slobin divides the Second Wave further, into 
an earlier stage (1925-1929), in which émigré writers realize their need to define borders, and a 
later stage (1930-1939), in which the diaspora achieves self-affirmation, consolidation, and 
“accommodation” within their host countries (16). In this light, Kojève’s (and Koyré’s) 
accommodation into French philosophical history reflects a larger shift toward assimilation and 
integration within Russian diasporic intellectual communities. 
1.4 Immanent Anti-Humanism: Kojève’s Atheism (1931) 
As I mentioned above, the largest “break” between these two generations of Russian 
diasporic philosophers lay in the assumption of a theological underpinning to their philosophies. 
Kojève, in a parallel to the “critical realists” of the nineteenth century, breaks with his theological 
predecessors of the “First Wave,” yet nevertheless his work remains implicitly in conversation 
 31 
with their continuation of Russian religious philosophy abroad. This explains the split, in critical 
literature on Kojève, between evaluations of his work within the more religious tradition of 
Russian philosophy and a more secular one. 
Aleksei Rutkevich, for example, routinely denies any theological underpinning to Kojève’s 
work and has criticized biographers Dominique Auffret and Marco Filoni in this regard. Rutkevich 
finds particularly unbelievable a link both biographers draw to the work of Nikolai Minskii, a 
relatively minor Silver Age poet who achieved brief fame in fin-de-siècle St. Petersburg circles 
for his spiritualist philosophy of subjectivity known as “meonism”:  
 Even less convincing to me is the search for parallels between Kojève’s future philosophy 
and the texts of those Russian thinkers who in varying degrees developed the theme of 
“nothingness” [nechto] (or “non-being” [nebytie]). The comparison to N. M. Minsky’s 
“meonism” is tied not to what Auffret and Filoni have read of the latter but rather to how 
Minsky is briefly characterized in the Histories of Russian Philosophy published by V. V. 
Zenkovskii and N. O. Losskii and translated into French. If Filoni at least avoids 
completely any improbable parallels, Auffret manages to connect Kojève’s philosophy to 
the work of Pavel Florenskii, Sergei Bulgakov, and even Aleksei Losev, whom he takes to 
be a Hegelian! (Rutkevich, “Formirovanie” 14-15)26  
In referencing Zenkovskii and Losskii’s works on Russian philosophy, both formative histories 
that fueled Western interest in Russian intellectual history in the post-war period, Rutkevich seems 
                                                 
26 “Еще менее убедительным мне кажутся поиски параллелей будущей философии Кожева с текстами тех 
русских мыслителей, у которых в той или иной степеней разрабатывалась тема «нечто» (или «небытия»). 
Сопоставление с «меонизмом» Н. М. Минского связаны не с тем, что Оффре и Филони последнего читали, а 
с тем, что его кратко характеризуют в своих переведенных на французский «Историях русской философии» 
В.В. Зеньковский и Н.О. Лосский. И если Филони хотя бы избегает совсем уж невероятных параллелей, то 
Оффре ухитряется увязывать философию Кожева с творчеством П.А. Флоренского и С.Н. Булгакова и даже 
А. Ф. Лосева, объявленного к тому же гегельянцем!” 
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to imply that elevating Kojève to the status of “Russian philosopher” is to succumb to a temptation 
to essentialize him as a canonical figure in the tradition of Russian religious philosophy. A more 
nuanced analysis of this tension, however, reveals Kojève’s philosophy as yet another bridge 
between religious philosophy and competing secular narratives in the Russian tradition. This is a 
bridge, furthermore, that reveals the historical tension between the two as a result more of their 
shared genesis rather than of insurmountable contradictions between them. 
Despite Rutkevich’s skepticism toward any connection of Kojève’s work to Russian 
religious philosophers, numerous scholars of Kojève (not only Auffret [1990] and Filoni [2008], 
but also Geroulanos [2010]; Groys [2012]; and Love [2018]) find conceptual parallels to Kojève’s 
project in the line of Russian thought descendant from Solovʹev. According to Auffret, Kojève was 
a regular guest at two highly influential émigré circles in France, both deeply invested in 
theologically inflected philosophy: the circle surrounding Berdiaev as well as a separate yet 
affiliated circle of Eurasianists, including Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi, Petr Suvchinskii, and Lev 
Karsavin (158-159). In Groys’ words, “Kojève’s discourse on the end of history can be rightly 
understood only in the context of the ‘historiosophical’ and ‘sophiological’ discussions among 
representatives of post-Solovyovian Russian thinking during the first quarter of the twentieth 
century” (148). In his own work, Geroulanos draws clear thematic connections to this group’s 
theological activity, describing Kojève’s “philosophical obsession with the Eastern Orthodox 
theme of theanthropy, which he reinterprets as the instance when, after a long historical rise, Man 
comes to recognize his ontological status as that of a finite God and thus becomes one with nature, 
with Being” (131, emphasis in original). 
While traces of these shared influences can be found throughout Kojève’s work, the 
“smoking gun” that most clearly reveals his intervention into the competing narratives of Russian 
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philosophy is his treatise Atheism, written in Russian in 1931 but published for the first time, in 
French, in 1998.27 In the manuscript, Kojève attempts a philosophical account of atheism, and 
explores the possibility of defining an “atheist religion,” yet the treatise simultaneously develops 
an account of how an individual first comes to develop a theological worldview. Indeed, according 
to Kojève’s argument, one must move first from theology and into atheism, rather than vice versa. 
This claim is reminiscent of a similar argument several years later in Kojève’s Hegel seminars, in 
which he argues that the historical trajectory of Absolute Spirit necessitates the secularization of a 
Christian anthropology: “according to Hegel, one cannot realize the Christian anthropological 
ideal (which he accepts in its totality) except in ‘eliminating’ Christian theology”28 (224, emphasis 
in original).  
In language that further parallels that of his seminars on Hegel,29 Kojève describes God as 
an articulation of the “ultimate Other.” Subjectivity begins with the realization that there exist 
things other than oneself. Each person originally understands themselves in relationship to what is 
not themselves (i.e., subjectivity is formed through interrelation), and eventually one is confronted 
by the existence of God as ultimate Other, distinguishable from all other definable “somethings” 
in the world: “God is something that differs radically from every other thing that one could say is 
this or that”30 (72). In the first step toward atheism, then, the atheist denies the existence of this 
other “something”: 
                                                 
27 Rutkevich has edited a version of the work in its original Russian (Moscow: Praksis, 2007), and Love has recently 
published the first version in English (New York: Columbia, 2018). The French version, however, is by far the most 
accessible and cited edition, and I will therefore refer to it throughout. 
28 “d’après Hegel, on ne peut réaliser l’idéal anthropologique chrétien (qu’il accepte intégralement) qu’en « 
supprimant » la théologie chrétienne.”  
29 Atheism in particular greatly anticipates Kojève’s emphasis of the Master/Slave chapter in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit, which serves as the lynchpin of his Paris seminars (1933-39). I discuss this in detail in the following chapter. 
30 “Dieu est quelque chose qui se différencie radicalement de toute autre chose, dont nous pouvons dire qu’elle est 
ceci ou cela.” 
 34 
 As for the atheist, for him God is not something. It is nothingness, and between myself and 
God there cannot be a relation, nor anything in common, since I know to a certain extent 
that I exist (I am a something), whereas God simply doesn’t exist. It is clearly impossible 
to say what is this nothingness that God “is,” since it doesn’t exist. Not only can one not 
say anything about it, but moreover one has nothing to say. The negation of God by the 
atheist must be understood radically and “simply”: in other words, for the atheist there is 
no God. (74)31 
While this sounds tautological, the problem Kojève finds in the atheist’s denial of God is that the 
atheist must necessarily acknowledge the non-existence of God in order to deny it. Kojève 
summarizes this with an analogy of an atheist stone: “a stone, as well as, if it exists, the ‘naïve 
atheist,’ does not know that God doesn’t exist, whereas the atheist knows it (an analogy: I don’t 
see the table; I see that there is no table. In other words, atheism assumes theism)” (213).32 For 
Kojève, then, both the atheist and the theist are originally presented with a “path toward God,” 
understood in the original articulation of the self in opposition to the ultimate Other—the atheist, 
in denying the existence of God, paradoxically must recognize the existence of the thing that he 
seeks to deny. Kojève understands this inevitable “path toward God” as the religion, and the 
atheist’s path to nowhere as the “atheist religion.”  
                                                 
31 “Quant à l’athée, Dieu n’est pas pour lui un quelque chose. Il est le néant, et entre moi et Dieu il ne peut pas y avoir 
de relation, ni absolument rien de commun, puisque je sais que d’une certaine manière j’existe (je suis un quelque 
chose) alors que Dieu n’existe tout simplement pas. Il est évidemment impossible de dire ce qu’est ce néant que Dieu 
« est », puis qu’il n’existe pas. Non seulement on ne peut rien dire de lui, mais encore on n’a rien à dire de lui. La 
négation de Dieu par l’athée doit être entendu radicalement et « simplement » — autrement dit, pour l’athée il n’y a 
pas de Dieu.” 
32 “la pierre (de même que, s’il existe, l’«athée naïf») ne sait pas que Dieu n’existe pas, tandis que l’athée le sait 
(analogie : je ne vois pas de table ; je vois qu’il n’y a pas de table. Autrement dit, l’athéisme suppose le théisme).” 
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God furthermore represents radical alterity, in the sense that God is understood as a “non-
qualified something.” This is a “something” completely without definable attributes, in contrast to 
every other “qualified something”:  
 the pure theist is one who affirms the existence of something without any attribute, whereas 
the atheist is someone who denies such a possibility. […] for the pure theist there is a 
qualified something given to a person in two ways, as me (one-self) and as not-me (the 
world), and there is a non-qualified something called God. It is clear that multiple non-
qualified somethings are not possible, for how would they differ from one another? In other 
words, pure theism is necessarily a “monotheism,” not in the sense that God is one (quantity 
is not even applicable to it), but in the sense that there are not multiple gods. (78)33  
 In Kojève’s argument, therefore, there exist three categories of things: oneself (which has 
definable attributes), things which are not the self but definable (understood as “the world”), and 
God, which is not oneself and not definable. The atheist does not believe in the latter: “[t]he atheist 
believes ‘neither in God nor the devil’; he only knows qualifiable things, the me and the not-me, a 
person (oneself), in the world, and nothing else. Outside of this, there is only nothingness”34 (79). 
From this, Kojève claims that all qualifiable things (including the self) exist in an immanent 
homogeneity: 
                                                 
33 “Le théiste pur est celui qui affirme l’existence de quelque chose sans aucun attribut, tandis que l’athée est celui qui 
nie une telle possibilité […] pour le théiste pur il y a un quelque chose de qualifié qui est donné à l’homme sous deux 
aspects, comme moi (soi-même) et comme non-moi (le monde), et un quelque chose de non qualifié qu’il appelle 
Dieu. Il est clair que plusieurs quelques choses de non qualifiés ne sont pas possibles. Car comment se distingueraient-
ils alors les uns des autres ? Autrement dit, le théisme pur est nécessairement un « monothéisme », non dans le sens 
où Dieu est un (la catégorie de quantité ne lui est pas même applicable), mais dans celui où il n’y a pas de plusieurs 
dieux.” 
34 “L’athée ne croit « ni en Dieu ni au diable » ; il ne connaît que des quelques choses qualifiés, le moi et le non-moi, 
l’homme (soi-même) dans le monde, et rien d’autre. Hormis cela, il n’y a pour lui que le néant.” 
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 In seeing outside of myself other people, I cease to perceive the world as something 
completely foreign to me, as something other, radically different from this something that 
I myself am. I can fear an ‘empty’ world, that is, it could seem to me ‘foreign,’ but the fear 
disappears (or becomes something else, dread without object transforms into concrete fear 
before an enemy, etc.) as soon as I recognize another person: I see immediately that my 
fear is in vain, that the world is not as strange to me as it seemed before […] It is rather in 
seeing something incontestably familiar outside of myself that I understand that this 
‘outside of myself’ cannot be completely foreign to me. (92)35 
This homogeneity is incredibly important for Kojève, as it establishes an atheist’s sense of 
community within this world. This community serves as the basis for Kojève’s larger project of 
philosophical anthropology: “despite the diversity of forms in which he and I are given, on account 
of analogous qualitative content [of these givens] (and of Seinsart), in seeing another person, I feel 
a sense of community with him. […] [This community] is given in the interaction between the 
world and person” (93).36 
Kojève wrote Atheism in explicit dialogue with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, as is 
clear here from Kojève’s extensive citation of the German philosopher’s own terminology, as well 
as Kojève’s development of Heidegger’s Dasein and Being-in-the-world.37 Kojève defines this 
                                                 
35 “En voyant en dehors de moi d’autres hommes, je cesse de percevoir le monde comme quelque chose de 
complètement étranger à moi, comme quelque chose d’autre, de radicalement différent de ce quelque chose que je 
suis moi-même. Je peux craindre un monde « vide », c’est-à-dire qu’il peut me paraître « étranger », mais la peur 
disparaît (ou devient tout autre, l’angoisse sans objet se transforme en une peur concrète devant l’ennemi, etc.), dès 
que je rencontre un autre homme : je vois aussitôt que ma peur est vaine, que le monde ne m’est pas aussi étranger 
que cela m’était d’abord apparu. […] C’est plutôt en voyant quelque chose d’incontestablement familier en dehors de 
moi que je comprends que cet « en dehors » ne peut m’être complètement étranger.” 
36 “Malgré la diversité des formes sous lesquelles lui et moi me sont donnés, en raison de l’analogie du contenu 
qualitatif [de ces données] (et de Seinsart), en voyant un autre homme, j’éprouve un sentiment de communauté avec 
lui. […] Elle est donnée dans l’interaction du monde et de l’homme.” 
37 The intertextual relationship between Kojève and Heidegger is very vast and cannot be addressed in full here. For 
a broader context of Kojève’s engagement with Heidegger across his career, see Pirotte, “Alexandre Kojève, lecteur 
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Being-in-the-world as the atheist’s “l’homme dans le monde”: “the atheist religion limits its 
horizon to the immanence of ‘person in the world’” (86).38 Heidegger’s influence on Kojève is 
furthermore found in their shared emphasis on death as a pivotal form of being. According to 
Kojève, in denying the existence of God, the atheist’s “path toward God” becomes instead a path 
toward nothingness: “nothing is therefore given to the atheist outside of the world, but what does 
it mean that ‘nothing is given?’” (131).39 This path toward nothingness is exemplified in death, in 
the sense that death represents the atheist’s only conditioned access toward being “outside of the 
world” and therefore nothing:  
 in being dead, I am no longer on the level of being. I am no longer ‘person in the world.’ I 
am different from myself and between living me and dead me is the abyss of death […] 
death is a paradox, the absolutely irrational abyss (hiatus irrationalis) separating and 
linking ‘person in the world’ and ‘person outside of the world,’ at the same time separated 
and linked by death, by its intermediary, and not existing outside of it. (124, 128, emphasis 
in original)40 
A brief comparison to Being and Time (1927) reveals Kojève’s debt to Heidegger’s own 
articulation of being-toward-death just several years earlier: 
 [w]ith death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In this 
possibility, Dasein is concerned about its being-in-the-world absolutely [schlechthin]. Its 
death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. […] Death is the possibility of 
                                                 
de Heidegger,” and Janicaud, Heidegger in France, for French philosophy’s broader reception of Heidegger, 
transmitted through Kojève’s own influence. 
38 “la religion athée limite son horizon à l’immanence de l’« homme dans le monde ».” 
39 “Rien n’est donc donnée à l’athée en dehors du monde; mais que veut dire que « rien n’est donné » ?” 
40 “comme mort, je ne [me situe plus sur le plan] de l’être, je ne suis plus « homme dans le monde », je suis différent 
de moi-même et entre moi vivant et moi mort il y a l’abîme de la mort […] la mort est un paradoxe, l’abîme absolument 
irrationnel (hiatus irrationalis) séparant et liant l’ « homme dans le monde » et l’ « homme en dehors du monde », à 
la fois séparés et liés par la mort, par son intermédiaire, et n’existant pas en dehors d’elle.” 
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the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus, death reveals itself as one’s ownmost, 
nonrelational, and insuperable [unüberholbar] possibility. (241) 
These parallels between Heidegger and Kojève’s early work are particularly telling given 
Heidegger’s own intention to develop an atheist philosophy through a redevelopment of 
theological metaphysics.41 
While Atheism’s relatively recent publication has delayed a proper evaluation of Kojève’s 
early influences and philosophical trajectory, the manuscript’s direct dialogue with theological 
thought underlines the importance in understanding Kojève’s later, more well-known work as an 
explicitly atheist endeavor. Indeed, Kojève’s Hegel seminars famously stressed human subjectivity 
as negation, and in Atheism one sees the development of this immanent negation as a direct denial 
of a transcendent, Christian understanding of negation before God. The modern human, whose 
being as an atheist is conditioned by a relationship to “nothing” outside of this world, is finite and 
contingent. As Vincent Descombes argues, moreover, one must remember that Kojève is a direct 
precedent to the “dissolution of man” across the humanistic disciplines in the post-war generation: 
“the slogan of the 60s—‘the death of man’—was prefigured in Kojève’s lectures, where it also 
appeared as an ultimate consequence of the ‘death of God’” (31). Indeed, whereas Kojève’s 
Russian peers sought a renewal of an “integral humanism” that would reinstate the transcendental, 
spiritual value of humanity germane to Russian religious philosophy, Kojève in response proposed 
a radical, anti-humanism in which the subject is grounded in nothingness rather than God. 
Geroulanos’s own interpretation of Kojève hinges upon this larger midcentury shift in 
evaluations of humanism. His book An atheist that is not humanist emerges in French thought 
                                                 
41 Judith Wolfe has explored this topic extensively in both Heidegger’s Eschatology: Theological Horizons in Martin 
Heidegger’s Early Work (2013) and Heidegger and Theology (2014). 
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(2010) proposes that, with the various political catastrophes of the early twentieth-century, 
philosophy was forced to divorced itself from the post-Enlightenment logic of humanism. 
Humanism, which had itself abandoned a transcendental, theist apologia for the human in its 
pursuit of rationalism and secular progress, could no longer be justified in light of widespread 
violence and socio-political disarray. Devoid of faith in humanism after the devastation of the First 
World War, and without a return to the transcendental buttress of God as the justification for man, 
the human subject in modernity collapsed as a stable discursive agent.  
Geroulanos notes, however, that the “non-humanist atheism,” which emerged in the 1920s 
and in which Kojève’s own intervention played a pivotal role, differed from earlier atheisms in its 
direct (if negative) engagement with theology: 
 Indeed, efforts toward the new atheism doubled as reformulations of the theologico-
political domain—a new atheist political theology, a new relation of man (and the political 
domain) to the interrogation (and refusal) of the divine. […] For it, theological shadows 
lurked in the history of modern thought, in concepts and ontological arrangements that 
ground notions of man, and even in political movements that flaunted their secular 
credentials. Hence the new atheism’s fundamental opposition to traditional atheist 
dismissals of religion as obsolete, as overcome by a combination of scientific teleology 
and social egalitarianism that supposedly aimed toward man’s self-perfection sans God. 
(6) 
Absent a belief in God and devoid of integral humanism, modern thought nevertheless evolved 
within the “negative space” of theology. In that space, those philosophers could develop their 
claims in theological terms, replacing “God with man, history, a political messianism, the Nation, 
or the State, frequently pushing under the rug religious problems and questions” (6).  
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Geroulanos describes this shift, moreover, in terms of cross-cultural exchange within the 
dramatic migrations of interwar Europe. Indeed, this major shift that takes place in French 
intellectual life in the 1920-30s is unthinkable without the contribution of a steady wave of 
émigrés, who were born in Russia/Soviet Union and then trained in Germany or France, and who 
brought with them ideas and problematics that reinvigorated a French philosophy that had until 
then been stifled by Neo-Kantianism. Stefanos argues that “as foreigners and exiles, not only did 
they enjoy a heightened personal aura, but their foreign education […] clashed with the priorities 
of French philosophy and provided an alternative to the more traditional French resolutions of 
philosophical problems” (54). 
While Kojève is the most obvious example of this transformation, one must likewise look 
to the influence of his fellow Russian colleague Alexandre Koyré. As mentioned earlier, Koyré 
belongs with Kojève to the “Second Wave” of Russian philosophy in émigré France. Koyré taught 
courses on the history of religious thought, and Hegel, at the École pratique des Hautes Études in 
Paris—he would eventually bequeath his Hegel lectures to Kojève, a decision that would result in 
Kojève’s own famous seminars at the institute. Beyond this, Koyré is most well-known for his 
work in the history and philosophy of science, where, like Kojève, he sought to trace a trajectory 
from theological to secular models of thought. His From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe 
(1957), his most well-known work, originated as a series of lectures, delivered in the United States, 
which succinctly restated themes he had developed over the span of his career as a philosopher of 
science. In it, Koyré described what he saw as a paradigm shift in science in the seventeenth 
century: 
 [s]ome historians have seen its most characteristic feature in the secularization of 
consciousness, its turning away from transcendental goals to immanent aims, that is, in the 
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replacement of the concern for the other world and the other life by preoccupation with this 
life and this world. […] This scientific and philosophical revolution […] can be described 
roughly as bringing forth the destruction of the Cosmos, that is, the disappearance, from 
philosophically and scientifically valid concepts, of the conception of the world as a finite, 
closed, and hierarchically ordered whole (a whole in which the hierarchy of value 
determined the hierarchy and structure of being, rising from the dark, heavy, and imperfect 
earth to the higher and higher perfection of the stars and heavenly spheres), and its 
replacement by an indefinite and even infinite universe which is bound together by the 
identity of its fundamental components and laws, and in which all these components are 
placed on the same level of being. (1-2)  
Koyré interpreted the birth of modern science as the destruction of a transcendental, cosmological 
hierarchy of world and the birth of an immanent universe, in which all things abide equally by the 
same laws of science. Koyré’s work on the paradigm shift of modern science parallels Kojève’s 
atheist philosophical anthropology, where: 
 [f]or the atheist, each something disappears with its death, and it is in this equality of being 
in the face of death that resides the power of the homogeneity of everything given. The 
atheist does not recognize the differentiation of the given in the world and in the ‘other’; 
each thing is given to him as something finite and terrestrial. (Kojève, L’Athéisme 191)42 
Kojève further makes clear the connection between his work and Koyré’s in his contribution to a 
volume commemorating Koyré’s seventieth birthday. Entitled “The Christian origin of modern 
science” (1964), the essay claims that modern science can be understood as a direct result of 
                                                 
42 “Pour l’athée, chaque quelque chose disparaît avec sa mort, et c’est dans cette égalité de l’être devant la mort que 
réside la puissance de l’homogénéité de tout ce qui est donné. L’athée ne connaît pas la différenciation du donné en 
monde et en « autre » ; chaque quelque chose lui est donné comme un quelque chose de fini et de terrestre.” 
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Christian theology’s theory of incarnation: “what is the Incarnation if not the possibility for the 
eternal God to be actually present in the temporal world where we ourselves live, without stripping 
him of his absolute perfection?” (303).43 Kojève therefore claims, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that 
contrary to popular belief, the paradigm shift described by both Koyré and Kojève was a 
development out of Christian theology rather than in mere opposition to it. This claim parallels his 
own argument, in Atheism, for atheism as a philosophical development out of a religious 
worldview. 
As the first generation of émigré Russian thinkers after the wake of the mass exodus of 
Russian religious philosophers to France, Kojève and Koyré were explicit in their formulation of 
secular philosophies formed out of the preceding generation’s own theologically grounded work. 
This “Second Wave” of Russian philosophy abroad highlights the difficulties in easily delineating 
the so-called competing narratives of Russian philosophy, religious or critical, given the frequent, 
if contentious, exchanges between the two. I will now conclude with a brief description of Kojève 
and Koyré’s most enduring legacy in intellectual history, their anthropological philosophies of 
history, in order to illustrate their crucial roles played in a new reconceptualization of humanism 
out of the ashes of religious thought in the interwar period.  
1.5 Secular (Hegelian) Anthropologies of History 
According to Michael Roth, a massive re-appraisal of Hegelianism in French philosophy 
in the 1920s-1930s took shape in three major interpretations, each of which continues to hold sway 
                                                 
43 “qu’est-ce l’Incarnation, sinon la possibilité pour le Dieu éternel d’être réellement présent dans le monde temporel 
où nous vivons nous-mêmes, sans déchoir pour autant de son absolue perfection?” 
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in continental philosophy. In 1929, Jean Wahl published Le Malheur de la conscience dans la 
philosophie de Hegel, which as its title suggests stressed the role of the unhappy conscience stage 
in Hegel’s Phenomenology. A second Hegelian, Jean Hyppolite, throughout the 1930s translated 
Hegel’s corpus into French, the commentary of which stressed the role of language in Hegel and 
would later become his Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel, published 
in 1946. The last major interpretation, however, is arguably the most famous one: Koyré and 
Kojève’s combined seminars on Hegel throughout the 1920s and 1930s, which are often referred 
to in shorthand as “philosophical anthropology” for their interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology 
as a methodological account of the human subject, inaugurated by the negating power of desire 
and the Master/Slave fight for recognition.  
Unlike Kojève’s seminars, the proceedings of which were transcribed and published by 
Raymond Queneau in the 1960s, there exists little record of Koyré’s preceding lectures on Hegel 
at the university. It is known, however, that in 1931-1932, the last year before Kojève takes over 
the position, Kojève attended Koyré’s seminar, devoted to the question of religion in Hegelian 
philosophy and the relationship between finitude and infinity (Koyré, De la mystique 87). The 
uniqueness of Koyré’s interpretation of Hegel has been preserved through his essay “Hegel at 
Jena,” published in 1934, in which the philosopher presents a Hegel similar to the one elaborated 
in his earlier seminars.  
Koyré devotes his reading of Hegel to an argument for continuity in the philosopher’s 
development, between young Hegel and mature Hegel, guided by the publication of Hegel’s early 
“theological writings” for the first time in 1907.44 He centers his argument, however, on Hegel’s 
                                                 
44 Hegel’s early work was first edited and published by Herman Nohl as Hegels theologische Jugendschriften in 1907. 
Roth argues that the early twentieth-century “return to Hegel” in part occurred as a response to this discovery of the 
philosopher’s youth. 
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activity in Jena up to 1806, the year of Napoleon’s decisive defeat over the Prussians—Koyré is 
quite possibly the first Hegelian interpreter to associate Hegel’s philosophy directly with the 
historical phenomenon of Napoleon. In this interpretation, Koyré describes Hegel at Jena as 
working to define historical time as a relationship between the present and the future, rather than 
the present and the past:  
 It is this insistence on the future, the primacy given to the future over the past, that 
constitutes, in my opinion, Hegel’s greatest originality. This allows us to understand why, 
in the additions to his Encyclopedia, Hegel speaks of expectation, of hope. And also, of 
regret. This is because Hegelian time is, above all else, a human time, the time of man, 
himself that strange being which “is what he isn’t and is not what he is,” the being that 
negates what he is himself for the sake of what he isn’t, or is not yet, a being that, while 
based in the present, denies it in his quest to realize the future, who lives for the future, 
finding or at least searching there for his own “truth”; a being that only exists in this 
continual transformation of the future into the now, and a being that ceases to exist the day 
when there is no longer a future, when nothing is on the horizon, when everything has 
already come to pass, when everything is already “accomplished.” And it is because 
Hegelian time is human that it is also dialectical, just as because it is both one and the other 
that it is essentially historical time. (“Hegel à Jena” 177, emphasis in original)45 
                                                 
45 “C’est cette insistance sur l’avenir, la primauté donnée à l’avenir sur le passé, qui constitue, à notre avis, la plus 
grande originalité de Hegel. Et cela nous fait comprendre pourquoi, dans les additions à l’Encyclopédie, Hegel parle 
de l’attente, de l’espoir. Et aussi du regret. C’est que le temps hégélien est, avant tout, un temps humain, le temps de 
l’homme, lui-même cet être étrange qui « est ce qu’il n’est pas et n’est pas ce qu’il est », être qui se renie en ce qu’il 
est au profit de ce qu’il n’est pas, ou n’est pas encore, être qui, partant du présent, le renie, cherchant à se réaliser dans 
l’avenir, qui vit pour l’avenir y trouvant, ou du moins, y cherchant sa « vérité » ; être qui n’existe que dans cette 
transformation continuelle de l’avenir dans le maintenant, et qui cesse d’être le jour où il n’y a plus d’avenir, où rien 
n’est plus à venir, où tout est déjà venu, où tout est déjà « accompli ». Et c’est parce que le temps hégélien est humain 
qu’il est aussi dialectique, comme c’est parce qu’il est l’un et l’autre, qu’il est essentiellement, un temps historique. ” 
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Koyré’s Hegel is thus an anthropological Hegel, one that sees across the German philosopher’s 
career an interest in the human being understood as negation over time, continuously negating 
herself in progression toward a future ideal. Napoleon represents the apotheosis of human, 
historical time, the closest depiction of its total completion on the field of battle, and Koyré 
concludes his essay with the speculation that Hegel had in fact known that at Jena, watching 
Napoleon achieve and, to borrow Koyré’s phrase, “accomplish” history. 
When Kojève began his own seminars in 1933, he intended to complete the interpretation 
of Hegel carried out by Koyré. Kojève began the seminars by stating explicitly, like Koyré, that 
Hegel’s Phenomenology is a philosophical anthropology46: “it’s theme is the human as such, real 
being in the world […] it attempts to describe the integral ‘essence’ of man, that is all human 
‘possibilities’ (cognitive, affective, active)” (Introduction 48).47 He also, like Koyré, understands 
Hegel’s importance in the equivocation of History and the human, both of which are driven by 
negation. Both History and man are “accomplished” when there is no longer anything to negate: 
 History ends when Man no longer acts in strict sense of the word, that is, when he no longer 
negates or transforms the natural and social given through bloody Struggle and creative 
Work. Man no longer does this when the given Real provides him with full satisfaction 
(Befriedigung), fully realizing his Desire (Begierde, which is in man a Desire for universal 
recognition of his unique personality in the world: Anerkennen or Anerkennung). If Man 
is truly and fully satisfied by what is, he no longer desires anything real and no longer 
                                                 
46 Kojève is insistent on anthropomorphism as Hegel’s intent throughout his seminars: “This Phenomenology [of 
Spirit] is distorted in Hegel by a monist prejudice (in anticipation of the Logic): by a prejudicial thinking that the being 
of humanity is not different from that of nature […] this ontology in the Logic is in fact anthropological; it is therefore 
distorted whenever it interprets Nature. It is not universal, despite what Hegel claimed: it’s an ontology of Man 
(‘Spirit’) and not one of Nature” (Introduction 47). 
47 “Son thème, c’est l’homme en tant qu’humain, l’être réel dans l’histoire […] elle veut décrire l’« essence » intégrale 
de l’homme, c’est-à-dire toutes les « possibilités » humaines (cognitives, affectives, actives).” 
 46 
changes therefore his reality, ceasing as such to really change himself. The only “desire” 
that he can still have, if he is a philosopher, is to understand what is and what he is, and to 
reveal this through discourse. (Introduction 547)48 
Kojève has long been associated with this theory of the “End of History,” taken up by famously 
by the conservative economist Francis Fukuyama, as well as Marxist Existentialists in their belief 
in an eventual overcoming of human alienation.49 The following chapters will be devoted to a more 
detailed analysis of both Kojève’s political influence and the unique interpretation forged in his 
seminars on Hegel, yet one can see here that Kojève’s historicist interpretation of Hegel, in which 
History and Man are intertwined and will end with one another, are a response to the theological 
questions posed by his contemporaries, all while, to borrow Geroulanos’s phrase, “pushing under 
the rug religious problems and questions.”  
As mentioned above, Jeff Love argues for a direct lineage to Kojève from the tradition of 
Solov΄ev’s Godmanhood, a philosophy of theandry that imagines the convergence of the earthly 
and the divine, as well as the “divine fraternity” found both in Dostoevsky and the philosopher 
Nikolai Fedorov’s “Common Task” (The Black Circle 92). The influence of Solov΄ev and 
Godmanhood is seen most directly in Kojève’s dissertation, which was written on Solov΄ev’s 
philosophy of history under the direction of Karl Jaspers in Germany. There, Kojève provides a 
general chronology of Solov΄ev’s development as a philosopher, but it is the last period of 
                                                 
48 “L’Histoire s’arrête quand l’Homme n’agit plus au sens fort du terme, c’est-à-dire ne nie plus, ne transforme plus 
le donné naturel et social par une Lutte sanglante et un Travail créateur. Et l’Homme ne le fait plus quand le Réel 
donné lui donne pleinement satisfaction (Befriedigung), en réalisant pleinement son Désir (Begierde, qui est chez 
l’Homme un Désir de reconnaissance universelle de sa personnalité unique au monde, — Anerkennen ou 
Anerkennung). Si l’Homme est vraiment et pleinement satisfait par ce qui est, il ne désire plus rien de réel et ne chance 
donc plus la réalité, en cessant ainsi de changer réellement lui-même. Le seul « désir » qu’il peut encore avoir — s’il 
est un philosophe, c’est celui de comprendre ce qui est et ce qu’il est, et de le révéler par le discours.” 
49 Francis Fukuyama, End of History and the Last Man (1992). The political dimensions of Kojève’s philosophy of 
history are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Solov΄ev’s life that most interests Kojève. Indeed, Kojève’s dissertation on Solov΄ev, in tandem 
with Atheism and his Hegel seminars, illustrates how Kojève’s historicism can be seen as a direct 
development of Solov΄ev’s own eschatological thinking. 
Solov΄ev’s last work, Three Conversations (1900), written just months before his death, 
addressed the question of a post-historical condition seen through the story of the anti-Christ. 
Through the arrival of the anti-Christ in the story, qualities like good and evil have been undone, 
as the anti-Christ has solved the major problems of the world and reconciled man to nature. The 
obvious trouble, however, is that the anti-Christ is not Christ as he claims. There is indeed no 
working difference between Christ and the anti-Christ; both could theoretically establish, as the 
anti-Christ in Solovʹev’s story does, a utopia on Earth. Kojève in his dissertation saw in Three 
Conversations a definitive break from Solovʹev’s previous Sophiological work, a break that 
Kojève clearly believes himself to be inheriting. He argues that “Solovʹev no longer believed that 
history leads in a steady progression to the realization of ‘total life,’ of the ‘kingdom of God on 
Earth,’ or that with this realization history finds its natural conclusion” (“Die 
Geschichtsphilosophie”). The anti-Christ figure instead represents the final accomplishment of life 
on Earth, one devoid of any transcendental love seen in Solovʹev’s previous metaphysics but 
instead firmly immanent and post-historical. In Solovʹev’s story, the remaining religious Christians 
fight one final battle, destroy the anti-Christ, and bring about the collapse of the finite world. As 
Kojève describes it: 
 Since at that point history is for Solovʹev no longer the gradual reconstitution of 
Godmanhood and the return of fallen Sophia to God, but rather a perpetual battle of the 
principle of evil with that of the good, a battle that, though it ends with the victory of the 
latter, at the same time has as a consequence the annihilation of a large part of the empirical 
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world: the kingdom of God lies on the other side of history that itself is abandoned to the 
dominion of evil. It could be that Solovʹev from this point of view is moving towards a 
specific essence of the Historical. (“Die Geschichtsphilosophie” 17)50 
Kojève strains to differentiate an earlier Solovʹev, caught up in a theological tradition of 
transcendental love, from a later, pessimistic one redefined by a secular sense of history. By 
stressing the lack of reconciliation of the world with the Divine in the later Solovʹev, Kojève reverts 
to the same duality that he will emphasize years later in his Hegelian seminars, where the stressing 
of the Master/Slave struggle delays the eventual closure in Kojevian Hegelianism. 
Any comparison between Kojève and Solovʹev’s eschatological thinking must therefore 
stress Kojève’s embrasure of Solovʹev’s Godmanhood, yet his insistence on its atheistic 
interpretation. Vadim Rossman argued that: 
 In a sense, with his reflection on the end of history, [Kojève] continues the tradition of 
Russian historiosophy, in particular the apocalyptic tradition in Russian literature of the 
fin-de-siècle (Merezhkovsky, Sergei Nilus, Solovʹev, Fedorov). In particular, his work 
resonates greatly with these thinkers’ premonition of the arrival of a new type of human— 
the future boor (griadushchii kham).51 There is undoubtedly a link between his work and 
[Konstantin] Leontʹev’s idea of a “full, bourgeois Europe,” which lost the ferocity of 
                                                 
50 “Denn jetzt ist die Geschichte für Solwjew nicht mehr die allmähliche Wiederherstellung des Gottmenschentums 
und die Rückkehr der abgefallenen Sophia zu Gott, sondern ein fortwährender Kampf des bösen Prinzips mit dem 
Guten, ein Kampf, der zwar mit dem Siege des letzteren endet, aber zugleich auch die Vernichtung des größten Teiles 
der empirischen Welt zur Folge hat: das Gottesreich wird jenseits der Geschichte verlegt und diese eigentlich der 
Herrschaft des Bösen preisgegeben. Es mag sein, daß Solowjew auf diesem Standpunkte dem spezifischen Wesen des 
Historischen näher kommen.” 
51 Merezhkovsky in 1906 published a series of essays entitled “The Future Boor” (“Griadushchii kham”), in which he 
anticipated future political upheaval in Russia as the brutish rise of the bourgeoisie.  
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Byzantine negativity, as well as with Vladimir Solovʹev’s conception of the apocalypse in 
Three Conversations.52 
If one therefore were to look for some kind of “key” to the philosophical anthropology that both 
Kojève and Koyré bring to their Hegelianism, it may lie in this systematic de-divinization of 
Solovʹev that Kojève brought with him to Western Europe. The political implications of this 
convergence, in which Kojève took influence from a generation of Russian philosophy’s imagining 
the coming revolution as a bourgeois apocalypse, is particular striking in light of Kojève’s deep 
roots in the bureaucracy of the post-war world order. 
The succeeding chapters explore in detail the conceptual problems that emerge in Kojève’s 
work as a result of this secularization of Russian religious thought. In particular, the next chapter 
examines the tension between (religious) love and (atheist) history as competing foundational 
models in Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel. Any accurate assessment of Kojève’s work, however, 
should examine this tension within the larger framework of a reconceptualization of what it means 
to be human in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, much of Kojève’s appeal lies in his ability to 
illuminate the epistemic crises that struck philosophy, politics, and theology in this period, as each 
field in its own way sought a new articulation of its own base assumptions. Kojève’s capacity to 
speak to these crises inevitably comes from his own liminal position, neither fully Russian nor 
Soviet, Western nor Eastern, or even fully secular or fully theological. 
 
                                                 
52 “В известном смысле своими размышлениями о конце истории он продолжает традиции русской 
историософии, в частности апокалиптическую традицию в русской литературе рубежа веков (Мережковский, 
Нилус, Соловьев, Федоров). В частности, она весьма созвучна предчувствиям этих мыслителей о скором 
приходе нового типа человека — “грядущего хама”. Несомненна связь его концепций с идеями Леонтьева о 
“сытой мещанской Европе”, потерявшей огонь византийской негативности, и с концепцией апокалипсиса в 
“Трех разговорах” Владимира Соловьева.” 
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2.0 Desire in Kojève: When Russian Eros Moved Abroad 
“This unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness is Desire 
in general.” – G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 
Alexandre Kojève is undoubtedly more famous for those he influenced rather than for his 
own work. Both directly and indirectly, the list of devotees includes some of the greatest names in 
twentieth-century intellectual history: Louis Althusser, Georges Bataille, Simone de Beauvoir, 
Jacques Derrida, Frantz Fanon, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Paul Sartre, and others exhibit clear and 
immediate resonances with Kojève’s unique interpretation of Hegel in their work. The emergence 
of what has now become known as “French theory” would be unthinkable without mentioning the 
French philosopher of Russian extraction. In the words of editors of a special issue of Parallax 
devoted to his legacy, “Kojève taught a generation of French intellectuals how to return to, read 
and interpret a text” (Morra and Smith i). Kojève’s greatest gift bequeathed to the post-war 
generation in Paris was indeed an innovative return to text, namely that of Hegel—it would indeed 
be incorrect to claim any unmediated influence of Hegel on these figures without first 
acknowledging the particular, to some critics distorting,53 interpretative lens forged by Kojève in 
his famous seminars. Hegel, the monist philosopher par excellence who sought to track the 
historical development of a universal world spirit, somehow became warped through Kojève, into 
the thinker of two: the Self and the Other, exemplified in Kojève’s stressing of the chapter on Lord 
                                                 
53 See, for example, Robert B. Pippin’s Hegel and Self-Consciousness (11), where he chastises Kojève for having paid 
“almost no attention to the first three chapters” of The Phenomenology of Spirit, i.e., those devoted to consciousness 
before the development of self-consciousness through the formulation of Lord and Bondsman. See also Fredric 
Jameson’s The Hegel Variations, which states openly its attempt to overcome the legacy of Kojève’s Hegel within 
Marxist hermeneutics. 
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and Bondsman in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This duality formed around the question of 
desire, mutual recognition, and intersubjectivity through negation, and is inarguably Kojève’s most 
enduring legacy in twentieth and twenty-first century thought, so definitively sculpting the 
discourse around identity and difference that for someone like Lacan, “every reference to ‘Hegel’ 
should be glossed ‘Kojève’” (Macey 13).54   
The genesis of Kojèvian desire precedes both the seminars and even Kojève himself. In the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth-century, erotic desire emerged full force as a philosophical 
problem that somehow warranted a “solution.” Across disciplines, fixation on eroticism served the 
demands of larger inquiries into questions of human nature and agency. As Olga Matich describes, 
the sexual decadence of fin-de-siècle prescribed “new forms of love and corresponding life 
practices that would transform the family and even the body itself,” with an eye aimed at the larger, 
socially and politically transformative project of modernity (4). In the generation preceding 
Kojève’s, the sui generis tradition of Russian Silver Age philosophy had already employed 
Hegelianism to debate at length the social and even economic problems surrounding erotic desire, 
with Kojève “inheriting” these debates through the influence of philosopher Vladimir Solovʹev, an 
ever-present imprint on diasporic Russian philosophy and the subject of Kojève’s dissertation at 
the University of Heidelberg.  
I will argue in this chapter for an interpretation of Kojève’s philosophy of desire within the 
context of Russian philosophy in diaspora more broadly, in which the legacies of the Russian 
speculative tradition came into conflict and in turn influenced the intellectual life of their new 
homes, for Kojève France and to a lesser extent Germany. Kojève belonged to the well-
                                                 
54 For a general, but still thorough, account of Kojève’s legacy in French philosophy, see Descombes, Modern French 
Philosophy. 
 52 
documented generation of Russian intellectuals who, in various degrees of coercion, relocated to 
the West in the aftermath of the revolution. Many of them went on to play foundational roles in 
molding the contours of post-war philosophical and political thought, including amongst their 
ranks figures such as Isaiah Berlin, Alexander Koyré, Victor Serge, Boris Souvarine, and of course 
Kojève himself. Any understanding of continuity with their “original” national traditions and 
larger European intellectual history has yet to be thoroughly explored, arguably due to the Cold 
War relic of an East/West division in scholarly fields that has over the past decades only recently 
begun to collapse—beyond the more obvious (Soviet) figures oriented toward Marxist thought, 
Russian philosophy and that of Eastern Europe in general remains largely outside the purview of 
Western historians of philosophy.55 
In his recent book, Jeff Love has taken the needed step in strengthening our understanding 
of the Russian influence of Kojève as a diasporic philosopher: Love approaches this aspect of 
Kojève’s Russian influence most specifically from the point of view of Dostoevsky and Vladimir 
Solovʹev, whose visions of wisdom and self-negation provided a blueprint for Kojève’s own 
fashioning of the “Godman” or Sage who emerges at the End of History. While providing 
necessary historical context to Platonism in Russian philosophy, and its lingering influence on 
Kojève, Love nevertheless devotes little attention to the legacy of this thought after Solovʹev, most 
specifically in the generation of émigré philosophers who, while still working through the 
problematics of the Russian tradition established by philosophers such as Solovʹev, found 
themselves in new intellectual environments with new frames of reference. By analyzing Kojève’s 
                                                 
55 Two biographies of Kojève exist, both of which necessarily address his Russian origins: Auffret, Alexandre Kojève, 
and Filoni, Le philosophe du Dimanche (trans. from Italian by Gérald Larché). Neither, however, tackles Kojève’s 
relationship to Russian Hegelianism other than through general references to themes of fin-de-siècle Russian 
intellectual life. 
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famous seminars specifically through the lens of Russian philosophy’s theory of desire, I will 
illustrate Kojève’s continuation of, and then ultimate break with, his Russian compatriots in exile. 
In this light Kojève’s seminars represent the tail end of a larger heritage of desire and social alterity 
within Russian philosophy, which, just like Kojève himself, emigrated to Paris with the Russian 
diaspora in the aftermath of the October Revolution. 
What did Kojève bring in his suitcase of ideas to Paris? How did they depart from those of 
his Russian predecessors, and where do we find these ideas today? To tackle these questions, I will 
first address the question of what constitutes desire in Kojève’s philosophy. I will then briefly 
elaborate on the larger Russian philosophical tradition of non-erotic desire and interrelational 
identity, in order afterward to explain Kojève’s ultimate distancing from his Russian peers and the 
Orthodox tradition through a secular reworking of desire in the context of historical progression. 
Finally, I will conclude by speculating on the oscillation between dualism and its mitigation in 
Kojève’s theory of desire, its larger heritage in Russian philosophy, and its continued relevance 
within contemporary debates in the wake of Kojève’s intervention on Hegel. 
2.1 Desire According to Kojève 
Kojève’s series of seminars on Hegel’s Phenomenology, entitled “La Philosophie 
Religieuse de Hegel” and held in Paris at the École pratique des Hautes Études from 1933 to 1939, 
played a monumental role in invigorating debate over desire’s role in the formation of subjectivity.  
At the core of Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel in the seminars is the argument that human 
subjectivity is formed around the desire for an Other’s desire. Kojève identified history as a violent 
process of desiring recognition from an external Other, thereby tightly knitting together the themes 
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of history and intersubjectivity. He claimed in his seminars that the human subject first began 
historical development toward self-realization when it began to desire not merely another thing 
but another desire itself:  
in order to be human, man must act not with the aim to make a thing submit, but with the 
aim to make another Desire (for a thing) submit. Man who desires a thing like a human 
acts not so much in order to take possession of the thing as to make his right recognized 
by another […] over this thing, to make himself recognized as owner of the thing. And this, 
ultimately, is done in order to make his superiority over the other known. It is only the 
Desire for such a Recognition (Anerkennung), the Action that stems from such a Desire, 
which creates, realizes, and reveals a human, non-biological Me. (Introduction 197, 
emphasis in original)56 
Whereas animals merely desire things (food, water, shelter), humans distinguish 
themselves by desiring desire itself: prestige, respect, dignity. Indeed, in so far as it is correct to 
label Kojève’s thought philosophical anthropology, what was at stake for Kojève was a 
methodological account of the conditioned emergence of the human “subject,” inaugurated by the 
negating power of desire and a battle for external recognition. 
Kojève derives his own eclectic interpretation almost entirely from the famous 
Lord/Bondsman chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, where death as a form of negation 
already plays an essential role in the mediation of mutual recognition. As Hegel argued, for self-
                                                 
56 “[p]our être humain, l’homme doit agir non pas en vue de se soumettre une chose, mais en vue de se soumettre un 
autre Désir (de la chose). L’homme qui désire humainement une chose agit non pas tant pour s’emparer de la chose 
que pour faire reconnaître par un autre son droit […] sur cette chose, pour se faire reconnaître comme propriétaire de 
la chose. Et ceci—en fin de compte—pour faire reconnaître par l’autre sa supériorité sur l’autre. Ce n’est que le Désir 
d’une telle Reconnaissance (Anerkennung), ce n’est que l’Action qui découle d’un tel Désir, qui crée, réalise et révèle 
un Moi humain, non-biologique.” 
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consciousness to show that it is in fact “the pure abstraction of self-consciousness,” that is to say, 
“not attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such, that 
it is not attached to life,” it must engage in a life or death struggle with another self-consciousness 
(113). The relationship between Lord and Bondsman results in the Lord’s both subjugation of and 
reliance upon the Bondsman. While the Bondsman was unable to successfully risk his/her life in 
death and must therefore work for the Lord, who succeeded, the Bondsman becomes conscious of 
his/herself through this labor: “[i]t is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes 
to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence” (118). The risk of death, or 
in the case of the Bondsman the fear of the risk of death, lies at the crux of this phenomenologically 
mutual recognition in Hegel’s own account.  
Kojève understood this risk of death in more concrete terms, imagining its potential to 
render us human in the examples of a soldier’s risk of death for love of country or the chivalry of 
the early modern lover.57 In his own centering of this chapter, Kojève changes the nature of mutual 
recognition into a question of both mortality and action guided by lack (which leads to desire), 
framing Hegelian desire (Begierde) as “the desire to assimilate the object (of desire), to make it 
one’s own, to make it oneself (food, sexuality) […] in Desire he [Man] wants the annulation of the 
object and therefore—unconsciously at first—the affirmation of himself” (61). Kojève links 
human desire with the affirmation of self-mortality, describing self-affirmation as quest for 
recognition, a desire of the other’s desire, born at the risk of death:  
                                                 
57 While Kojève’s relationship to and legacy in psychoanalysis is too complex to discuss here, it is nonetheless 
worthwhile to note the similarities between Kojève’s theory of death and desire and Freud’s analysis of the death drive 
in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Kojève’s writing on totality and (lack of) sexual desire also greatly 
anticipates Lacan’s claim for the Real and the absence of sexual relation, lending credence to an often-invoked rumor 
(Auffret 13) that Lacan may have liberally borrowed from an unpublished manuscript by Kojève on Hegel and Freud, 
found amongst his papers by Lacan days after the philosopher’s death. Mysteriously, only the first page of the 
manuscript remains.  
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Man seeks to be recognized by others: simple Desire (Begierde) becomes desire of 
recognition. […] He must risk his life in order to force the awareness of the other. He must 
partake in a struggle for recognition. In risking thus risking his life, he proves to the other 
that he isn’t an animal; in seeking the death of the other, he proves to the other that he 
recognizes him as man. (63, emphasis in original)58 
Desire of another’s desire underlies, for example, the lover’s risking of death in a duel for the sake 
of one’s beloved. In his seminars, however, Kojève is vague on any concrete relationship between 
sexuality or even actual love and his own definition of desire. It is only in a separate session on 
the dialectic, delivered in the early years of the seminar (and included in Raymond Queneau’s 
collection of Kojève’s teachings), that Kojève explicitly addresses love, referencing an obscure 
fragment from Hegel’s early theological writings:  
[Early] Hegel for a while believed he had found the specifically human content of Man’s 
existence in Love, and this it was by analyzing the relationship of Love that he first 
described the Dialectic of this existence, which distinguishes it from purely natural 
existence. To describe Man as Love was then, for Hegel, to describe Man as specifically 
human and essentially different from the animal. (601)59 
At first, Hegel identifies love specifically as that which humanizes us. With his maturation in the 
Phenomenology, however, “Love and the desire for love have become Desire for recognition and 
the Struggle to the death for its satisfaction, with all that that entails—that is, History which ends 
                                                 
58 “L’homme cherche à être reconnu par les autres: le simple Désir (Begierde) devient désir de reconnaissance. […] 
Il doit risquer sa vie pour forcer la conscience de l’autre. Il doit engager une lutte pour la reconnaissance. En risquant 
ainsi sa vie, il prouve à l’autre qu’il n’est pas un animal ; en cherchant la mort de l’autre, il prouve à l’autre qu’il le 
reconnaît comme homme.” 
59 “Hegel a cru un moment avoir trouvé dans l’Amour le contenu spécifiquement humain de l’existence de l’Homme, 
et que c’est en analysant le rapport amoureux qu’il décrivit pour la première fois la Dialectique de cette existence, qui 
la distingue de l’existence purement naturelle. Décrire l’Homme en tant qu’Amant, c’était alors, pour Hegel, décrire 
l’Homme en tant que spécifiquement humain et essentiellement différent de l’animal.” 
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in the coming of the satisfied Citizen and the Sage. Mutual Recognition in Love has become social 
and political Recognition through Action” (601-602). He finishes by concluding that Hegel had 
decided that History and not Love as creating man. Love is a private affair (as opposed to universal 
recognition) and requires no Risk, thereby not involving Action as Kojève chooses to define it: 
“As Goethe said, one loves someone not because of what he does but by what he is; this is why 
one can love someone dead, because man who really does nothing would already be like a dead 
man; this is also why one can love an animal, without being able to ‘recognize’ it” (602). Kojève 
therefore decided that History comes first, after which, and only conditionally, follows Love. 
What can be made of this strange digression by Kojève into sexuality and metaphysics, and 
why does Kojève insist on thinking of desire as history, instead of and without sexuality or Love? 
I argue here that Kojève’s preferential treatment of the Lord/Bondsman mediation, and his 
caveated insertion of sexuality into the Desire of mutual recognition, can only be understood 
through Kojève’s attempt to both respond to, and ultimately decisively break with, the central 
themes of love and metaphysics within diasporic Russian philosophy. 
2.2 Non-Erotic Desire 
In order to understand better the legacy of eroticism bequeathed to Kojève from the Russian 
speculative tradition, and its role in Kojève’s own intervention amongst French intelligentsia in 
Paris, a bit of historical backtracking is necessary. For Russian philosophy, fascination with the 
power that erotic desire could hold over subject formation and social cohesion began in earnest 
earlier within the religious renaissance of the turn of the century. As work done by Anna Lisa 
Crone (2010) and Alexander Etkind (1997) has already illustrated, both psychoanalysis and the 
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modern renaissance of Russian religious philosophy60 emerged in the same historical period 
(approximately 1890-1930) and frequently shared methodological points of departure: an original 
(Platonic) wholeness, sublimation, and, most importantly, a complicated relationship between Eros 
and the human subject’s acclimation into civilization. Modern Russian Orthodox philosophy of 
this period frequently leaned on psychoanalytical terms and theories to explain theological 
concepts, this despite the relatively staunch atheism and alleged positivism of psychoanalysis. This 
is not, however, to suggest that modern Orthodox theological accounts of sexuality were merely 
grafts of psychoanalytic ones. On the contrary, Russian religious philosophy juggled patristics, 
Neo-Platonism, mystical and gnostic teachings, German idealism, and psychoanalysis with 
relative ease, inadvertently laying bare the contingencies between these seemingly diverse fields.61 
Yet regarding sexuality, however, although their conclusions and aims differed widely, modern 
Russian religious philosophy and psychoanalysis both shared an emphasis on eroticism’s role in 
forming the human subject, and its ensuing regulation through social interconnectivity.   
Just as psychoanalysis, most famously in Freud’s more “speculative” later works, such as 
Civilization and its Discontents (1930) or even Moses and Monotheism (1939), imagined that 
libidinal investments required sublimation in order to achieve social legibility, modern Russian 
Orthodox theories of desire emphasized the subordination of individual sexual love to the larger 
                                                 
60 By Russian religious renaissance is meant the theological tradition, most commonly defined through its descent 
from Vladimir Solovʹev, that reached its apex in Russian Orthodox communities within émigré circles in Paris and, to 
a lesser extent, Berlin in the 1920-1930s. For a more thorough account of this movement, see Zernov, The Russian 
Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century; see also Evtuhov, The Cross & The Sickle: Sergei Bulgakov and the 
Fate of Russian Religious Philosophy. 
61 The original, if uneasy, camaraderie among theology, psychoanalysis, and German idealism (Hegel) within Russian 
religious philosophy reminds us in particular to be wary of later claims that the work of Kojève’s student Jacques 
Lacan, for example, represents a mere “grafting of Hegel onto Freud” (Archard 30). Slavoj Žižek similarly argues that 
his early work signals a “return to Hegel,” and that “the only way to ‘save Hegel’ is through Lacan” (Sublime Object 
of Ideology 7). Such claims neglect the much earlier convergence of Hegelianism with psychoanalysis and mysticism 
in the Russian modernist tradition from which Kojève, and by extension Lacan as well as Žižek, already emerge.  
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social matrix of Christian total unity. Total unity (sobornostʹ) began as a concept much earlier, 
amongst Slavophiles Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevskii in the mid-nineteenth-century.  For 
Khomiakov, sobornostʹ reinforced the dream of a utopian Christian state where society reflects the 
total unity of humankind in God.  In the words of Robert Bird, Khomiakov believed that “the 
vertical relationship between each individual and God, and the horizontal connection between all 
believing individuals of all nations and ages, are thus mutually dependent, each being unattainable 
outside of the other” (15). For Kireevskii, European culture underwent an increasing 
compartmentalization of individual lives, bracketing salon life for example from one’s family, 
religious life, and so on.  In contrast, Kireesvkii argued that in Russian culture:  
 the forms of social life, expressing a general totality, never underwent separate, 
independent development divorced from the life of the entire people, and therefore could 
never extinguish in man his familial sense, nor hinder the totality of his moral ascent. The 
pointed particularity of the Russian character in this regard lies in the fact that no 
individual, within his own social relations, ever sought to put forward his own originality 
as some kind of virtue, but instead all ambition of private individuals has been limited to 
the striving to be a correct expression of the fundamental spirit of society. (271-72)62 
Various definitions of religious love or eroticism within Russian religious philosophy later served 
to justify this view of an integral social totality. 
                                                 
62 “[ф]ормы общежития, выражая общую цельность быта, никогда не принимали отдельного, 
самостоятельного развития, оторванного от жизни всего народа, и потому не могли заглушить в человеке его 
семейного смысла, ни повредить цельности его нравственного возрастания. Резкая особенность русского 
характера в этом отношении заключалась в том, что никакая личность, в общежительных сношениях своих, 
никогда не искала выставить свою самородную особенность как какое-то достоинство, но все честолюбие 
частных лиц ограничивалось стремлением быть правильным выражением основного духа общества.” 
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Vladimir Solovʹev in particular developed the early Slavophile emphasis on Orthodox total 
unity, yet infused it with an eroticism heavily inspired by various mystic traditions. As I have 
already discussed in the preceding chapter, Solovʹev criticized what he saw in Hegel as the primacy 
of the abstract over the material. To rectify this, Solovʹev resorted to an eroticized union of the two 
embodied in his theory of “Sophia.”  
Solovʹev’s definition of Sophia is at times ambiguous to the point of incoherence and varies 
throughout his career, certainly a result of the diverse sources from which he derives his theory of 
the eroticized and feminized embodiment of Divine Wisdom. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt includes 
among his sources the Old Testament, the Kabbalist and Gnostic traditions, Jacob Boehme, 
Plotinus, and perhaps most foundationally Plato with his distinction between Earthly and Heavenly 
Aphrodite (34-48). Despite this eclecticism, however, several underlying features of Solovʹev’s 
Sophia remain consistent. To Solovʹev, Sophia represents the natural pairing to the Christian belief 
in Christ as Logos. In common Biblical exegesis, God is equated with the Word/Logos and Jesus 
represents the physical embodiment of Logos into material flesh: “In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God […] The Word became flesh and lived among 
us, and we have seen his glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace and truth.” (New 
Oxford Annotated Bible, John 1:1-14). Solovʹev employs Sophia to imagine the reverse process: 
whereas Logos is the Word made into flesh, Sophia describes the process whereby flesh transforms 
into the totality of Divine unity. In his major work, Lectures on Godmanhood (1878), Solovʹev 
refers to Logos as “first unity” or “first state of being” (pervoe polozhenie sushchego) and Sophia 
as the “second state” (vtoroe polozhenie sushchego), suggesting that Sophia emerges from the 
already-created Absolute yet induces its unification:  
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We have thus a second mode or a second state of being: that all or universal content, that 
particular Godly essence, which in the first state or first image (manner) of existence 
consisted only in a hidden condition as only a potential, here in this second mode acts as a 
kind of ideal reality; if in the first state, it is hidden in the depths of subjective, unrevealed 
being, here it is considered as the subject. (86)63 
The erotic underpinnings of Sophia are relatively obvious: whereas Logos symbolizes the (implied 
masculine) pure being of the Divine embodied in, if not formal logic per se, deep contemplation 
of the laws of the world, Sophia represents the feminization of the Divine reached through 
sensuality. The two are interdependent: Logos exists alone at first, in the beginning phase, yet 
becomes in the second stage manifest in Sophia who “occupies the mediating position between the 
multiplicity of living beings, which comprise the real content of her life, and the unconditional 
unity of Divinity, which is the real beginning and the norm of that life” (Kornblatt 173). A third, 
final stage realizes the unification of material being and the idealist Divine—the reunification of 
the material and the spiritual becomes translated into the discourse of sexual intercourse. 
Solovʹev’s Sophia is therefore a metaphysical, theological example reflecting the storied trope of 
displacing the masculine subject’s content onto a female lack: in lyric poetry (see, for example, 
Aleksandr Blok’s and Andrei Bely’s poems on Sophia) and of massive importance, later, for 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and its theory of the “missing woman.” 
Despite therefore the emphasis on oneness in his religious worldview, Solovʹev relies on 
the equivalent of metaphysical coitus and sexual reciprocity to understand Orthodox theology 
                                                 
63 “Таким образом, мы имеем второй вид или второе положение сущего: то все или всеобщее содержание, та 
собственная сущность Божия, которая в первом положении или в первом образе (способе) существования 
заключалась лишь в скрытом состоянии как только потенциальная, здесь, в этом втором виде, выступает как 
некоторая идеальная действительность; если в первом положении она скрывается в глубине субъективного, 
непроялвенного бытия, то здесь она полагается как предмет.” 
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through a redevelopment of Hegel. One cannot overemphasize the duality that lies behind this 
interpretation of spiritual unity. His belief in the primacy of sensuality over reason not only 
eroticizes the Orthodox imperative to practice holiness immanently on Earth but also places the 
Word of God’s actualization in the feminized Other of Sophia. As Piama Gaidenko describes, “it 
is she [Sophia] who receives independence from divine nature and can influence it, she alone is a 
free subject and completes the act of moving from God, the essence of which lies in an attempt to 
enjoy the full completeness of being for oneself, that is, to establish oneself outside of God” (57).64 
In other words, the relationship between Logos and Sophia parallels that of Hegel’s Lord and 
Bondsman: in order for one to be “self-certain,” in Hegel’s account, they must receive recognition 
exteriorly, from an Other. In a battle over recognition, the Bondsman/Sophia submits and 
recognizes the Lord/Logos. Sophia, however, possesses the power to recognize and realize Logos 
and is therefore at a certain advantage. Both are necessary, despite any a priori claim for 
superiority for the Lord or Logos: self-revealed spirit for Hegel and Solovʹev is therefore “in itself” 
(an sich), “self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else,” and “for itself” (für 
sich), in which the subject receives confirmation (outside of consciousness) that it is an objective 
truth in the world (Hegel, Phenomenology, 113). 
As Boris Groys argues, absolute knowledge for Solovʹev is achieved not through rationality 
but instead through eroticized, spiritually sensuous love: “[t]he human body (lichnostʹ) is an 
original unity of soul and body. To love somebody means to recognize this unity (not only spirit, 
and not only matter) as it truly is. And this means that love is the medium of absolute knowledge—
because absolute knowledge is, precisely, the knowledge of this unity” (Introduction to 
                                                 
64 “Именно она [София] получает независимость от божественного начала и может воздействовать на него, 
она одна является свободным субъектом и совершает акт отпадения от Бога, суть которого—в стремлении 
обладать всей полнотой бытия от себя, т.е. утверждать себя вне Бога.” 
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Antiphilosophy 154). Kojève drew the same conclusion in his dissertation work on Solovʹev: “[for 
Solovʹev] the idea of all-in-oneness is the idea of love, that God is love, that divine Love is the 
love of God for Man and of Man for God, that this free love or that freedom in and by love is the 
essence and very being of the ideal Man” (“La métaphysique 2,” 122, emphasis in original).65 
Human love, as opposed to human reason, becomes the ultimate medium for the absolute, therefore 
shifting Russian Hegelianism from a monistic, Logic-driven system to one predicated upon 
duality, materiality, and (sexual) difference. 
In his treatise on the metaphysics of love entitled Meaning of Love (1894), Solovʹev, citing 
Goethe, argued that Werther’s eventual suicide bears testament to the impassioned intensity of his 
love. Love that aimed toward spiritual truth and the sublime is certainly human and not animal, 
and it likewise has absolutely nothing to do with the sexual act or procreation. Instead, it is tied to 
mortality, finitude, and the risk of self-annihilation: “the most powerful love is very often found 
to be unrequited and produces not a great offspring but no offspring whatsoever […] even if the 
ardent Werther didn’t kill himself, his unhappy passion nevertheless remains an inexplicable riddle 
for the theory of qualified offspring” (Smysl, 11). As for Kojève, for Solov΄ev the greatest desire 
was one that ends in the threat of negation for its own sake. And just as Kojève credited this 
negation with inaugurating human subjectivity (if we recall, humanity is won only through the 
fight for recognition, and another’s desire is only won when one risks one’s life), Solovʹev also 
claimed that love saves the individual from pure egoism, while preserving and elevating their 
individuality: 
                                                 
65 “l’Idée unitotale est l’idée de l’amour, que Dieu est amour, que l’Amour divin est l’amour de Dieu pour l’Homme 
et de l’Homme pour Dieu, que cet amour libre ou cette liberté dans et par l’amour est l’essence et l’être même de 
l’Homme idéel.” 
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 Truth, as a living power that takes possession over the internal essence of a human and 
actually removes him from his false sense of self-affirmation, is called love. Love, as the 
actual abolition of egoism, is the actual justification and salvation of individuality. Love is 
greater than rational consciousness, but without it love could not act as an internal saving 
power, elevating and not abolishing individuality. Only thanks to rational consciousness 
(or, what is the same thing, a consciousness of truth) can a human being distinguish himself, 
that is, his true individuality, from his egoism. Therefore, in sacrificing this egoism and 
surrendering himself to love, he finds in it not merely a living but life-giving power and 
does not lose his individual essence with his egoism, but on the contrary immortalizes it. 
In the world of animals, as a result of their lack of proper rational consciousness, the truth, 
which realizes itself in love, does not find in them any internal point of support for their 
actions. It can only act directly, as an external fateful power, taking possession of them like 
blind instruments for world ends totally unknown to them. (18)66 
The particularities of this line of anthropocentric thinking within Russian philosophy, and 
culminating in Kojève, will be addressed in detail elsewhere, yet Solovʹev’s erotic spiritualism 
relies heavily on the distinction between earthly and spiritual love germane to the Neoplatonic 
tradition of love originally inspired by Plato. Indeed, as Love has illustrated at length, Solovʹev’s 
                                                 
66 “Истина, как живая сила, овладевающая внутренным существом человека и действительно выводящая его 
из ложного самоутверждения, называется любовью. Любовь, как действительное упразднение эгоизма, есть 
действительное оправдание и спасение индивидуальности. Любовь больше, чем разумное сознание, но без 
него она не могла бы действовать как внутренная спасительная сила, возвышающая, а не упраздняющая 
индивидуальность. Только благодаря разумному сознанию (или, что то же, сознанию истины) человек может 
различать самого себя, т. е. свою истинную индивидуальность, от своего эгоизма, а потому, жертвуя этим 
эгоизмом, отдаваясь сам любви, он находит в ней не только живую, но и животворящую силу и не теряет 
вместе со своим эгоизмом свое индивидуальное существо, а, на против, увековечивает его. В мире животных 
вследствие отсутствия у них собственного разумного сознания истина, реализирующаяся в любви, не находя 
в них внутренней точки опоры для своего действия, может действовать лишь прямо, как внешняя для них 
роковая сила, завладевающая ими как слепыми орудиями для чуждых им мировых целей.” 
 65 
Platonic influences are crucial to understanding the image Kojève crafts where “the body is 
suffused with the absolute” (Love, The Black Circle 77). All animals, including humans, are 
capable of the physical act of reproduction, and, according to Solovʹev, “the higher we ascend in 
the hierarchy of organisms, the weaker becomes the power of propagation and greater, on the other 
hand, the power of sexual attraction” (7).67 In his view, “lesser” animals reproduce more, yet have 
less of both individuality and, with it, a defined sexual attraction. Arriving at humanity, humankind 
differs from animality in that it does not need to rely on sexual reproduction to achieve its ends: 
“[w]hat rational basis can one conceive of for the creation of new forms by nature more complete, 
when there is already a form capable of eternal self-perfection and able to accommodate the 
fullness of absolute content?” (15)68 While of course humanity reproduces, any true spiritual love 
will transcend mere physicality, for with physical reproduction comes the mortality of the animal 
condition at the base of humanity, thereby evading the union of flesh and spirit that defines 
Sophiology and Divine Humanity. If “physical union cannot really restore the integrity of the 
human being, then this means that the false union must be replaced by a true one,” that is, one that 
“presupposes the true separateness of the united ones […] each finding in the other the fullness of 
his own proper life” (34, 54).69 
                                                 
67 “чем выше поднимамся мы по леснице организмов, тем сила размножения становится меньше, а сила 
полового влечения, напротив, больше.” 
68 “Какое разумное основание можно придумать для создания новых, по существу более совершенных форм, 
когда есть уже форма, способная к бесконечному самоусовершенствованию, могущая вместить всю полноту 
абсолютного содержания?” 
69 “физиологическое соединение не может действительно восстановить цельность человеческого существа, 
то, значит, это ложное соединение должно быть заменено истинным соединением”; “предполагает истинную 
раздельность соединяемых […] находя каждый в другом полноту собственной жизни.” 
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2.3 From Russia, With Love 
The question of whether “spiritual love” included the actual physical act of sex intensely 
occupied modern Russian religious philosophy in Solovʹev’s wake. Following Solovʹev’s death in 
1900, the main figures of the Russian Religious Renaissance continued the philosopher’s tradition 
of combining Hegel, Neoplatonism, and (now explicitly) psychoanalysis in their attempt to 
delineate the “goals” of spiritual love in the pursuit of a totalizing philosophical system. Pavel 
Florensky, for example, in his magnum opus Pillar and Foundation of Truth (1914) placed the 
question of love and intersubjectivity at the foundation of his modern theology: the book is written 
in epistolary form to an imaginary friend and speculates on the various forms of Christian “love” 
and “friendship.” Delineating the various Greek terms for love, Florensky denies a place for 
“sensual” eros in Christianity, opting instead to emphasize the interaction between agape and 
philos. In his words, “a double bond unites and maintains religious society […] for ancient society 
these bonds were eros as an individual force, and storge as a familial base [nachalo rodovoe]. In 
these lay the metaphysical foundation for social being. In contrast, the natural soil for Christian 
society as such became philia in the personal realm and agape in the social one” (411).70 It is in 
this vein that Florensky constructs his philosophy of Christian love, in which brotherly love, based 
on one subject dyadically finding itself in another, is transcendental, ontological, and eternal. He 
separates two desires, one immanently grounded in lust [vozhdelenie] and one transcendentally 
grounded in mutual camaraderie. 
                                                 
70 “Двойным скрепом объединяется и сдерживается религиозное общество […] Для античного общества 
такими двумя скрепам были ἔρως, как сила личная, и στοργὴ, как начало родовое; именно в них лежал 
метафизический устой общественного бытия. Напротив, естественною почвою для христианского общества, 
как такого, стали φιλία, в области личной, и ἀγάπη, – в общественной.” 
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Although the interpretation of Solovʹev’s philosophy that guides Kojève’s own work is 
explicitly atheist, it is clear that Kojève owes much of his project in particular to the religious 
Russian peers whose company he kept upon relocating to France in 1926. Indeed, an investigation 
into erotic desire’s pride of place amongst émigré “sophiologists” sheds light on the extent of 
confluence between Kojève’s own Orthodox influences and later French theories of desire. As 
discussed in the preceding chapter, numerous Russian philosophers abroad were more explicitly 
expelled from the Soviet Union than Kojève, who was not on the “Philosophers’ Ships,” yet 
nonetheless integrated into the forcibly expatriated Russian intelligentsia. These diasporic 
philosophers, such as Sergei Bulgakov and Lev Karsavin, continued to work in a post-
sophiological tradition upon eventually settling in Paris. Bulgakov in particular garnered further 
criticism in the 1930s from the official Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russian (ROCOR) for 
his theologically scandalous works on Sophia, and, in 1935, ROCOR formally accused Bulgakov 
of heresy for these views. While no formal correspondence or direct influence connects Kojève to 
Bulgakov, Kojève had a well-documented friendship with Karsavin and other Russian 
philosophers in France, and certainly the debates surrounding Sophiology within the Russian 
community in Paris must have tempered Kojève’s own work on desire as he delivered his famous 
seminars several arrondissements over.  
Sophiology, as espoused by Bulgakov, shares with Kojève’s work the fundamental belief 
that desire phenomenologically engenders humankind. If we recall, Kojève suggested that human 
desire differs from animalistic desire only in that it is willing to die in order to satisfy its desire for 
recognition of its status from an other. Risk of death for desire becomes the defining characteristic 
of Kojève’s anthropology:  
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a struggle for life and death, because Desire that aims at a Desire  overcomes any biological 
given, in that the Action brought about by this Desire is not limited by that given. In other 
words, Man risks his biological life to satisfy a non-biological Desire. And Hegel says that 
the being who is incapable of putting one’s life in peril in order to attain not immediately 
vital aims, that is to say, who cannot risk one’s life in a Struggle for Recognition, in a 
struggle of pure status, is not a truly human being.71 (Introduction 197, emphasis in 
original) 
Man must therefore “lift himself beyond his biological instinct of conservation (his identity)” (198, 
emphasis in original) in order to achieve true, human desire that inaugurates the historical process 
toward total mastery (what Solovʹev would refer to as Godmanhood [bogochelovechestvo] and that 
Kojève refers to as the Sage).72 
Bulgakov’s reworking of Solovʹev’s Sophia, as the passive feminine pairing to the active 
Logos, likewise emphasizes the need for death and mortality in love, yet it is still based in a 
sentimentality befitting an (albeit eclectic) Orthodox theological exegesis. Bulgakov defines 
Sophia as “a mutual love, in which each of the hypostases, by a timeless act of self-giving in love, 
reveals itself in both the others” (Sophia 34). Sophia for Bulgakov “appears not only as the wisdom 
present at creation but as the power that gave God strength to rule over everything, as the artist 
(feminine) who created everything, as an infinitely mobile and sparkling reflect of the eternal light” 
(Evtuhov, 154-155). To attempt to concretize an intentionally elusive category, one can define 
Bulgakov’s Sophia as a spiritual love that, in the manner of an ontological glue, helps to connect 
                                                 
71 “Une Lutte pour la vie et la mort, parce que le Désir qui porte sur un Désir portant sur un Désir dépasse le donné 
biologique, de sorte que l’Action effectuée en fonction de ce Désir n’est pas limitée par ce donné. Autrement dit, 
l’Homme risquera sa vie biologique pour satisfaire son Désir non-biologique.” 
72 “s’élever au-dessus de son instinct biologique de conservation (identité)” 
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the Orthodox hypostases (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) to our perceivable world. Bulgakov imagines 
this task twofold: first, Sophia helps to solve the ontological problem in Orthodoxy and general 
Christian theology whereby God is three distinct persons, or hypostases, yet one underlying 
substance (ousia). Second, and finding resonance here with Kojève’s philosophy of desire, Sophia 
through love permits an “entryway” of sorts for humanity to achieve divinity in the material world. 
Given that Sophia symbolizes the spiritualization of matter, humanity may, so long as it desires to 
find union with Sophia, become the creative image of God, the “absolute in the becoming” 
(Evtuhov 105). This theological love underpins Solovʹev’s previously mentioned philosophy of 
Divine Humanity, characterizing the convergence of the earthly and the divine, and man’s place 
therein, in terms of an erotic union. Bulgakov imagines God’s love, or Sophia, as kenosis, whereby 
God diminishes himself in order to allow for both the creation of humanity and its ability to achieve 
connection with the divine through spiritual love. The term “kenosis,” a Koine Greek word based 
on the verb “to empty,” entered the Orthodox theological lexicon through Paul in the New 
Testament: “who, though he was in the form of God, did not consider equality with God as 
something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human 
likeness.” (The Bible: New Oxford Annotated Version, Philippians 2:6-7). In order for man to 
become God and God to become man, however, it is necessary that God, the divine, actively 
empties himself and seeks mortality and humanity in the death of Jesus Christ: “Sophia—
antinomically—condescends itself in the kenosis of the Son of God who descends from heaven to 
earth, in the self-diminishing of Christ. […] In a way which is incomprehensible to man, divine 
nature diminished itself so far as to allow the death of human nature, uniting itself with it in an 
indivisible manner” (Kiejzik, 60). By embracing death, both in humanity as well as in the divine 
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Son, Sophia embodies the highest aim of spiritual love and connectivity. Sophia’s gift of divine 
mortality is what enables humanity to in turn aim towards the divine. 
Although Karsavin openly expressed disdain for what he called the “aesthetic-religious 
decadence, Latinism, and sophianism” of theologians like Bulgakov, his own theology of desire 
exposes his contrast with Bulgakov as one of degree and not kind.73 Unlike the relationship 
between Bulgakov and Kojève, of which nothing concrete demonstrating immediate 
correspondence in Paris or St. Petersburg has been found, a clear relationship exists between 
Karsavin and Kojève. This may betray the more direct influence he may have had on Kojève, 
acting both as a fellow philosopher in exile and as a close friend—it is through Karsavin and his 
circle, for example, that Kojève first met Nina Ivanova, his longtime partner who was the best 
friend of Karsavin’s youngest daughter (Rutkevich “Formirovanie” 9). Karsavin’s legacy abroad 
in France is much shorter lived: he established a new intellectual circle amongst Russian émigrés 
in Clamart (just outside of Paris) with Berdiaev but was refused a professorial position at the St. 
Sergius Institute, offered instead to Georges Florovsky, and he moved in 1928 to Kaunas, 
Lithuania, to accept a position as Professor of World History. Following the Soviet occupation of 
Lithuania, Karsavin was arrested and died of tuberculosis in a labor camp in 1952 (Meerson-
Aksenov 140-141). Before his death, however, Karsavin continued to meet regularly with Kojève 
in his frequent travels to Western Europe to discuss theology and philosophy of history, and it 
would therefore not be surprising if Kojève’s philosophy took heavy inspiration from Karsavin’s 
work (Auffret 158). 
                                                 
73 In a debate in Parisian émigré journal The Way over Eurasianism, Karsavin defended his fellow Eurasianists from 
any suggestion of camaraderie with sophiologists: “[мы] не можем по разуму и совести высоко поставить 
эстетическо-религиозное упадочничество, латиинство и софианство” (“Otvet” 98). This deflection, however, 
may have been less a question of conceptual disagreement than one of political orientation. 
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Part of Karsavin’s major legacy within Russian philosophy lies in an anthropological 
development of Solovʹev’s theory of pan-unity (vseedinstvo). Khoruzhii describes it as “a 
construction of pan-unity as a complicated hierarchy of ‘moments’ or ‘qualifyings’ 
(kachestvovaniia) in various orders, connected to one another in a relationship of ‘contractedness’ 
(stiazhennosti)” (“Filosofiia Karsavina” 204).74 Karsavin justifies theologically the personality’s 
“finiteness,” including its mortality, on the premise that subjectivity is always based on 
interrelations with others, finally and most importantly with God.75 His extrapolation on 
humankind’s emergence before God is, if not explicitly and formally dialectical, at the very least 
dialogical. Borrowing heavily from Solovʹev, and betraying his similarities with Bulgakov, 
Karsavin describes the emergence of the human personality as follows: “First, only God. Then, a 
dying God and an emerging creature. Then, only a creature instead of God. Then, a dying creature 
and a resurrecting God. Then, again only God” (171-172).76 His sole piece devoted exclusively to 
the question of love, Noctes Petropolitanae (1922), imagines spiritual love as similar to 
Bulgakov’s, where love serves the larger theandric process of connecting humankind to the 
Absolute: 
I cannot come to know myself completely and perceive myself as a unity or person without 
having drawn myself together first, and I can only draw myself together if I’m not 
                                                 
74 “конструкция всеединства как сложной иерархии «моментов» или «качествований» разных порядков, 
связанных между собой отношением «стяженности»”; according to Khoruzhii, Karsavin borrows the term 
“стяженность” from the theology of Nicholas of Cusa, who imagined creatures as finite, “contracted” and 
interrelational images of God, with only God representing the total image (204). Bergson also provides a theory of 
contraction and interrelation in his Matter and Memory (1896), yet any influence on Karsavin’s work is unclear. 
75 It should be reiterated here that Karsavin’s development of the term “personality” (“личность”) belongs to the same 
theological tradition as Bulgakov, which uses the Orthodox belief in hypostasis, the possibility of one person in 
multiple natures (e.g., Father, Son, Holy Spirit), to account for the emergence and particularity of an individual subject 
or “personality.” 
76 “Сначала—только один Бог, потому—Бог умирающий и тварь возникающий, потом—только одна тварь 
вместо Бога, потом—тварь умирающий и Бог воскресающий, потом—опять один только Бог.” 
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boundless and if beyond my limits something opposes me. Self-contractedness, self-
awareness builds personhood necessarily limited in its originality, but in my love I come 
to know that my personhood is only a part of a higher personhood, the second half of which 
is in my beloved. In love I overcome the limits of my person, at the same time outlining 
them for the first time, and I recognize myself as a twofold personality. My twofold 
personality follows from the fact that, recognizing myself as a definite, bounded unity, I 
absorb into myself the just as definite and bounded unity of my beloved and pour myself 
completely out into it. (169-170)77 
Karsavin relies upon the interconnectivity between the subject and his beloved to eventually argue 
for the primacy of God as the being that unites all through love. As Nikolai Lossky describes it, 
“Karsavin supposes that if something, even a created something, were ontologically external to 
God, it would limit God. Hence Karsavin staunchly maintains that God is pan-unity, and creature 
is nothing” (302). For Karsavin, as well as for many modern Russian Orthodox theologians, the 
reciprocities of love provide evidence for a greater reciprocity between the material and the divine, 
allowing Karsavin to essentially repeat his formulation of love as the same underlying formulation 
of the triune nature of God: if love requires self-affirmation outside of oneself, then the Father, for 
example, receives its essence as much from the Son as vice versa, yet they are mere manifestations 
of the same one God. 
                                                 
77 “Не могу познать себя я всецело и постичь как единство или личность, не собрав себя самого; а собрать себя 
я могу только, если не безграничен я и если за гранями моими что-то мне противостоит. Самостяжение, 
самосознание созидает личность, в самобытии своем необходимо ограниченную. Но в любви моей познаю я, 
что моя личность лишь часть высшей личности, другая половина которой в любимой моей. В любви 
превозмогаю я грани моей личности, в то же время впервые их ясно очерчивая, и сознаю себя личностью 
двуединой. Двуединая личность моя становится в том что, сознавая себя определенным, ограниченным 
единством, я вбираю в себя столь же определенное или ограниеченное единство любимой и всецело себя 
изливаю в него.” 
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The similarities between Karsavin and Kojève’s secular interpretation are most striking in 
Kojève’s annotated translation of the fourth chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which 
precedes the notes on his seminars collected and published by Raymond Queneau in 1947: 
 The man “absorbed” by the object he contemplates can only be “called to himself” by a 
Desire: by the desire to eat, for example. It’s the (conscious) Desire of a being which 
constitutes this being as Me and reveals it as such by forcing it to say: “I…”. It is Desire 
that transforms Being revealed to itself by itself in (true) knowledge, in an “object” 
revealed to a “subject” by a subject different from the object and “opposed” to it. It is in 
and through, or better yet as, its Desire that man constitutes himself and reveals himself –
to himself and to others—as a Me, as the Me essentially different from, and radically 
opposed to, not-Me. The (human) Me is the Me of a—or the—Desire. (13-14)78 
As with Kojève, it is unclear whether Karsavin or Bulgakov imagined their philosophies of love 
to include the act of procreation. This is particularly crucial given the link established by other 
philosophers between love, procreation, and history. 
Berdiaev, for example, in echoes of Florensky (and, by extension, Solovʹev), distinguished 
procreative love in particular as an impediment to the totality sought by Russian religious 
philosophy:  
 reproductive, sexual love [rodovaia, polovaia liubov'] fractures individuality and aims for 
the immortality of a family, for the creation of many beings as opposed to one complete 
                                                 
78 “L’homme « absorbé » par l’objet qu’il contemple ne peut être « rappelé à lui » que par un Désir : par le désir de 
manger, par exemple. C’est le Désir (conscient) d’un être qui constitue cet être en tant que Moi et le révèle en tant que 
tel n le poussant à dire : « Je… ». C’est le Désir qui transforme l’Être révélé à lui-même par lui-même dans la 
connaissance (vraie), en un « objet » révélé à un « sujet » par un sujet différent de l’objet et « opposé » à lui. C’est 
dans et par, ou mieux encore, en tant que « son » Désir que l’homme se constitue et se révèle—à soi-même et aux 
autres—comme un Moi, comme le Moi essentiellement différent du, et radicalement oppose au, non-Moi. Le Moi 
(humain) est le Moi d’un—ou du—Désir.” 
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being, and for a bad infinity and eternal return. True love, overcoming sex, should direct 
all human energy inward and into eternity instead of outward and over time. This false cult 
of the future, this false-progressiveness has been tied to reproductive sex (239, emphasis 
mine).  
Humankind becomes bogged down in the material world when it focuses the goals of love toward 
procreation and not toward the divine. Note here in particular the contrast Berdiaev establishes 
between sexual reproduction and historical time, on the one hand, and transcendental love on the 
other. History is understood as the procession of (sexual) reproduction over generations, 
preventing the larger goal of complete unity. Of course, as Love correctly points out, this fracturing 
of historical progress and sexual reproduction already found its apex earlier, in the philosophy of 
Nikolai Fedorov and his “Common Task.” There Fedorov famously claimed “that the only 
emancipatory ideal for humanity is to achieve universal immortality (and universal resurrection of 
the dead) through technological advancement” and at the expense of sexual activity, which was 
viewed as a distraction to the cause (Love 5). To reproduce is to move history forward in the wrong 
direction. 
What I wish to stress, however, is the opposition posed between history and love in the 
Russian Silver Age tradition. Olga Matich summarizes this influence of Solovʹev’s eroticism rather 
succinctly: “[l]ove’s goal was to bring history, associated with the irrevocable natural cycle, to an 
end and to immortalize the body” (74). While Kojève accepts this opposition, and what Matich 
describes as the “apocalyptic rupture” of the Russian modernists, his “choice” of history over love 
renders a major break from the Russian tradition before him (9).  
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2.4 The Break With the Russian Tradition 
If we recall Kojève’s own view on love and history, Kojève also wanted to separate history 
from love altogether, yet unlike his Russian peers he chooses history instead of love (arguing that 
Hegel made the same break in his earlier years). Furthermore, although for him mortality/death 
accordingly plays a fundamental role in the understanding of history, he chooses not to identify 
mortality with procreation and ignores the relationship, essential to the religious philosophers, 
between the production of children and the continuation of human history at the expense of 
eternity. Though an avowed atheist, Kojève sympathizes with his religious peers when they prefer 
human oneness over fragmentary reproductive sex, making it the defining characteristic of his 
anthropology: man must “lift himself beyond his biological instinct of conservation (his identity)” 
through desire for recognition (Introduction 198, emphasis in original).  
Herein lie both the continuity with and reaction against Russian religious philosophy that 
we curiously find in Kojève’s interpretation of desire: Kojève accepts both the rejection of 
“biological,” animalistic reproduction and the endorsement of the unity of the individual as the 
teleological goal, yet he simultaneously argues for “history” and denies transcendental love as the 
link to God, the logic of which necessarily undergirds Russian religious philosophy’s monist 
integrity—after all, why would Orthodox thought deny immanent, reproductive love if there were 
no transcendental love in exchange? As a militant atheist with a clear eye to remove God from his 
interpretation and replace him with historicized human potential, Kojève, in his own provocative 
style, embraces the finitude of the human and its search for self-realization in the face of death, 
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placing this search at the core of his understanding of history.79 This process of self-realization, 
however, nonetheless utilizes the same interrelational subjectivity of his theist peers, where at the 
end of self-realization, the infamous conclusion of said history, “the synthesis of Master and Slave 
is realized, the synthesis that is the integral Human, the Citizen of the universal and homogenous 
State, created by Napoleon” (Introduction 201).80 
For Solovʹev, humanity’s self-realization was embodied Divine Humanity, the synthesis of 
the human and spiritual achieved specifically through love that justifies humanity’s historical 
development. If love then is not merely the propagation of the species, it is for Solovʹev the ever-
approaching union with God, viewed in terms of sexuality where the union is one “of flesh and 
spirit [which] takes place along the lines of sexual intercourse” and inaugurates the divine on Earth 
as well as transcendentally (Kornblatt 70). Kojève denies the transcendental, and he furthermore 
prefers history over love, yet his formulation of an atheist development of history adopts a fair 
amount of Solovʹev’s language, as desire is responsible for the initiation of historical self-
realization. Kojève seizes from Solovʹev the belief that men (Jesus, Napoleon, Stalin) can become 
God, yet their becoming of God is immanent rather than transcendental: there is no Other, divine 
hereafter, no mutual Love therefore to unite them, and “becoming God” here merely indicates the 
successful synthesis of the Hegelian opposition through man’s labor. It is another example of 
Kojève’s atheist reworking of Orthodox Christian theology, and one, moreover, that he suggests 
in his dissertation that Solovʹev himself was anticipating.   
                                                 
79 It would of course be incomplete not to acknowledge the inheritance of Martin Heidegger’s “Being-toward-Death” 
in Kojève’s interpretation as a way to assuage the vacuum left from the disavowal of transcendental love. That said, I 
am more interested here in discussing his reorientation of particularly Russian religious thought and its continued 
framing of his work.  
80 “la synthèse du Maître et de l’Esclave, cette synthèse qu’est l’Homme intégral, le Citoyen de l’État universel et 
homogène, crée par Napoléon.” 
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Kojève finds in Solov΄ev’s last work, Three Conversations, written months before his 
death, one final stage in the development of the philosopher’s worldview and a source for Kojève’s 
own break with the Russian Orthodox emphasis on love. In it, Solovʹev expounds on the question 
of a post-historical condition seen through the story of the anti-Christ. He describes a synthesis not 
unlike Hegel’s, where qualities like good and evil have been undone thanks to the labor of the anti-
Christ, who has solved the major problems of the world and reconciled man to nature. The trouble, 
however, is that the anti-Christ is not Christ as he claims, again raising for Solovʹev and Orthodoxy 
more broadly the question of satisfaction of one’s desires without transcendental love. Other than 
ontologically, there is virtually no practical distinction between Christ and the anti-Christ; both 
could theoretically establish, as the Anti-Christ in Solovʹev’s story does, a utopia on Earth. 
According to Kojève, “Solovʹev no longer believed that history leads in a steady progression to 
the realization of ‘total life’, of the ‘kingdom of God on Earth,’ or that with this realization history 
finds its natural conclusion” (“Die Geschichtsphilosophie” 17). The anti-Christ figure instead 
represents the final realization of life on Earth, one devoid of any transcendental love seen in 
Solovʹev’s previous metaphysics. In Solovʹev’s story, the remaining religious Christians (with help 
from the Jews) fight one final battle, destroy the anti-Christ, and bring about the collapse of the 
finite world. As Kojève describes it: 
 Since at that point history is for Solovʹev no longer the gradual reconstitution of 
godmanhood and the return of fallen Sophia to God, but rather a perpetual battle of the 
principle of evil with that of the good, a battle which, though it ends with the victory of the 
latter, at the same time has as a consequence the annihilation of a large part of the empirical 
world: the kingdom of God lies on the other side of history which itself is abandoned to 
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the dominion of evil. It could be that Solovʹev from this point of view is moving towards a 
specific essence of the Historical. (19)81 
Just as Kojève sought to differentiate two Hegels, an earlier one which believed in Love as a 
humanizing principle and the later one who decided definitively on History, here again Kojève 
strains to differentiate an earlier Solovʹev caught up in transcendental love from a later, pessimistic 
one redefined by a secular sense of history. By stressing the lack of reconciliation of the world 
with the Divine in the later Solovʹev, Kojève reverts to the same duality that he will emphasize 
years later in his Hegelian seminars, where the articulation of Lord and Bondsman override any 
sense of closure in Kojevian Hegelianism. This establishes a remarkably ignored degree of 
continuity with Russian religious philosophy in Kojève’s thought which speaks to later challenges 
in understanding the philosopher’s legacy. 
2.5 The Homogenous State or Eternal Difference? 
Like his religious peers such as Bulgakov or Karsavin, Kojève postulates that the human 
subject lacks self-sustained stability, and that it is only through an Other that the subject achieves 
self-certainty. Judith Butler describes this innovation of Kojève’s over Hegel as “the human 
subject as a mode of Becoming, internally nonidentical” (15, emphasis added). Kojève’s major 
                                                 
81 “Denn jetzt ist die Geschichte für Solowjew nicht mehr die allmähliche Wiederherstellung des Gottmenschentums 
und die Rückkehr der abgefallenen Sophia zu Gott, sondern ein fortwährender Kampf des bösen Prinzips mit dem 
Guten, ein Kampf, der zwar mit dem Siege des letzteren endet, aber zugleich auch die Vernichtung des größten Teiles 
der empirischen Welt zur Folge hat: das Gottesreich wird jenseits der Geschichte verlegt und diese eigentlich der 
Herrschaft des Bösen preisgegeben. Es mag sein, daß Solowjew auf diesem Standpukte dem spezifischen Wesen des 
Historischen näher kommen, dessen selbständige Bedeutung besser erfassen und die seiner früheren Methaphysik 
anhaftenden inneren Antinomien überwinden würde, aber davon wissen wir, wie gesagt, nichts.” 
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debt to the sophiologists following in Solovʹev’s footsteps lay in an understanding of the internally 
nonidentical subject as a function of the ontological primacy of love—namely, that love 
(poeticized as Sophia) is the force that both destabilizes and constitutes the subject. This paradox 
of subject formation, championed by Solovʹev in The Meaning of Love as the ego death necessary 
in the unfolding of spiritual love, becomes translated by Kojève into an interpretation of Hegel as 
a philosopher of alterity, what Žižek calls “the strongest affirmation yet of difference and 
contingency” (Sublime Object of Ideology 7).   
The greatest of challenge therefore in understanding Kojève’s Hegelianism lies in its 
position both as a vision of alterity and difference, with the aforementioned appeals to perpetual 
difference between Subject and Other, and as a philosophy of the universal, homogenous state at 
the end of History. The paradox begins when Kojève equates love and labor in his philosophy: 
desire serves to negate but preserve the externality of the object of desire, so that Hegel’s logic of 
sublation (Aufhebung) reveals for Kojève a historicized process of healing humankind’s alienation 
from itself, its others, and so on until the manifestation of Absolute Spirit, for Kojève the 
appearance of a final state defined by pure managerialism and embodied in first Napoleonic 
France, then Stalinist Russia, and lastly De Gaullist France. Groys argues that the philosopher 
imagined said bureaucratic world beyond History as one devoid of any necessary sexual relation, 
at least philosophically:  
[Kojève] points out that the realization of desire, the realization of love, means their 
disappearance. Every desire can be satisfied—and, therefore, finalized. Satisfaction puts 
an end to desire. The end of history is possible and inevitable because there is no such thing 
as infinite desire. The universal and homogeneous state is for Kojève the final truth, 
because it is the state of love that satisfies in a finalizing way our desire for recognition. 
 80 
Kojève carried out a radical sexualization of reason, history and politics; the sexualization 
that he learned from Solovyov. […] Kojève is thematizing in the first place not desire itself, 
but rather the philosophical state of mind after its satisfaction. For Kojève thought is 
posthistorical because it is post-coital. (Introduction to Antiphilosophy 158). 
This seems to be based off the premise that, if History is understood as the long process of 
reconciliation to one’s desires, then any theoretical end to History for Kojève would be the result 
of an ultimate satisfaction of desire altogether: 
 Man can be truly “satisfied,” History can end, only with and through the formation of a 
Society, a State, where the strictly particular, personal, individual values of each are 
recognized as such, in their very particularity, by all, by the Universality incarnated in the 
State as such, and where the universal values of the State are recognized and realized by 
the Particular as Particular, but all the Particulars. (Introduction 215, emphasis in 
original)82 
It is indeed a clever thought experiment, to imagine how philosophy could exist in utopia, the 
conditions of which are determined through philosophy itself. Liberal political interpreters of 
Kojève have taken this idea of satisfaction in two directions. One, Francis Fukuyama, saw in 
Kojève’s End of History the theorization of American neoliberalism, perhaps taking direction from 
Kojève’s infamous remark that the United States had achieved the final stage of “Marxist 
‘communism’” in that every member of society had access to whatever goods they may need.83 
Another direction, recently taken by Mark Lilla and formulated years earlier by Shadia Drury, 
                                                 
82 “l’Homme ne peut être vraiment «satisfait», l’Histoire ne peut s’arrêter, que dans et par la formation d’une Société, 
d’un État, où la valeur strictement particulière, personnelle, individuelle de chacun est reconnue en tant que telle, dans 
sa particularité même, par tous, par l’Universalité incarnée dans l’État en tant que tel, et où la valeur universelle de 
l’État est reconnue et réalisée par le Particulier en tant que Particulier, par tous les Particuliers.” 
83 See Kojève’s footnote, 436, and Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 
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takes Kojève to task for what Lilla sees as the philosopher’s indifference to the risks of political 
engagement within philosophy, so long as the proposed final state achieves homogenous 
satisfaction.84 
While it would, of course, be facile to deduce the particularities of Kojève’s theories of 
desire and satisfaction to merely the particularities of Orthodox theology, it is difficult not to see 
some influence of the immanent materiality of Orthodoxy on Kojève’s belief in the immanent 
totality of difference emblematized in desire as a historical project. In particular, Karsavin, who 
advocated for reciprocity of all things in God as pan-unity, finds resonance in Kojève’s advocacy 
of the particularity under the universal State. One cannot also but think of Bulgakov’s vision of a 
“sophic economy” (sofiinostʹ khoziaistva), where man’s ability to partake of Sophia (Kojève’s 
desire) permits his labor to overcome “the division of subject and object, for it posits the 
fundamentally active nature of their relationship” (Evtuhov 168). As Catherine Evtuhov notes, 
Sophia allows Bulgakov to imagine the formation of a social order (economy, labor, general 
collective human productivity) in sexualized terms, with the original exchange between 
masculinized Man and feminized Nature understood as a harmonious marital union: “Labor 
becomes the bridge from the ‘I’ to the ‘not-I’” (168). Kojève merely had to secularize these eclectic 
sophiologies in order to turn a philosophical justification of Orthodox social life under God into a 
“universal, homogeneous state, in which all citizens are satisfied” and which is also “the world 
that no one can manage to overcome” (Geroulanos 145). This becomes what Butler describes as 
Kojève’s “ideal Hegelian society as one that maintains a dialectical mediation of individuality and 
                                                 
84 Lilla, The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics and Drury, Alexandre Kojève: The Roots of Postmodern Politics. 
Both arguments are based in the exchange between Kojève and Leo Strauss over the role of philosophy in politics, see 
Strauss, On Tyranny. 
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collectivity. In fact, collective life appears to gain its final measure and legitimation in proving 
capable of recognizing individual desires” (78).  
Regardless of their valences, each interpretation of the satisfaction of desire at the End of 
History rests upon an oscillation between dualism and its mitigation in Kojèvian Hegelianism. It 
is almost certainly the case that the two aspects of Kojève’s thought are simply irreconcilable, a 
fact which would please Kojève himself, but what one can do is find the source of this troubled 
irreconcilability in the philosopher’s intellectual heritage. In particular, the work of F.W.J. 
Schelling, one of the last German idealists and contemporary counterweight to Hegel, looms over 
the Solovʹev-Kojève connection. To a lover of Russian philosophy, this should come as no 
surprise, as most histories of Russian philosophy begin with the various circles of intelligentsia 
devoted to Schelling and Hegel in the early nineteenth-century. To quote Dmitrii Chizhevsky, 
“more than one Russian Hegelian passed through Schellingism,” so that to discuss one necessitates 
discussing the other (22). Solovʹev shared in particular with Schelling “a struggle against abstract 
rationalism and formal logical metaphysics,” which pitted both of them against a monolithic 
Hegelian Absolute (Losev 193).85 Kojève himself was aware of this fact—in his dissertation and 
articles on Solovʹev, he describes the Russian philosopher as an almost proxy of Schelling: 
“everything that he [Solovʹev] says of the Absolute and its ‘other’ is in short nothing more than a 
very simplified and impoverished paraphrase of several of Schelling’s speculations, which, on this 
                                                 
85 As Chizhevsky notes, Russian religious critiques of Hegel, found largely amongst the Slavophiles Ivan Kireevsky 
and Aleksei Khomiakov and inherited by Solov’ev, often accused the German philosopher of equating rationalism 
with totality: “Khomiakov’s objection is directed precisely against the incompleteness, limitedness of the sphere of 
theoretical knowledge in Hegel’s system, a system which after all wants to be all encompassing and universal. Hegel’s 
system of knowledge is actually deprived of that fullness to which it pretends since it does not take into consideration 
feeling and will, which are both immanent to knowledge” (216).  
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point, merely follow and develop the thought of Jacob Böhme” (“La métaphysique religieuse de 
Vladimir Soloviev (1)” 544).86 
What is this Absolute and its ‘other,’ and how can it help in our understanding of difference 
and desire in Kojevian Hegelianism? Schelling’s theory of God and His Ground emerged from a 
need to explain the imperfections of the world despite the presence of God. Based on a belief that 
human freedom meant the ability to commit both good and evil, Schelling concluded that since 
evil was independent from God, it required finding within God something which is not God, 
therefore critiquing Hegel’s closed system of logic, which implies rational coherence under 
Absolute Spirit. Imagining a primordial, mad God before the Creation, Schelling proposed that 
this God had to expel his “Ground,” or the finite existence (notably humanity) that gives him 
substance, to self-differentiate and establish his own existence as Absolute. Human evil is therefore 
an indicator of a lack, or disjunct, between the totality of God and our freedom from enslavement 
to this totality. The importance of Schelling’s philosophy lies in understanding this lack as integral 
to the very totality to which it is opposed. In a passage referenced by Kojève in his essay on 
Solovʹev, Schelling describes the relationship between God and His Ground as follows:  
 In the circle through which all things go, it is no contradiction that that through which the 
One is produced, is in turn conceived by It. There is no first or last here, for everything is 
mutually supposed, there is no other nor no without other. God has within Himself an inner 
Ground to His existence, which in this respect precedes him as Existence. But even then, 
                                                 
86 “Tout ce qu’il [Soloviev] dit de l’Absolu et de son ‘autre’ n’est en somme, qu’une paraphrase très simplifiée et 
appauvrie de certaines spéculations de Schelling, qui, sur ce point, ne fait d’ailleurs que suivre et développer la pensée 
de Jacob Boehme.” 
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God is the prius of the Ground, in which the Ground as such could not be if God did not 
exist actu (Schelling 358).87 
For man to become divine, there must be a remnant of himself that is not divine to begin with, 
namely the material earthly self that Schelling—and Solovʹev—would describe as evil: “in man 
there is the whole power of the dark principle and at the same time the whole strength of the light. 
In him there is the deepest abyss and the loftiest sky […] Because he emerges from the Ground (is 
creaturely), man has in relation to God a relatively independent principle in himself” (Schelling 
32). Our ability to fight against the evils of the world suggests the existence of what Schelling, and 
Žižek after him, have infamously called an “indivisible remainder,” an unthinkable differential 
that both lays outside the philosophical system it constitutes and is essential to understanding 
difference within totality.88 
Modern Russian Orthodox theology has been heavily influenced by this German idealist 
theodicy, most notably in of Sophia. Indeed, love, envisioned as the sexual coupling of Sophia 
with God, was thought to be a means to reconcile this rift between the Absolute and its Other. In 
this light, Solovʹev and Kojève’s abandonment of love for history is deeply telling. In his later, 
deeply pessimistic period Solovʹev is no longer able to imagine a final unification in love between 
the human and the divine, for there will forever be the evil remainder, embodied in the freedom of 
the anti-Christ. By picking up in his own philosophy where Solovʹev left off, Kojève endorses the 
lingering division between the mortal world of the anti-Christ and the kingdom of God “on the 
                                                 
87 “In dem Zirkel, daraus alles wird, ist es kein Widerspruch, daß das, wodurch das Eine erzeugt wird, selbsts wieder 
von ihm gezeugt werde. Es ist hier kein Erstes und kein Letztes, weil alles sich gegenseitig voraussetzt, keins das 
andere und doch nicht ohne das andere ist. Gott hat in sich einen innern Grund seiner Existenz, der insofern ihm als 
Existirendem vorangeht; aber ebenso ist Gott wieder das Prius des Grundes, indem der Grund, auch als solcher, nicht 
sehn könnte, wenn Gott nicht actu existirte.” 
88 Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder (15-16): “Schelling’s point is a somewhat similar radical uncertainty: will a 
philosopher [Hegel] succeed in containing everything within his system? Or will he, sooner or later, stumble upon an 
element which will unmask his vain pretense and reveal his impotence?” 
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other side of history that itself is abandoned to the dominion of evil,” the moment where Kojève 
finds Solovʹev moving into a development of History. Kojève’s theory of desire and history 
therefore models a larger rift in Russian philosophy between difference and its mitigation through 
a social totality.  
It would be too speculative and facile to claim that Kojève simply takes inspiration for this 
unique interpretation of desire and intersubjectivity from a long tradition in Russian philosophy of 
deploying Schelling to offset Hegelian Absolutism. I would nevertheless propose in conclusion 
that Kojève’s oscillation between difference and totality reflects a larger, still contentious problem 
in the legacy of German idealism, one which survived in full force in the eclecticism of its Russian 
reception. This problem still resurfaces in philosophy and politics in the unlikeliest of places: Žižek 
for example has frequently addressed the problem of the Other and the Absolute, particularly 
through the lens of psychoanalysis, where he invokes Jacques Lacan’s petit objet a and the 
estranged object of desire in psychoanalysis in an explicit lineage from Schelling through to 
Kojève. In politics, Lilla’s recent rant against the place of identity politics in modern liberalism 
illustrates a continuous fear that social difference somehow threatens the social totality from 
without, rather than playing an important role in its very constitution.89 In my view, given Kojève’s 
broad appeal within both liberal political classicism and contemporary critical theory, his 
articulation of a novel interpretation of the Hegelian Master/Slave and the homogenous end state 
of History is a crucial ideational predecessor to these debates. In any case it must be said that 
Kojève’s looming legacy over contemporary thought is in part a response to Russian 
Hegelianism’s own tradition of employing desire to question intersubjectivity’s place within 
universalism. This conflict lived on within a community of émigrés, themselves fixated on both 
                                                 
89 Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. 
 86 
continuity with a national tradition of speculative thought and the need to understand their own 
marginalization and difference in dramatic political exile. 
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3.0 Geopolitics or End of History? Political Aftermaths of the Twentieth Century 
“The goal is—unfortunately!— homogeneous distribution. Whoever—in his hemisphere—
attains it first will be ‘the last.’” – Alexandre Kojève in a letter to Carl Schmitt, May 2, 1955 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc toward the 
end of the twentieth-century, global politics fell into an ideological void—what would now shape 
political conflict worldwide following the dispersal of the conflict between First and Second 
world? No debate held more political relevance and notoriety in the ideological limbo of the post-
Soviet 1990s than that between Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Fukuyama, relying 
heavily on Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel and the “last man” at the End of History, argued for 
liberal democracy as the definitive, enduring political and economic form, one that all states and 
civilizations would see as the result of their own historical developments. Huntington, meanwhile, 
in response infamously dissected the world map into competing cultural spheres of influence, 
claiming that in the post-Cold War “global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational” 
(21, emphasis in original). In Huntington’s view, cultural conflict superseded economic and 
political conflict, thereby refuting Fukuyama’s claim that states will necessarily come to the 
democratic politics allegedly adopted by the West in the pursuit of economic liberalization: “only 
naïve arrogance can lead Westerners to assume that non-Westerners will become ‘Westernized’ 
by acquiring Western goods. What, indeed, does it tell the world about the West when Westerners 
identify civilization with fizzy liquids, faded pants, and fatty foods?” (58) 
Both positions are now, rightfully, seen as antiquated and simplistic in their assessment of 
the post-Soviet world order—Fukuyama has gone so far as to regret his claims and realize that 
perhaps his announcement was a bit premature. Yet while the relationship between these two 
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political theories has historically been characterized as oppositional, their twentieth-century 
development in embryo share significant points of departure, and contemporary politics in the 
United States, Europe, and Russia in fact exhibit influence from both ideological camps. One 
cannot help but observe the diplomatic and military disasters of post-9/11, with its insistence on 
“Axes of Evil” and the incompatibility of Islam with Western-styled society, as indicative of a 
convergence of both Fukuyama and Huntington’s arguments: namely, that the interventionist need 
to “liberate” the markets of the Middle East runs in tandem with the perverse pursuit of global 
liberal democracy as the catchall political form. 
Regardless of one’s position in the debate, it is significantly Kojève whose philosophical 
and political activity in the twentieth-century unites these two tendencies in political theory. This 
chapter will address the adherence of these two legacies, for convenience’s sake emblematized in 
Fukuyama and Huntington, to the notoriously contradictory lifework of the Russian-French 
philosopher. 
3.1 Eternal Satisfaction: Teleological History and the Free Market with Fukuyama 
Fukuyama’s argument for liberal democracy in the wake of the Cold War relies 
significantly on two major principles from Kojève’s Hegel seminars: first, Fukuyama borrows 
from Kojève the overwhelming emphasis on the Master/Slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit to describe the needs and problems of human experience in civil society. Political 
organization begins with the anthropogenic principle of risking one’s life for recognition—humans 
distinguish themselves from animality in their willingness to die for non-biological pursuits such 
as glory, prestige, and honor. In Fukuyama’s terms: “[w]hile we need not abandon the economic 
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account of history, ‘recognition’ allows us to recover a totally non-materialist historical dialectic 
that is much richer in its understanding of human motivation than the Marxist version, or than the 
sociological tradition stemming from Marx” (144). While traditionally English political 
philosophers (Thomas Hobbes, then John Locke) stressed a human need for self-preservation as 
the reason for forming civil society, thereby taking the Hegelian position of the “Slave” and not 
risking their lives for recognition in open violence, the German political tradition (Hegel, 
Nietzsche, then later through Kojève) recognized the human desire for prestige and recognition, 
exemplified in the Hegelian “Master” class of Prussian, aristocratic military officers.  If the former 
tradition stresses bourgeois individualism and self-preservation, the latter channels a willingness 
to risk death into the patriotic service to a state. 
Fukuyama’s argumentation diverges from more normative, conservative neoliberal 
accounts (Henry Simons, Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper) of successful liberal societies, where the 
Hegelian/continental tradition of a Rechtstaat is accused of having “focused too heavily on the 
collective […] and subjugated individual interests to the larger nation” (Jones 100). While 
Fukuyama clearly advocates for the Lockean version of self-interested, liberal democracy, he 
found it lacking in its capacity to achieve recognition of a citizen’s self-worth. Arguably the most 
significant theoretical ploy in Fukuyama’s “End of History” is therefore the explicit reconciliation 
of Hegelian “positive liberty” through the state with the “negative liberty” of the Anglo-American 
liberal tradition.90 While Fukuyama adamantly endorses free trades as a caveat for liberal 
democracy, he just as equally stresses a recognition of a citizen’s dignity on the part of the 
                                                 
90 “Positive” and “negative” liberty are two terms typically associated with Isaiah Berlin, from his 1958 lecture at 
Oxford entitled “Two Concepts of Liberty.” The former refers to an active, citizenry role in directing one’s life through 
collective institutions (i.e., voting through government). The latter refers to freedom from coercion and is frequently 
cited in neoliberal pursuits of free markets and the reduction of collective impositions like taxation—in the words of 
Fukuyama, “the state’s main job is to get out of the way of individuals” (203). 
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government. This recognition, which borrowing from Plato he terms thymos, is absent even in 
“totalitarian” statist governments, i.e., the former Eastern Bloc:  
 Hegelian “liberalism” can be seen as the pursuit of rational recognition, that is, recognition 
on a universal basis in which the dignity of each person as a free and autonomous human 
being is recognized by all. What is at stake for us when we choose to live in a liberal 
democracy is not merely the fact that it allows us the freedom to make money and satisfy 
the desiring parts of our souls. The more important and ultimately more satisfying thing it 
provides us is recognition of our dignity. Life in a liberal democracy is potentially the road 
to great material abundance, but it also shows us the way to the completely non-material 
end of recognition of our freedom. The liberal democratic state values us at our own sense 
of self-worth. Thus both the desiring and thymotic parts of our souls find satisfaction. (200, 
emphasis added) 
If for example a Soviet citizen is, in theory, guaranteed satisfaction of her desires (basic needs 
such as housing, employment, and food) through the state, Fukuyama claims that she nonetheless 
lacks the “thymotic” recognition of her worth. Liberal democracy therefore prevails as a “middle 
path” between aggressive statism (“totalitarianism”) and the slavishly bourgeois mentality of mere 
English social theory. Liberal democracies satisfy both human needs: “[t]he universal and 
homogeneous state that appears at the end of history can thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars 
of economics and recognition” (Fukuyama 203). 
Fukuyama’s second major principle borrowed from Kojève’s philosophy is therefore this 
abstracted form of social satisfaction, which contains within it both the economic satisfaction of 
basic needs (biological) and the political recognition of an individual’s self-worth (non-biological). 
In one of the most controversial and widely discussed passages from the published notes of 
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Kojève’s Hegel seminars, Kojève in a footnote suggests that the United States, rather than the 
Soviet Union, had in fact already achieved the final stage of Marxist “communism,” as it had 
achieved the most enduring and pervasive sense of satisfaction amongst its citizenry. The comment 
clearly drives Fukuyama’s thesis and merits citation in full: 
 Observing what was taking place around me and reflecting on what happened in the world 
after the Battle of Jena, I understood that Hegel was correct to see in it the end of History 
per se. In and through this Battle, the avant-garde of humanity had virtually attained its 
goal, that is the end of Man’s historical evolution. What has been produced since is but an 
extension in space of the universal revolutionary strength actualized in France by 
Robespierre-Napoleon. From an authentically historical point of view, the two World Wars 
with their procession of small and large revolutions have only resulted in aligning the 
straggling civilizations of the peripheral provinces with the historic positions of Europe 
(real or virtual). If the Sovietization of Russia and the communization of China are anything 
more than the democratization of imperial Germany (through the intervention of Hitlerism) 
or the independence of Togo, or even the auto-determination of the Papuans, this is only 
because the Sino-Soviet actualization of Robespierran Bonapartism requires post-
Napoleonic Europe to accelerate the numerous anachronistic aftereffects of its pre-
revolutionary past. Already this process of elimination is more advanced in the North 
American continuation of the European project than in Europe itself. One could even say 
from a certain point of view that the United States has already attained the final stage of 
Marxist “communism,” given that practically all the members of a “classless society” can 
acquire for themselves everything that they like, without working any more than they feel 
like. Now, multiple comparative trips (between 1948 and 1958) to the United States and 
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the USSR have given me the impression that, if the Americans seem to be enriched Sino-
Soviets, this is because the Russians and the Chinese are only still-impoverished 
Americans, nevertheless in the process of rapid enrichment. I was therefore led to conclude 
that the American way of life [sic] was the way of living proper to the post-historical period, 
and the current presence of the United States in the world prefigures the future “eternal 
present” of humanity as a whole. (Kojève, Introduction 510-511)91   
The major revolutions after Jena have, in Kojève’s argument, been mere spatial extensions 
of the liberal democracy inaugurated by Napoleon and enshrined philosophically by Hegel—
ideological aberrations such as, for example, communism can be explained away through the 
particular needs of the global periphery to catch up to the historical development of the center. In 
Fukuyama’s words, “[t]hough the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions seemed like monumental 
events at the time, their only lasting effect would be to spread the already established principles of 
liberty and equality to formerly backward and oppressed peoples, and to force those countries of 
                                                 
91 “En observant ce qui se passait autour de moi et en réfléchissant à ce qui s’est passé dans le monde après la bataille 
d’Iéna, j’ai compris que Hegel avait raison de voir en celle-ci la fin de l’Histoire proprement dite. Dans et par cette 
bataille, l’avant-garde de l’humanité a virtuellement atteint le terme et le but, c’est-à-dire la fin de l’évolution 
historique de l’Homme. Ce qui s’est produit depuis ne fut qu’une extension dans l’espace de la puissance 
révolutionnaire universelle actualisée en France par Robespierre-Napoléon. Du point de vue authentiquement 
historique, les deux guerres mondiales avec leur cortège de petites et grandes révolutions n’ont eu pour effet que 
d’aligner, sur les positions historiques européennes (réelles ou virtuelles) les plus avancées, les civilisations 
retardataires des provinces périphériques. Si la soviétisation de la Russie et la communisation de la Chine sont plus et 
autre chose encore que la démocratisation de l’Allemagne impériale (par le truchement de l’hitlérisme) ou l’accession 
du Togo à l’indépendance, voire l’autodétermination des Papous, c’est uniquement parce que l’actualisation sino-
soviétique du bonapartisme robespierrien oblige l’Europe post-napoléonienne à accélérer l’élimination des 
nombreuses séquelles plus ou moins anachroniques de son passé prérévolutionnaire. D’ores et déjà, ce processus 
d’élimination est d’ailleurs plus avancé dans les prolongements nord-américains de l’Europe qu’en Europe elle-même. 
On peut même dire que, d’un certain de vue, les États-Unis ont déjà atteint le stade final du « communisme » marxiste, 
vu que, pratiquement, tous les membres d’une « société sans classes » peuvent s’y approprier dès maintenant tout ce 
que bon leur semble, sans pour autant travailler plus que leur cœur ne le leur dit. Or plusieurs voyages comparatifs 
effectuée (entre 1948 et 1958) aux États-Unis et en U.R.S.S. m’ont donné l’impression que, si les Américains font 
figure de sino-soviétiques enrichis, c’est parce que les Russes et les Chinois ne sont que des Américains encore 
pauvres, d’ailleurs en voie de rapide enrichissement. J’ai été porté à en conclure que l’American way of life était le 
genre de vie propre à la période post-historique, la présence actuelle des États-Unis dans le Monde préfigurant le futur 
« éternel présent » de l’humanité entière.” 
 93 
the developed world already living in accordance with such principles to implement them more 
completely” (66). 
This dramatically Eurocentric underestimation of revolutionary events in Russia and 
China, let alone the century-long process of decolonizing states such as Togo, girds Fukuyama 
(and Kojève’s) underlying belief in the primacy of European liberal democracy as the “universal 
and homogenous state.” Kojève employs this term throughout his work, for example in his Hegel 
seminars he describes it as follows:  
 It [the state] reunites all of humanity (at least those who historically count) and “annuls” 
(aufhebt) in its being all “specific differences” (Besonderheit): nations, social classes, 
families. […] This State no longer changes, because all its Citizens are “satisfied” 
(befriedigt). I am fully and definitively “satisfied” when my personality, exclusively my 
own, is “recognized” (in its reality and its value, its dignity) by all, on the condition that I 
myself “recognize” the reality of the value of those who are forced to “recognize” me. To 
be “satisfied” is to be “unique in the world yet (nevertheless) universally valuable.” 
(Introduction 171, emphasis in original)92 
The final state is understood as an equally applicable form of government across national, 
historically contingent political traditions. Despite its homogeneity, this state nonetheless carries 
within it a sublated diversity of identity. For this reason, Judith Butler for example insists on an 
interpretation of Kojève’s homogenous state as “one that maintains a dialectical mediation of 
                                                 
92 “Il réunit l’humanité tout entière (du moins celle qui compte historiquement) et « supprime » (aufhebt) en son sein 
toutes les « différences spécifiques » (Besonderheit) : nations, classes sociales, familles. […] cet État ne change plus, 
parce que tous ses Citoyens sont « satisfaits » (befriedigt). Je suis pleinement et définitivement « satisfait », quand ma 
personnalité exclusivement mienne est « reconnue » (dans sa réalité et dans sa valeur, sa « dignité ») par tous, à 
condition que je « reconnaisse » moi-même la réalité de la valeur de ceux qui sont censés devoir me « reconnaître ». 
Être « satisfait », — c’est être « unique au monde et (néanmoins) universellement valable ».” 
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individuality and collectivity. In fact, collective life appears to gain its final measure and 
legitimation in proving capable of recognizing individual desires” (78). 
On a geopolitical scale, the diversity within “definitive” liberal democracy provides 
Fukuyama ammunition for his claim that cultural differences are overcome (or sublated) due to 
the deracination of the labor force under global industrialization. He concedes the perseverance of 
“natural and necessary inequality” however and employs the term to offset criticisms of lingering 
inequality in the American way of life advocated by Kojève: “[m]idle-class societies will remain 
highly inegalitarian in certain respects, but the sources of inequality will increasingly be 
attributable to the natural inequality of talents, the economically necessary division of labor, and 
to culture” (Fukuyama 291). By describing certain inequalities as essential rather than 
circumstantially constructed, Fukuyama therefore evades the most compelling counterclaim to his 
argument for liberal democracy as the ultimate purveyor of equality: that massive economic 
disparities, often inflected along the very cultural categories (namely race and ethnicity) he 
attempts to dismiss, persist both in the “liberal and democratic” developed world as well as those 
areas that remain financially dependent on the West through an unequitable division of capital and 
labor.93 
Kojève’s own articulation of the “homogenous end state” suffers from the same blindness 
to injustices committed in the developed world in the name of an inevitable trajectory toward 
global liberalization. In 1945, Kojève became an advisor to the Direction des relations 
économiques extérieures (DREE), a newly created department within the French Finance Ministry 
tasked, among other things, with negotiating terms of import and export for France and the 
                                                 
93 Fukuyama’s argument for “necessary inequality” echoes frequent discourse surrounding “deserving and 
undeserving poor” and “equality of opportunity” in circulation in neoliberal discourse from its very origin. See Jones, 
64. 
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expansion of foreign trade (Auffret 293-313). Working under Giscard d’Estaing, the future 
President of France (1974-1981), Kojève’s first major assignment was to rally support for the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OECE), founded following the Marshall plan 
in 1948 to supervise the distribution of American financial aid in Europe. The organization 
stipulated as a condition to economic aid the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to intra-
European trade, paving the way for the later creation of a common customs union on the continent 
through the European Community (EC). Kojève would lobby again in 1949 for economic 
liberalization and free trade, this time with recently independent countries (mostly former French 
colonies) in the Middle East and South Asia. The philosopher turned bureaucrat emphatically 
supported France’s “search for new markets” in post-colonial and colonial territories to offset 
American hegemony, given the overwhelming influence of the United States on the post-war 
European economy. These combined efforts reflect the eventual transformation of the OECE into 
the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development), a global organization of 
wealthy countries with a self-proclaimed mission of promoting free trade and economic growth. 
Most criticism of the OECD has been leveled precisely against its perpetuation of colonial 
hegemony over former colonies through its sole stated goal of “perpetual growth” and ever newer 
markets, encouraging a global economic system in which developing economies remain aid-
dependent indefinitely out of an artificial need for financial gains at home.94  
It is unclear, however, to what degree Kojève cared about the neocolonial implications of 
his vision of free trade and bureaucratic end-states when “he asserted that postwar America or the 
members of the European Community constituted the embodiment of Hegel’s state of universal 
recognition” (Fukuyama 203). In a correspondence begun in 1955 with controversial political 
                                                 
94 See Tandon and Mkapa, 108. 
 96 
philosopher Carl Schmitt, Kojève and Schmitt discussed at length the need for former colonizers 
to invest financially in the places they have formerly colonized to offset increasingly stark uneven 
development. They based their discussion on Schmitt’s relatively recent work The Nomos of the 
Earth (Der Nomos Erde, 1950). There Schmitt employed three different translations of the Greek 
concept of “nomos” (as a verb, “nemein”) to describe the three major historical processes 
contributing to social and economic order: “nemein” can be understood as “to take or appropriate” 
(nehmen), “to divide or distribute” (teilen) or “to graze or pasture” (weiden) (326-327). The first 
process (nehmen) refers to land and material appropriation as seized through colonialism, 
conquest, and migration. The second (teilen) addresses the legally determined social distribution 
of goods and services, and the third (weiden) is a question of industrialization and production. 
Kojève in the correspondence over the book was convinced that the first process, most exemplified 
in the mass, violent disruptions of European colonization, had no longer existed “since Napoleon” 
(94), leaving the state to concern itself only with the maintenance of production and distribution: 
“thanks to this ‘neutralization’ of the political the administration could carry out its work 
unencumbered, i.e. [could] rather ‘administer’ (= organize the ‘grazing,’ to speak your language)” 
(“Correspondence,” 98). 
These beliefs are repeated in a lecture Kojève delivers at Schmitt’s invitation at the Rhein-
Ruhr Club in Düsseldorf in 1957. In his capacity now as both a legendary interpreter of Hegel and 
an influential advisor to the French government, Kojève is asked to discuss the problem of 
“underdeveloped regions.” In the lecture, entitled “Colonialism from a European perspective,” 
Kojève again stresses that “appropriation” no longer exists, and Europe and the United States must 
undertake a project of “giving” or “principled” colonialism (122-124). He claims somewhat 
eclectically that capitalism, embodied in Henry Ford, realized the truth of Marx’s critique and 
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learned that it must invest in its workforce in order to increase, expand, and perfect 
industrialization:  
 capitalism can neither progress, nor even exist, if the ‘surplus value’ produced through 
industrial technologies is not divided between the capitalist minority and the working 
majority. In other words, the post-Marxist capitalists understood that the modern, highly 
industrialized capitalism of mass production not only permits, but also requires, a constant 
increase in the income (and of the standard of living) of the working masses. (117) 
Kojève concludes that just as capitalism has transitioned to a “giving” form of itself, so too must 
colonialism, posing in the lecture the question, “how can colonialism be economically 
reconstructed in a ‘Fordist’ way?” (121) He suggests foreign policy methods such as increasingly 
economically advantageous terms of trade for (developing) nations exporting raw materials, or 
both corporate and national investment of surplus value extracted from the “former” colonies back 
into the local area. Kojève mentions in passing terms “commodity agreements,” “Full 
Employment,” as well as US President Harry Truman’s “Point Four” program to provide 
technological expertise to underdeveloped states, all in English, as an implicit acknowledgement 
of his immersion in the still evolving fiscal language of a liberal post-war order. 
Thus, despite his status as a philosophical heavyweight in the formation of critical theory, 
Kojève in short closely straddled the development of neoliberal ideology, from its very 
inauguration post-war in foreign policy agreements through to its post-Cold War triumph where, 
to paraphrase Margaret Thatcher, “there was no alternative.” While Fukuyama is the most visible 
example of applying Kojève’s philosophy to endorse neoliberalism, a brief analysis of Kojève’s 
work throughout his career illustrates that the philosopher already prepared the intellectual ground 
for such a political deployment, so that Fukuyama represents not an alteration of the Russian 
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philosopher’s thought but rather an appropriate continuation. The career of one of Kojève’s most 
conservative students from his Hegelian seminars, Raymond Aron, proves the extent of his 
primacy of place in the teleological underpinnings of neoliberalism. 
While relatively unknown to the English-speaking world, Aron is arguably one of the most 
visible endorsers of neoliberal political thought in a post-war French intelligentsia driven 
overwhelmingly by left-oriented figures. Aron audited Kojève’s seminars along with Raymond 
Queneau, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georges Fessard, and other eclectic members 
of French intellectual life. Aron was entranced by Kojève’s presentation of the Phenomenology, 
delivered “in an impeccable French to which his Slavic accent added a certain originality and 
charm” (Aron 65). Kojève clearly left a lifelong impression on Aron, so that decades later in 1982 
he would mention the philosopher to d’Estaing, who now out of presidential office described 
Kojève as a negotiator who “took indirect paths” but eventually arrived at his goal (Aron 67). 
Aron’s own intellectual and professional trajectory is relevant for its similarities to both 
Kojève and Fukuyama’s teleological philosophy of neoliberalism. While occasionally attending 
Kojève’s seminars (1933-1939), Aron also found time to attend the Colloque Walter Lippmann, a 
1938 conference held in Paris to address the “crisis of capitalism” and defend individual liberty 
against planned economies and “collectivism” (Denord 45). The conference is frequently cited as 
one of the earliest recorded uses of the term “neoliberalism,” and Aron, along with notable 
attendees including Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, would all later reconvene in 1947 in 
Switzerland for the Mont Pèlerin Society, an organization that included these three as well as Karl 
Popper and Milton Friedman and that devoted itself to “a neoliberal network [that] would facilitate 
opportunities and contacts that might help to change the intellectual and political climate in the 
West to one that would be more congenial to free markets and individual liberty” (Jones 74). While 
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Kojève attended neither of these conventions, the presence of his student, and his later role in trade 
liberalization in France, is telling. 
The war of ideas fought between “collectivism” and neoliberalism, both for Aron as much 
as for Fukuyama, was just as much cultural as it was economic. Aron became in the 1950s an 
active member of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an American-funded organization tasked 
with promoting cultural activity (literature, music, art) with an anti-communist ideology, primarily 
in Europe but also more globally, in order to offset the appeal of communism amongst cultural 
workers. The Congress organized conferences, various literary journals, art exhibitions, and so on, 
which drew beyond Aron as diverse figures as Bertrand Russell and Tennessee Williams. Aron 
was an alternate member (representing France) on its executive committee and was explicit in his 
willingness to bear the somewhat awkward position of accepting American money, explaining that 
he was “entirely convinced that for an anti-Stalinist there is no escape from the acceptance of 
American leadership” (Stonor Saunders 171). Things became increasingly complicated 
geopolitically when the American money, thought to have come mostly from foundations such as 
the Ford Foundation, in fact was directly from the CIA—Aron denied knowledge (Aron 173), yet 
it is unclear if this is accurate (Stonor Saunders 394).  
Regardless, the scandal emblematizes the enduring, vivid paradoxes of Alexandre Kojève 
and his legacy in twentieth-century intellectual history. Indeed, there is a certain irony in Kojève’s 
disciple courting American money in the pursuit of anti-Stalinism. From his early years up until 
his death, Kojève claimed to be “Stalin’s consciousness,” one who saw in Stalin the herald of the 
End of History just as Hegel had seen it in Napoleon. Aron himself frequently interpreted Kojève’s 
remarks as an intellectual provocation rather than a deep-seated political affirmation. Archival and 
anecdotal evidence, however, confirms that Kojève at least intended to send a letter to Stalin in 
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1940, most likely in the form of a Russian translation of his Parisian seminars on Hegel. Hager 
Weslati has compiled various unfinished pages of a manuscript found in Kojève’s papers, in 
corroboration with memoirs from those who knew Kojève and his admiration of Stalin, in order to 
provide a theoretical plan of the letter. Weslati claims that Kojève in the letter described to Stalin 
“a new opportunity for revolutionary action that will ‘Sovietize’ (that is to say, unify) the realized 
consciousness of ‘the man of action’ with the revealed self-consciousness of ‘discursive wisdom’” 
(10).   
Several scholars of Kojève in a Russian context, furthermore, have argued for the claim of 
Kojève’s Stalinism to be taken at least provisionally seriously (Groys [2012]; Biareishyk [2013]; 
Penzin [2016]; Love [2018]). Biareishyk situates Kojève’s End of History in the context of Stalin’s 
“socialism in one country,” whereby the: 
  advent of post-historical time […] is signaled by the coincidence (identity) or form and 
content, being and consciousness, thus engendering a condition where change is 
impossible, precisely because the motor of this change—the disjunction between material 
conditions and consciousness—has been eliminated. Needless to say, such a coincidence 
for Stalin is only possible under the societal conditions of socialism/communism, when a 
homogeneous state as classless society has materialized. (248) 
Stalin and Kojève, Biareishyk argues, therefore share a vision of the post-historical homogeneous 
state. Penzin makes a similar claim, relying heavily on Groys’s well-known articulation of Stalinist 
socialist realism as a total artwork or Gesamtkunstwerk, the satisfaction of earlier avant-garde 
demands for a total aesthetic-political project (Groys Total Art, 36). Groys argued furthermore that 
“Stalinist culture was not merely culture in the making, but represented instead the mature, 
posthistorical culture for which ‘capitalist encirclement’ was simply an external, moribund 
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formation fated to disappear together with the entire ‘history of the class struggle’” (Groys 41-42). 
Stalin’s posthistorical state shares with Kojève the belief in a bureaucratic, homogeneous state 
managed by the sage through his wisdom—Groys elsewhere has described Kojève and Stalin’s 
state as the “perfect society of realized, recognized love that emerges after the revolutionary 
paroxysm […] Stalin realized the society of love by abolishing love” (Introduction to 
Antiphilosophy 158). 
Jeff Love has elaborated perhaps the most nuanced argument for camaraderie of thought 
between Stalin and Kojève. Turning to Kojève’s lesser-known work on the philosophy of legal 
right, Love claims that Kojève “develops a concept of freedom as the radical extirpation of 
individual interest,” an anti-individualism shared in the political ideology of Stalinism (“Alexandre 
Kojève and philosophical Stalinism” 264). Love sees in Kojève an “equation of human freedom 
with the abandonment of individuality” (265). In Kojève’s definition of legal right, a “juridical 
situation,” or right, is understood as a judgment in the complaints of two individuals by “a 
disinterested intervention of a third,” that is, the homogeneous state (Esquisse 24).95 The state is 
able to pass judgment on a conflict between two legal parties, thereby negating individual interests, 
the original source of the conflict and legal complaints, through legal adjudication: “the juridical 
signals the ultimate end of the political, of struggle, of history, individuality as such” (Love 269). 
While this legal apparatus for adjudicating legal disputes can arguably be seen as intrinsic to the 
modern nation-state itself, Love makes the argument that Kojève draws this thread from Napoleon 
and Hegel through to himself and Stalin, who represents the most extreme and efficient example 
of the state suppressing individual claims in the pursuit of a juridical administrative system. 
                                                 
95 “une intervention désintéressée d’un tiers.” 
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These attempts to take Kojève’s Stalinism seriously therefore link claims to the 
posthistorical bureaucratic apparatus in both Soviet and Western state ideologies. Thus, Kojève, 
the self-avowed Stalinist, through both his own work and that of his students, can simultaneously 
claim a rather substantial place in the creation of some of the most influential and lasting neoliberal 
institutions to emerge in the post-war period. As I illustrate in the coming section, this schism in 
Kojève’s legacy is not split solely along political lines, but rather is indicative of a much more 
complicated and intersecting organization of political thought still relevant to contemporaneity. I 
hope therefore to show how Kojève overcomes a simplistic dichotomy of either Russian and 
Western philosophy or liberal and conservative political philosophy, confirming his place as a 
uniquely adaptable figure in the geopolitical deployment of critical thought. 
3.2 The Clash: Huntington & Conflict as an Enduring Category of Political Life 
Samuel Huntington wrote The Clash of Civilizations as a direct response to the claims 
Fukuyama, his former student, made in The End of History. If Fukuyama interpreted liberal 
democracy as a form of government “free from the ‘contradictions’ that characterized earlier forms 
of social organization and would therefore bring the historical dialectic to a close,” Huntington 
argued that these contradictions would continue in the form of cultural conflicts (Fukuyama 64). 
The latter, unlike Fukuyama, does not rely on philosophy, let alone Kojève, to support his claims, 
yet one can nonetheless recognize the philosophical stakes of his understanding of oppositions as 
enduring rather than historically determined: “[p]eople use politics not just to advance their 
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interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are 
not and often only when we know whom we are against” (21). 
Indeed, this last quotation from Huntington could easily have been taken from Kojève’s 
Hegel seminars, where the philosopher stressed the Master/Slave dialectic and the interrelational 
formation of the human subject, arguably understating the larger sweeping reconciliation of this 
opposition in the procession of World Spirit as described in the Phenomenology: “in Desire, he 
[man] seeks the cancellation of the object and therefore, unconsciously at first, the affirmation of 
the self” (Introduction 61).96 In the aforementioned correspondence between Kojève and Schmitt, 
the German philosopher asks his Russian colleague a telling question in this regard about Hegel, 
one crucial to understanding the stakes of Kojève’s interpretation: 
 Now my modest question: it concerns the concept of enemy in Hegel […] Who is this 
enemy?—is it possible that he shows himself precisely in the animal functions? What does 
he seek there? […] It is generally—as with the question of the possibility of a “dictatorship” 
in the system of Hegelian philosophy—the question whether there can be an “enemy” in 
Hegel at all. For: either he is only a necessary passing stage of negation, or invalid and 
insubstantial. (105, emphasis in original) 
Schmitt is concerned here with whether the “enemy” can be understood as an enduring category 
in Hegel’s thought, embodied in the “Other” constituting to the subject in the Phenomenology, or 
whether this is overcome in dialectical development of Hegelianism. Kojève responds: 
 As always: Yes and No. Yes,—insofar as, and as long as there is struggle for recognition, 
i.e. history. World history is the history of enmity between peoples (which does not exist 
at all among animals: animals “fight” for something, not out of enmity). No,—insofar as 
                                                 
96 “Dans le Désir, il veut l’annulation de l’objet et donc — inconsciemment d’abord — l’affirmation de soi.” 
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and as soon as history (= struggle for recognition) has been “sublated” in Absolute 
Knowledge. Thus enmity is, after all, only a “moment” of the “Logic” […] Now one could 
perhaps ask oneself, if in 500 years the speech of the wise man (Hegel) about enmity will 
still be understood. Already today only a few understand what the words “enemy,” “state,” 
“war,” “history” mean. (107, emphasis in original) 
As a good Hegelian, Kojève concedes that the “enemy,” or perhaps the Other, is conditioned upon 
historical development, so that once history has finished it will be sublated and what remains is 
the homogenous and universal state. This reiterates what has thus been far described as the position 
Fukuyama sees in Kojève’s philosophy, what Kojève describes as the “‘neutralization’ of the 
political,” understood here by Schmitt as a “necessary passing stage of negation” (98). Yet despite 
this concession, opposition and conflict are arguably the defining features of Kojève’s unique 
interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology, and the Russian philosopher relied on this opposition at 
multiple stages in his philosophical and political career. A delineation of this position, and its 
contradiction with the “other” side of Kojève’s oeuvre, will therefore tell us something of this view 
of politics and its ideological camaraderie with the geopolitics professed by Huntington in the post-
Soviet period. 
It is no coincidence that it is in conversation with Carl Schmitt that Kojève inadvertently 
reveals the contradiction underlying his interpretation of the homogenous state and his emphasis 
on the Master/Slave dialectic. In 1927 Schmitt wrote his most famous political treatise The 
Concept of the Political, in which he sought to isolate the most essential principle by which one 
could define what one means by the political. In the same way that morality, for example, relies 
on a distinction between good and evil, and aesthetics between beautiful and ugly, Schmitt argued 
that “[t]he specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is 
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that between friend and enemy” (26). Schmitt was rallying precisely against what he saw as the 
politics’ “neutralization” under liberalism, which threatened to deplete the political authority of 
the state into society: “these dissolutions aim with great precision at subjugating state and politics, 
partially into an individualistic domain of private law and morality, partially into economic 
notions” (72). 
Schmitt’s claim to the dissolution of politics under liberalism has attracted admirers from 
both left and right political perspectives who, though ideologically diverse, share the belief that 
conflict is essential to human experience and abhor liberal appeals not “to make things political.”97 
In this Schmitt and Kojève share a particularly strong affinity. If we recall from Kojève’s 
Phenomenology seminars, in order for the human to overcome its original animality, it must 
engage in violent struggle with another for recognition: 
 He [man] must risk his life in order to force awareness from the other. He must engage in 
a battle for recognition. In risking his life as such, he proves to the other that he recognizes 
him as human. 
 There is therefore the necessity of Struggle for live and death. Negativity = Death = 
Individuality = Liberty = History; man is: mortal, finite, free, a historical individual. (63)98 
For Schmitt, too, human society is grounded in the political as the underlying force engendering 
our humanity: “it is a fact that the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being 
symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning 
                                                 
97 Schmitt’s complicity with the Nazi regime rendered him anathema to the post-war intelligentsia, so that Kojève’s 
own seeking out Schmitt in the 1950s is somewhat jarring. 
98 “Il doit risquer sa vie pour forcer la conscience de l’autre. Il doit engager une lutte pour la reconnaissance. En 
risquant ainsi sa vie, il prouve à l’autre qu’il n’est pas un animal ; en cherchant la mort de l’autre, il prouve à l’autre 
qu’il le reconnaît comme homme. Il y a donc nécessité de la Lutte pour la vie et la mort. Négativité = Mort = 
Individualité = Liberté = Histoire ; l’homme est : mortel, fini, libre, individu historique.” 
 106 
precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing” (The Concept of the Political 
33). 
Although it is unclear the extent to which Kojève read Schmitt before their post-war 
exchange, Kojève cites The Concept of the Political in his Outline of a Phenomenology of Right 
(written in 1943), relying on the friend-enemy distinction in his juridical outline of the legal right 
and the end-state:  
 For there to be a State the following two conditions must be met: 1) there must be a Society 
in which all members are “friends,” and which treats as an enemy every non-member 
whoever it may be; 2) in the interior of this Society a group of “governors” must clearly 
distinguish themselves from the other members who constitute the group of “governed.”99 
(Esquisse 143) 
Furthermore, it is in the earliest years of Kojève’s work that one finds the strongest resonance with 
Schmitt. I would like to turn to these years, most significantly those first years Kojève spends with 
the Russian émigré community in Paris, in which the philosopher finds the opportunity to 
concretize his belief in the primacy of the political. In so doing, one can gather a better sense of 
how this contradiction of the homogenous state and the friend-enemy distinction synthesizes 
Kojève’s philosophical life with his political one. 
According to the authoritative biography of Kojève (Auffret), during the October 
Revolution sixteen-year old Kojève and his family remained relatively indifferent to the 
monumental historical shift taking place around them. Kojève’s mother explicitly denounced 
                                                 
99 “Pour qu’il y ait un État il faut que soient remplies les deux conditions principales suivantes : 1) il faut qu’il y ait 
une Société, dont tous les membres sont « amies », et qui traite en « ennemi » tout non-membre quel qu’il soit ; 2) il 
faut qu’à l’intérieur de cette Société un groupe de « gouvernants » se distingue nettement des autres membres, qui 
constituent le groupe des « gouvernés ».” 
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Bolshevism, and her husband (Kojève’s stepfather) Lehmkuhl was murdered defending property 
from looters outside the city, yet nonetheless not a single relative of Kojève fought on the side of 
the Whites during the Civil War. Generally speaking, the liberal family for a time even benefited 
from the new social conditions in the early Soviet Union, including his uncle, the painter Wasily 
Kandinsky, who worked temporarily as a professor in the fine arts division of the People’s 
Commissariat for Education (Narodnyi komissariat prosveshcheniia, or Narkompros). This 
political ambiguity within the Kozhevnikov family may inform the political contradictions within 
Kojève himself—although he was for a time during the Civil War arrested by the Cheka under 
suspicion for selling soap on the black market, the philosopher would proclaim in later years that 
it was at this very moment of arrest that he was “seduced by revolutionary ideas” and became a 
self-professed communist. Auffret goes so far as to describe this moment as the beginning of 
Kojève’s belief in the historical necessity of revolution. 
One of course need not take Kojève at his word, especially given the philosopher’s 
inclination toward hyperbole. Nevertheless, Kojève’s early admiration for revolution, regardless 
of what new politics resulted from it, reaches its apex several years later, when in 1929 in the 
Parisian émigré journal Eurasia (Evraziia) he publishes an article in support of the new 
philosophical politics emerging in the Bolshevik All-Union Communist Party (Vsesoiuznaia 
kommunisticheskaia partiia bol'shevikov, VKP[b]). While many of his philosopher-colleagues had 
been exiled abroad (and those who remained in Russia, denounced, banned, or even killed), Kojève 
made the bold rhetorical move of offering a positive assessment of the political shifts within Soviet 
philosophy.  
Kojève, still writing under the last name of Kozhevnikov, suggested in the article, entitled 
“Philosophy and the VKP,” that one ought to judge the course taken by the new ruling party in the 
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country from the point of view of its potential for historical innovation. According to Kojève, 
Western philosophy after Hegel “has come to an impasse,” and something new is necessary in 
order to substitute within Russian philosophy the decaying European influence: “the various 
nations, generally speaking, are in no rush to get anywhere, and devoid of a philosophy tradition, 
the [Russian] people [narod] will undoubtedly have a better chance at developing a radically new 
and truly philosophical worldview than a people living in an already ideologically formed 
world.”100 
Kojève sought to prove that “one can as a philosopher nonetheless welcome the 
‘philosophical politics’ leading to the full ban of the study of philosophy.”101 While the philosopher 
did not necessarily agree with the particular politics of the new government, he still believed that 
“the politics of the VKP are nonetheless preparation for a new culture of the future,” whatever that 
may be. One can imagine the response to this claim from a circle of émigré philosophers, largely 
but not exclusively monarchical in political orientation, who had just been banned from their home 
country where their work was now deemed politically unsound. The editorial board of Eurasia 
immediately recognized the controversy behind Kojève’s words and several issues later issued a 
response to his article.  
The response was written by Lev Karsavin, a member of the editorial, a major philosopher 
in his own right, and, perhaps non-incidentally, Kojève’s close friend. In his response Karsavin 
assures readers that Kojève’s article was not so much “an endorsement of censorship and violence” 
as a serious attempt to think through potentially positive repercussions for philosophy under the 
                                                 
100 “наступил застой”; “Народам спешить, вообще говоря, некуда, а лишенный философской традиции, народ 
несомненно имеет больше шансов выработать радикально новое и истинно философское миропонимание, чем 
народ, живущий в идейно уже оформленном мире.” 
101 “будучи философом, можно все же приветствовать «философскую политику», сводящуюся к полному 
запрещению изучения философии».” 
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new regime.102 Karsavin notes however that Kojève’s imagining of a new, truly Russian 
philosophy freed from European influence is itself erroneous and even disingenuous, given that 
Russian thought historically “went freely into European bondage,” and it would be impossible to 
divorce it from European tradition.103 Karsavin argues convincingly that the very highest 
achievements of Russian philosophy, embodied in such figures as Solov'ev and Pavel Florenskii, 
are really “Russian in language only,” whereas the major style and subject matter remains 
fundamentally German.104 Kojève’s hypothetically new Russian philosophy under the Soviet 
regime, moreover, is paradoxically based in a tradition of European, i.e., non-Russian, materialist 
philosophers (Marx, Engels, Hegel), so that his argument for a “break from the impasse of 
European philosophy” reflects an ideological preference rather than a national one. 
Nevertheless from a political point of view, the rift between Kojève and the readers of 
Eurasia, including Karsavin, reiterates a larger rift emerging between two competing factions 
within the Russian diaspora: Eurasianists and the smenovekhovtsy (“Milestone changers”), a brief 
yet influential group of émigrés arguing for reconciliation between the Bolsheviks and the 
dissident intelligentsia abroad, ideologically and politically diverse yet largely united in their 
aversion to the new Soviet government.105 Both Eurasianists and smenovekhovtsy recognized the 
need for a new direction for the future of the Russian state, one built upon the unique values of the 
Russian people, and likewise recoiled from Europe and its alleged political and cultural decline. 
                                                 
102 “проповедью цензуры и насилия.” 
103 “свободно пошла в кабалу Европы.” 
104 “русской лишь по языку.” 
105 The smenovekhovtsy took their name from Smena vekh (“Changing milestones,” 1921), a collection of essays 
published in émigré Prague. The title of the collection is a reference to their rejection of the positions elaborated in 
the influential Vekhi (“Milestones,” 1909), an earlier collection of essays where Russian philosophers, many of whom 
would be exiled after the revolution, developed a philosophy divorced from the growing influence of Marxist 
philosophy and instead formed from an eclectic combination of Orthodox theology and liberalism. In “changing the 
milestones,” the smenovekhovtsy sought to reorient Russian philosophy again, this time under the aegis of the 
Communist Party. 
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The Eurasianists, however, including Karsavin and the staff of Eurasia, rejected the idea that the 
Soviet government would be the definitive form of political life in Russia106, whereas the 
smenovekhovtsy proposed a conciliatory “Third Way” between the Red and White wings of 
Russian intellectual life, ultimately in order to bring legitimacy to the Bolshevik government.107 
Though Kojève never explicitly declared himself a smenovekhovets, his article in Eurasia 
nearly verbatim invokes the main theses of the movement. He suggests one assess the revolution 
beyond its current, most immediately visible result, namely the repressions, violence, and 
censorship which plagued the philosophical community at the time. A similar assessment can be 
found from the main proponent of the smenovekhovstvo movement, Nikolai Ustrialov: 
 In determining our relationship to the Russian revolution, we must be guided by this 
impartial, historical assessment. So be it that we, its contemporaries, see the dark, rather 
than light, face of the revolution. So be it that it is for us a force of nature into which we 
have been thrown, a force of nature both torturous and cruel, often evil, crippling life and 
bringing with it every possible kind of suffering. So be it. In order however not to 
involuntarily amplify these sufferings, in order not to pile on the agony of gloomy 
revolutionary life, we must in our practical activity be guided not by empirical impressions 
of the moment but rather by a general analysis of revolution and its historic role. Just as in 
Spinoza’s old formula, we must above all else “not cry, not ridicule, not curse, but 
understand.”108 
                                                 
106 Karsavin was for years a major ideologue of the Eurasianist movement, although he abandoned the movement in 
his later life. See: Khoruzhii, 79. 
107 Historians (Kvakin 2006) have extensively documented the Bolshevik government’s endorsement of the 
Smenovekhovtsy movement within the Russian diaspora, going so far as to finance their journals and publications in 
order to sway Russians abroad to the side of the new regime. 
108 This article was first published in Russkaia Zhizn’ in Harbin in 1922, although Ustrialov and the smenovekhovtsy 
also published frequently in European journals, particularly in Prague and Paris. 
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Attempting to understand the new Bolshevism (in their opinion) objectively, the smenovekhovtsy 
concluded that the Russian émigré community must defend the Bolshevik government from the 
objections of the old guards of the intelligentsia, which refused to recognize the power and 
potential of the new unified polity of the Russian state and its capacity to defend against foreign 
influence—it is no coincidence that the smenovekhovtsy unceasingly emphasized the role of 
Western interference on the side of the Whites in the Civil War in the pamphlets. Nationalism and 
patriotism were the impetus to their claim for Bolshevism as the true choice of the people:  
 Bolshevism was to the ideologues of “Smena vekh” an indigenous Russian national 
phenomenon, and the Bolshevik upheaval an authentic parallel to Russian national 
rebellions in the style of Razin or Pugachev […] The creative task of the Russian 
intelligentsia was to serve the people as well as the regime chosen by said people. Only 
then would the intelligentsia overcome its status as historical, national, and state pariah. 
(Kvakin 113-114). 
In his article on Soviet philosophical politics, Kojève likewise interpreted the new political 
situation from the perspective of someone who “will welcome the appearance of a truly new 
culture and philosophy, be it because it is neither eastern nor western but Eurasian, or simply 
because it will be new and alive, in contrast to the already crystallized and expired cultures of West 
and East.”  
Kojève was not a nationalist in the strictest sense of the word, in that he did not express 
any particular national affiliation in his work, and in fact almost none of his writings ever 
specifically addressed Russia. One can find, however, in these early writings a tacit argument for 
the irreconcilability of national difference that underlies much geopolitical thought of the twentieth 
century and its analysis of global conflict. Geopolitics as a field of foreign policy preceded the 
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Eurasianists and smenovekhovtsy—its most commonly cited “birth” is British geographer Halford 
J. Mackinder’s “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904), written at a time when imperial 
competitions had reached a fever pitch. In elaborating his heartland theory, the belief that 
whosoever controlled Eurasia (the “Heartland” of the world) would dominate global affairs, 
Mackinder began an important first step in conceptualizing twentieth-century politics along 
geographical realms driven by conflict: “[t]he actual balance of political power at any given time 
is, of course, the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, 
and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the 
competing peoples” (31). 
The Eurasianists took direct inspiration from Mackinder and Great Game theorists like 
him, meanwhile influenced by Oswald Spengler’s organicist conception of cultures’ rise and 
decline in The Decline of the West (Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 1923). Like Kojève, they 
were ejected from post-revolutionary Russia and thrust into post-war Europe (largely, with 
exceptions, France, Germany, and Czechoslovakia), and one arguably cannot understand either 
Eurasianists or Kojève outside of the context of a precarious life contemplating what one has lost 
in diaspora. Indeed, politically Eurasianism reflected the need for Russian émigrés to differentiate 
a culture, country, and empire (Russia, for the smenovekhovtsy, the Soviet Union) as oppositional 
to their new countries of residence. For this reason, Russia adopts the mode simultaneously of 
savior, given the West’s “decline,” and self-sufficient: “[f]or the Eurasianists, Russia cannot permit 
itself to participate in the global market and to be interdependent with other national economies. 
Rather, its essential nature impels it toward autarky” (Laruelle 81). The friend-enemy distinction 
at the heart of Eurasianism found renewed relevance in the aftermath of the Cold War, when, at 
the same time in which Fukuyama and Huntington are crafting competing visions of the future 
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political order, a diverse set of post-Soviet philosophers, political scientists, and journalists are 
fashioning their own versions of the uniqueness of an identity (mostly) built upon Russian 
nationalism, Russian Orthodoxy, and the particulars of their home geography. 
The geopolitical turn of Kojève’s work is not, however, limited to a Eurasianist context. In 
August of 1945, Kojève delivered a lecture entitled “The Latin Empire” to the French government 
on what he imagined as the imperative goals of French foreign policy. In his argument, France 
would be faced with two problems following the conclusion of the Second World War: the future 
of Germany as a major economic power in Europe, thereby sidelining France, and a potential future 
war between the Soviet Union and the “Anglo-Saxons,” in which France must remain neutral to 
avoid massive devastation. The lecture is particularly significant in that Kojève synthesizes his 
views in the End of History and the role of conflict and opposition for the first time in concrete, 
explicitly geopolitical terms. Claiming that “the modern state is not really a state unless it is an 
empire,” Kojève briefly describes the historical process of moving from kingdoms to nation-states 
and finally into empires (91). He claims that Hitler lost the war precisely because he could not see 
the move to shift away from nationhood—the Third Reich was a delayed attempt at embodying 
the vision of a nation but failed due to its opposition from “imperial socialism” from the USSR 
and “imperial capitalism” from the Anglophone world: “in the current hour, [internationalism] is 
learning at its own expense that it cannot skip from the Nation to Humanity without passing by the 
Empire” (94).109 
Kojève believed that France should strategically construct its own empire, based on the 
cultural traditions of the Latin world—whereas the Germano-Anglo-Saxon world was based in 
                                                 
109 “A l’heure qu’il est, il apprend à ses dépens qu’on ne peut pas sauter de la Nation à l’Humanité sans passer par 
l’Empire.” 
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Protestantism, and the Soviet sphere “increasingly on Orthodoxy,” France could unify the 
Mediterranean countries, including its Maghreb colonial possessions, in the pursuit of an empire 
driven by Catholicism. One should remember in this light Kojève’s remarks, in his discussion with 
Schmitt and his lecture in 1957 in Düsseldorf, that the new “giving” colonial system Kojève 
advocates is, in theory, built upon a redistribution of resources in order to eliminate uneven 
development across metropole and periphery. In this earlier lecture Kojève alludes to a similar 
arrangement:  
 this continual (and in principle unlimited) extension of the domestic market, seconded by 
an augmented supply of work, would permit the imperial economy to develop while 
avoiding both the inevitable cyclical crises of the Anglo-Saxon economy with its nearly 
saturated domestic market as well as the rigid and oppressive stability of the Soviet 
economy (109).110 
In a certain light, therefore, the contradiction in Kojève’s work between a homogenous end state 
and fragmented, oppositional political entities in perpetual conflict predicts the precarity of the 
post-war political and economic order, where each polar adversary of the Cold War was 
simultaneously imagining itself as a conclusive, historical end state and playing geopolitical chess 
in its global sphere of influence.    
The final chapter will discuss the need for a reading of Kojève considering the current 
failures of both Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s models of political order. What to make of Kojève 
and the state in light of, for example, the increasing means of supranational surveillance and the 
                                                 
110 “cette extension continuelle (et en principe illimitée) du marché intérieur, secondée par une offre toujours accrue 
d’emplois, permettrait à l’économie impériale de se développer en évitant tant les crises cycliques inévitables de 
l’économie anglo-saxonne à marché intérieur pratiquement saturé que la stabilité rigide et opprimante de l’économie 
soviétique.” 
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supersession of the market over the state in control of the political subject? Indeed, it seems as 
though the most important “shift” in reading Kojève is one toward a biopolitical understanding of 
the political, one in which universal state or empire, and its administrative apparatus beloved by 
Kojève, are perhaps less useful tools for analysis. I will read this reorientation of Kojève through 
Russian philosophers using his work today. Certainly, translations of Kojève’s work into Russian, 
done only recently in the early 2000s, reflect more the reorientation of post-Soviet literary studies 
toward French poststructuralism and psychoanalysis, his more “defined,” however secondary, 
disciplinary home, rather than any convergence with the publication in Russia of many émigré 
authors for the first time since the early twentieth century.111 I will argue, however, that the use of 
Kojève as a descriptor of the human in the current political order is particularly apt in contemporary 
Russia, and that the opposition of these two “contradictory” political Kojèves is already being 
overcome. 
                                                 
111 Russian literary journals such as Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie and the Ad Marginem series were largely responsible 
for bringing French theory into popularity in Russian metropolitan academy in the 1990s. See Condee and Kupsan, 
316-317. 
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4.0 Post-Socialist Teleophobia. Specters of Kojève 
“We see this Night when we look a human being in the eye, looking into a Night which 
turns terrifying. For from his eyes, the night of the world hangs out toward us.” – G. W. F. Hegel, 
Jena lectures of 1805-1806 
In spring of 1993, at the University of California, Riverside, a group of international 
scholars gathered to discuss the future of Marxist thought in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and other communist regimes across Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The conference, entitled 
“Whither Marxism? Global Crises in International Perspective,” invited as its plenary speaker 
philosopher Jacques Derrida.112 At first glance, the choice of Derrida to deliver a keynote address 
for a conference on Marxism could appear somewhat unusual—Derrida had built his philosophical 
career on deconstruction, a school of post-structuralist thought often placed at odds with more 
orthodox Marxist philosophy.113 Derrida, however, had early in his career cut his teeth in Marxist 
circles in Paris, such as those surrounding the journal Tel Quel, and his and other post-structuralist 
philosophers’ attempts to articulate an alternative to orthodox Marxism suddenly had renewed 
relevance with the collapse of so-called “real socialism.” If previously one could stake an 
                                                 
112 Proceedings from the conference were published in book form as Cullenberg and Magnus, Whither Marxism? 
Global Crises in International Perspective. 
113 Admittedly, a wide range of post-structuralists, across disciplines, claimed their work followed in a Marxian 
tradition, yet fault lines between the two generations were clear. Michel Foucault, for example, described post-
structuralism as a reaction against the doctrinaire attitude of post-war French Marxists such as Jean-Paul Sartre, who 
together with the French Communist Party refused until relatively late to denounce Stalinism and therefore caused a 
rift amongst the French intelligentsia with regard to support for the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe. 
Foucault famously claimed that “[a] left culture that was not Marxist was about to emerge” in the post-structuralist 
generation following the French Marxists (Remarks on Marx, 90). 
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ideological position on the left based on the level of support for existent communist states, the 
systemic failure of these states in the early 1990s reconfigured the premise of the question entirely. 
In his keynote address, later published in book-form as Specters of Marx (1994), Derrida 
refers often to this divide between supporters of Soviet communism and critics of the Soviet Union 
from the left in his own answer to the question “whither Marx?”: 
 For many of us the question has the same age as we do. In particular for those who, and 
this was also my case, opposed, to be sure, de facto “Marxism” or “communism” (the 
Soviet Union, the International of Communist Parties, and everything that resulted from 
them, which is to say so very many things…), but intended at least never to do so out of 
conservative or reactionary motivations or even moderate right-wing or republican 
positions. For many of us, a certain (and I emphasis certain) end of communist Marxism 
did not await the recent collapse of the USSR and everything that depends on it throughout 
the world. All that started—all that was even déjà vu, indubitably—at the beginning of the 
‘50s. […] The same question had already sounded. The same, to be sure, but in an 
altogether different way. And the difference in the sound, that is what is echoing this 
evening. (14) 
Derrida ventures further that an entire generation had been inflected with a teleological 
understanding of critical philosophy: 
 Many young people today (of the type “reader-consumers of Fukuyama” or of the type 
“Fukuyama” himself) probably no longer sufficiently realize it: the eschatological themes 
of the “end of history,” of the “end of Marxism,” of the “end of philosophy,” of the “ends 
of man,” of the “last man” and so forth were, in the ‘50s, that is, forty years ago, our daily 
bread. We had this bread of apocalypse in our mouths naturally, already, just as normally 
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as that which I nicknamed after the fact, in 1980, the “apocalyptic tone in philosophy.” (14-
15) 
Derrida links the eschatological feelings of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc with an earlier collapse 
of a stable human subject in leftist thought in the 1950s. As I have illustrated in the preceding 
chapter, this is a reasonable connection, given the convergence of Kojève and Francis Fukuyama’s 
articulations of the End of History: the same eclectic interpretation of Hegel that inspired post-war 
French Marxists in turn came to define Fukuyama’s argument for the inevitable victory of liberal 
democracy. Derrida spoke here, however, at a conference devoted to the question of Marxism’s 
survival in the context of post-socialism, and his claim to a collapse of teleological thinking in the 
West failed to consider the collapse of a different, if ultimately linked, teleological thinking in the 
official ideology of communist states in the Eastern Bloc.114 
Indeed, just as liberal democracy had its temporal logic of historic inevitability, official 
Soviet ideology presented its own narrative of historical progress, in which dialectical struggle 
would lead to history’s end in communism. As Katerina Clark describes with regard to the Soviet 
socialist realist novel, “[t]he ultimate stage of historical development, communism, is reached in 
a final synthesis, which resolves the dialectic [of spontaneity and consciousness] once and for all.” 
The socialist realist method ritualized the reenactment of this historical progression in cultural 
production: “the great historical drama of the struggle between the forces of spontaneity and the 
                                                 
114 Several other participants in the conference reflected on Marxism’s collapse specifically from the perspective of 
Eastern Europe. Romanian philosopher Andrei Marga, for example, likewise interpreted the collapse through the lens 
of Fukuyama’s End of History, yet he expressed prescient caution for any argument for liberalism’s total victory in 
the region: “the critique of liberalism […] has not ceased, in spite of its important victory in eastern Europe. Its strategy 
has become, however, more reflective and it actually resumes the antiliberal attack of the thirties in Europe. The liberal 
democracy, based on the market economy, the state of justice, natural rights and the liberties of the individual has 
proved to be once again superior. Its abandonment always had painful consequences. But even the history we have to 
run through in Eastern Europe compels us not to consider the history of the fight for recognition, and, in fact, for 
liberty, as being a closed one, in other words, for ‘history’ as such, in the traditional sense” (99-100).  
 119 
forces of consciousness is unfolded in the way one individual has mastered his willful self, became 
disciplined, and attained to an extrapersonal identity” (Clark 16). Susan Buck-Morss likewise 
argued that temporal conquest, rather than spatial conquest, defined the “dreamworld” of Soviet 
cultural politics: “the terrain of class warfare is temporal. Class revolution is a historical event 
understood as an advance in time. What constitutes a victory is described in terms of historical 
progress rather than territorial gain” (23).115 
Derrida’s reflection on the collapse of a historical narrative to Western Marxists thus 
described only one collapse of teleological thinking at the end of the twentieth century. Buck-
Morss correctly remarks, furthermore, that both Soviet and Western historical narratives were 
ultimately products of the same, Hegelian philosophical tradition, so much so that, in the 1990s, 
increased contact and exchange between Soviet and Western philosophers and academics revealed 
a shockingly similar set of intellectual prerogatives in their work, despite differing methodical 
approaches and institutional limitations that made collaborations between them challenging.116 She 
notably found one of the most pressing tasks amongst theorists in this early period of post-socialist 
exchange to be a “rethinking revolutionary politics without its temporal armature” (xiii). 
Where does one find Kojève in the breakdown of teleological thinking at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century? Kojève’s influence on trends in Russian philosophy in the post-socialist 
period and onward is particularly compelling for several reasons. First, as I alluded to in the 
                                                 
115 Of course, as Alexei Yurchak and others have shown, the average Soviet citizen’s experience of “lived socialism” 
and “revolutionary time” differed radically from the official ideology she or he was required to perform, a distinction 
that became particularly marked in the last decades of the Soviet Union. I would argue, however, that a similar 
discrepancy has existed in the lived experience of capitalist democracy. What interests me more here is the bifurcated 
construction of teleological narratives in the ideology of the Cold War, rather than the question of their authenticity 
in everyday life. See Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More. 
116 Buck-Morss narrates her own contribution to Soviet-Western academic exchanges in the philosophy community 
leading up to and after the Cold War. She includes the first Heidegger conference in Russia, first-time translations of 
canonical theoretical texts from the West in Russian, and the visiting of Moscow by figures such as Louis Althusser 
and Fredric Jameson as examples of this kind of theoretical merger between Russo-Soviet and Western academics. 
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conclusion of the previous chapter, Kojève’s integration into post-Soviet intellectual life is a result 
of the new-found synthesis between Russian and Western traditions of critical thought. Kojève 
belongs to a cadre of Western theorists whose introduction in the post-Soviet literary sphere in the 
1990s resulted in a strategy within literary criticism that Ilya Kukulin and Mark Lipovetsky have 
labeled neoacademism. Including in its rank figures such as Mikhail Epshtein, Mikhail Ryklin, 
and Igor' Smirnov, the neoacademic literary tradition in post-Soviet Russia synthesized 
poststructuralist and postmodernist figures with more “domestic” traditions such as Russian 
religious philosophy and Soviet structuralist and semiotic schools (291). Even within this 
introduction of Western trends, however, Kojève was translated comparatively late into Russian: 
his Hegel seminars were published in Russian translation for the first time in 2003 by Nauka Press. 
Russian writers, therefore, would necessarily require at least working knowledge of French (or 
English) in order to engage with Kojève’s thought—it is no accident that all of the Russian 
philosophers discussed below have either trained or worked at universities in the West. 
Second, to complicate matters, Kojève is not merely a Western philosopher brought East 
but also one of many Russian philosophers published in Russia for the first time only in the post-
Soviet period. The 1990s were a particular productive period for the publication and discussion of 
canonical texts from Russian philosophers previously exiled from the canon in the 1920-30s, such 
as Nikolai Berdiaev, Semen Frank, Vasilii Rozanov, and Pavel Florensky. Alyssa Deblasio, in her 
description of the “philosophical boom” of the period, notes that in 1993, there were more active 
philosophy journals in Russia than at any other point in Russo-Soviet history (End of Russian 
Philosophy 46-47). Much of this was more historical reclamation rather than original philosophical 
work, although Deblasio argues that many journals were also concerned with constructing 
intellectual stances in their own right — Russian journals such as New Literary Observer [Novoe 
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literaturnoe obozrenie] and Logos frequently balanced retrospective discussions of émigré Russian 
philosophers with new philosophical work, often with no reference to Russian philosophers 
whatsoever. In this light, Kojève’s introduction to the pages of post-Soviet philosophical journals 
is an unusually productive synthesis of these two tendencies: the renewed publication of diasporic 
Russian philosophers and the growing interest in Western critical theory.  
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the citation of Kojève’s philosophy in a post-
socialist context reveals a significant shift in our understanding of him as a philosopher — divorced 
from the “temporal armature” of the Cold War and teleological speculation, Kojève in a post-
socialist Russian context presents a preliminary image of the global trajectory of critical thought 
today. In other words, if previously Kojève played a decisive role in the trajectory of twentieth-
century (Western) philosophy, some of the most salient features of his thought have since come 
under scrutiny. At least part of this renewed scrutiny is a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and, with it, a rethinking of radical politics and philosophy outside the shadow of the Cold War. 
This more critical engagement with Kojève illustrates certain characteristics of philosophical 
thought in the early twenty-first century, as it transforms and adapts to contemporary challenges 
both in Russia and elsewhere.  
This final chapter therefore examines the use of Kojève’s thought within the context of 
contemporary Russian philosophy. I examine the citation of Kojève by four Russian philosophers 
active today: Artemy Magun, Sergei Prozorov, Oksana Timofeeva, and Alexey Rutkevich. In 
doing so, I wish to emphasize the diversity of their interpretations of Kojève’s thought—indeed, it 
would be a mistake to generalize these four philosophers as working within the same tradition, as 
their methods, subject matter, and political preoccupations often differ dramatically. Nevertheless, 
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one can see in their work the attempt to form a new critical philosophical project in response to 
the social, political, and cultural particularities of twentieth-first century Russia.  
4.1 Unemployed Negativity: Sergei Prozorov and the Post-Socialism Debate 
Sergei Prozorov is a philosopher working in the field of biopolitics, specifically as a scholar 
of Giorgio Agamben. An overarching argument in his work, moreover, is for the particular 
applicability of biopolitical thought in the post-socialist landscape. Taking as his point of departure 
the Fukuyama-Huntington debate, Prozorov has defined post-socialist studies in terms of a 
continuum between two theoretical points of departure: transitionalism and traditionalism. He 
describes these opposed positions as the following: 
 Transitionalist theory, which benefitted most from Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, 
proceeds from the a priori introduction of the teleological model of transition to a variably 
defined ‘liberal democracy’ and subsequently assess the country’s progress, viewing every 
deviation from the teleological model as an indicator of deviance or the failure to 
internalize the model in question. In contrast, traditionalism, fortified in the earlier 1990s 
by the controversy over Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1993), makes an 
ontological postulate of the existence of Russian ‘tradition’ or ‘civilization,’ from which it 
infers the impossibility for Russia to internalize the liberal-democratic model (Ethics of 
Postcommunism 4-5). 
Transitionalists in political theory on Eastern Europe sought to imagine post-socialist states in 
various stages of development in a linear progression toward “liberal democracy,” whereas 
 123 
traditionalists understood cultural difference as irreconcilable to universal historical progress.117 
Prozorov points to a particular debate within Slavic studies in the 1990s, where political scientists 
argued over the universal applicability of so-called “transitology.” Early predictions of post-
collapse, such as those argued by Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, claimed that the 
political events in the former Eastern Bloc “should be considered, at least initially, analogous to 
events or processes happening elsewhere. More than that, they should be treated as part of the 
same ‘wave of democratization’ that began in 1974 in Portugal and has yet to dissipate its energy 
completely or to ebb back to autocracy” (178). Prozorov, however, notes a marked shift following 
the Russian default in 1998 and ensuing economic crisis, in which predictions leaned further 
toward a traditionalist, anti-teleological understanding of the country’s development and became 
less optimistic with regards to political liberalization (Political Pedagogy 28).  
Prozorov seeks a mediation between the two poles of transitionalism/traditionalism in his 
study of post-socialist Russia, and he does so through a return to Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel. 
Rather than finding in Kojève’s Hegel the conclusion of history in the shape of a particular political 
form (for example, for Fukuyama in the shape of liberal democracy), Prozorov argues that Kojève 
in fact meant for the end of history to entail instead the suspension of historical progress: 
 the end of history is not an event that takes place in accordance with its own inherent logic 
outside our experience but is rather a possibility that is permanently available to social 
praxis in the here and now, to anyone in any context. In order words, history does not end 
                                                 
117 It should be mentioned that the very same debates have occurred throughout Russian intellectual history, beginning 
with the “Westernizer” and “Slavophile” debates mentioned in the first chapter. The emergence of this discourse in 
the post-Soviet period reflects therefore less an aberration than a return to a relatively stable, cyclical discursive 
framework for discussion of Russia vis-à-vis the West. 
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by fulfilling its logic but is rather brought to an end in the social practices that suspend its 
progress. (Ethics of Postcommunism 8) 
In order therefore to understand post-socialism as a suspension of historical progress, Prozorov’s 
work analyzes an ethos of anti-productivity that he finds throughout post-Soviet political culture. 
He suggests that a more productive model for post-socialism would emphasize the deactivation of 
political life in the 1990s, the “reduction of politics either to a ‘mediatic’ spectacle under Yeltsin 
or a sterile technocratic administration under Putin and Medvedev” (Ethics of Postcommunism 40). 
He cites widespread indifference, or an “absence of preference” already present in late Soviet 
culture, which rendered the Soviet state inoperable due to its citizens’ apathy toward the public 
sphere: “[i]nterested neither in openly opposing the system on its own terrain of teleo-ideology nor 
in continuing to enact its rituals in a tongue-in-cheek manner, the practitioners of the ethics of 
disengagement formed autonomous spaces beside the system, both material […] and symbolic” 
(111). This disinterest, moreover, was manifest in late- and post-Soviet cultural representations of 
disaffected work. Devoting much of his cultural analysis to what he calls the “janitor generation” 
of the late Soviet period, Prozorov refers regularly to the music of Boris Grebenshchikov and his 
band Akvarium, whose lyrics, he claims, invoked purposeful abandonment and the distancing of 
oneself from the activity of work, “eagerly inventing forms of praxis that evaded the requirements 
of productivity and the rhythm of ‘working time’” (93). Prozorov finds parallels in his analysis to 
the famously renunciatory words of Herman Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener”: post-Soviet 
culture would prefer not to.118 
                                                 
118 Herman Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener” (1853) describes a New York lawyer who hires Bartleby to help him 
process paperwork in his business. While Bartleby initially is highly productive at the office, his work slows to a halt, 
with his responding to each request at work with the phrase, “I would prefer not to.” Bartleby is eventually forcibly 
removed from the office and imprisoned, where he dies of starvation after refusing to eat.  
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From the perspective, therefore, of the post-Soviet condition, Prozorov argues that one can 
claim neither that history has concluded nor that cultural differences preclude the possibility of 
historical analysis. Instead, the “ethics of post-socialism” express a larger disaffection toward 
progress, seen in the suspension of labor (and, by extension, history). To argue this point on 
historical suspension, Prozorov reevaluates Kojève’s infamous interpretation of the Hegelian 
Master-Slave dialectic. There, if we recall, Kojève claimed that while the Master has successfully 
risked their life in struggle, the Slave has clung to life and is therefore subservient. The Slave is as 
a result required to labor for the Master, yet the Master has not achieved full satisfaction, because 
they lack adequate recognition—to be recognized by a Slave is not sufficient. The Master, 
moreover, remains dependent on the Slave for the labor they produce, and the Master’s relationship 
with the world is thus mediated by the work of the Slave. Kojève understood the Slave’s labor to 
be at the heart of the historical process: history is nothing more than negation of nature through 
the labor of the figure of the Slave: “when is Nature transformed into Welt (historical world)? 
When there is Struggle, that is desired risk of death, the appearance of Negativity which manifests 
as Labor. History is the history of bloody struggle for recognition (wars, revolutions) and labor 
which transforms Nature” (Introduction 66).119  
A “conclusion” to this historical process would theoretically see the reconciliation of the 
Master/Slave dialectical in mutual satisfaction and recognition. Prozorov’s intervention, however, 
speculates on what would happen were the Slave merely to stop working: “what if we imagine, for 
a moment, a figure of the Slave who was stopped working without at the same time taking up the 
fight for recognition […] the figure of the workless Slave fatally jams the very machine of 
                                                 
119 “Quand la Nature se transforme-t-elle ne Welt (monde historique) ? Quand il y a Lutte, c’est-à-dire risque voulu 
de mort, apparition de la Négativité, qui se réalise en tant que Travail. L’Histoire est l’histoire des luttes sanglantes 
pour la reconnaissance (guerres, révolutions) et des travaux qui transformant la Nature.” 
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dialectics that was originally entrusted with bringing history to completion” (Ethics of 
Postcommunism 11). In other words, rather than witnessing at the end of history the inauguration 
of a fully self-sufficient bureaucratic state (as we have seen elsewhere in Kojève), Prozorov 
emphasizes what he sees as the post-historical state’s inoperosity, or non-functioning nature (28).  
The term inoperosity has a long and important history that is relevant here: its origin is 
found in a letter Georges Bataille wrote to Kojève in 1937 about Hegel. Kojève in his seminars 
had defined being human as being negativity: 
 To be human is to not be restrained by any fixed existence. Humanity has the possibility to 
negate Nature, and its own nature, regardless of what that may be. It can negate its 
empirical animal nature, it can want its own death, risk its own life. Such is its negative 
being (negator: Negativität): to realize the possibility of negating, and transcending, in 
negating its given reality to be more and other than simply a living being. (63)120 
Action, and therefore history, is a process of negating the givens of the world—transformation of 
oneself and one’s world requires negating what had once been. Bataille, however, questioned in 
Kojève’s interpretation what would happen at the end of history, at the end of this long process of 
negation: “if action (‘doing’) is—as Hegel says—negativity, the question arises then as to whether 
the negativity of one who has ‘nothing more to do’ disappears or remains in a state of ‘unemployed 
negativity’” (Somme athéologique 169-170).121 Would, in other words, the human “remain” 
negativity at the end of history, given that humans are defined by this negation? The phrase 
                                                 
120 “Être homme c’est n’être retenu par aucune existence déterminée. L’homme a la possibilité de nier la Nature, et sa 
propre nature, quelle qu’elle soit. Il peut nier sa nature animale empirique, il peut vouloir sa mort, risquer sa vie. Tel 
est son être négatif (négateur : Negativität): réaliser la possibilité de nier, et transcender, en la niant, sa réalité donnée, 
être plus et autre que l’être seulement vivant.” 
121 “Si l’action (le « faire ») est — comme dit Hegel — la négativité, la question se pose alors de savoir si la négativité 
de qui n’a « plus rien à faire » disparaît ou subsiste à l’état de « négativité sans emploi »” 
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“unemployed negativity” has since entered theoretical vocabulary as an indication of the certain 
paradoxes in thinking of humanism through a historical lens. 
The philosopher Giorgio Agamben later seized on Bataille’s vision of “unemployed 
negativity,” translating it as inoperosity [inoperosità] and understanding in this an articulation of 
politics outside of dialectical thinking. Agamben claims that: 
 politics is that which corresponds to the essential inoperability [inoperosità] of humankind, 
to the radical being-without-work of human communities […] the issue of the coming 
politics is the way in which […] this essential potentiality and operability, might be 
undertaken without becoming a historical task, or, in other words, the way in which politics 
might be nothing other than the exposition of humankind’s absence of work as well as the 
exposition of humankind’s creative semi-indifference to any task, and might only in this 
sense remain integrally assigned to happiness.” (Means Without Ends, 140-141) 
Prozorov’s work on Agamben adopts inoperability, or indifference to productivity, as an apt 
descriptor for the political landscape of post-socialism. In his work on Agamben, Prozorov claims 
that: 
 For Agamben, the way to bring things to the end consists not in the teleological fulfillment 
of a process of development (the end as completion or accomplishment) nor in the merely 
negative act of the destruction or elimination of an object (the end as termination or 
cessation). Instead, it is the process of becoming or rendering something inoperative, 
deactivating its functioning in the apparatus and making it available for free use. Happy 
life is thus made possible by neutralizing the multiple apparatuses of power to which we 
are subjected, including our own identities formed within them. (Agamben and Politics 31) 
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A “happy life” therefore replaces teleological formulations of human progress and utopian 
thinking. Agamben would find a happy life, for example, in the ascetic lives of Franciscan monks 
who, in their adherence to their strict forms-of-life, escaped from medieval political rule and 
enjoyed monastic, communal use: “a human life entirely removed from the grasp of law and a use 
of bodies and of the world that would never be substantiated into an appropriation” (Highest 
Poverty xiii). Prozorov argues for a happy life in the cyclical construction and demolition of the 
post-Soviet landscape, either feigning or renouncing productivity in the “emergence of a non-
exclusive generic community, wholly exposed in its ‘whatever being’” (Ethics of Postcommunism 
246). 
One cannot help identifying in this argument a resignation or nihilism when Prozorov 
interprets as a net positive the deactivated political life of the post-socialist imaginary. Prozorov 
has himself acknowledged this, yet he claims that his and Agamben’s thought “is optimistic 
because this new form-of-life is no longer posited as a historical task, something to be attained in 
reformist or revolutionary praxis, but merely calls for the subtraction of the subjects from the 
existing apparatuses” (“Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist” 1054). He sees this particularly 
useful in the often-pessimistic realm of Russian politics, exhausted from a century of intensely 
teleological political projection: 
 To the extent one still views politics as a regulated contest between rival historical projects, 
postcommunist Russian politics, in the form of both the disorder of Yeltsinism and the 
stability of Putinism, cannot but appear utterly impoverished. Yet, this impoverishment is 
as good a reason as any to abandon the “historical” vision of politics itself and to raise the 
question of what politics might be in the absence of any mobilization of humanity for 
historical tasks of bringing about a “bright future.” (247) 
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As I will illustrate later, this interpretation of Russian political life may perhaps, just like the term 
“post-socialism,” lose argumentative weight the further one moves from the Soviet collapse. 
Nevertheless, Prozorov’s arguments about biopolitics in the post-socialist field are compelling in 
their capacity to speak to larger, universal problems of deactivated political life: after all, the end 
of history, he argues, is a suspension “permanently available to social praxis in the here and now, 
to anyone in any context” (8). In an era in which mediatization haunts political landscapes globally, 
and political scientists discuss an “illiberalism” emergent in post-communist Europe122, 
Prozorov’s theoretical model of post-socialism broadens significantly the implications of post-
socialist political culture in the region. 
Prozorov’s work and his re-articulation of Kojève are therefore situated within a larger, 
late twentieth-century project of thinking through political praxis without, to borrow again Buck-
Morss’s term, its “temporal armature.” The shift is premised in a move away from a humanistic 
form of emancipation, the historical overcoming of man’s alienation, toward a more nefarious 
understanding of power and means of resistance. This shift, alluded to in Derrida’s aforementioned 
“ends of man,” reflects a move away from historicism already underway in the late 1950s and 
1960s. If previously, Hegelian historicism became popular in canonical Western Marxist thought, 
such as in the legacies of Kojève, Herbert Marcuse, and the early work of György Lukács,123 
                                                 
122 “Illiberalism” has increasingly been used as a term to describe conservative political transformations in Eastern 
Europe. One of the most common origins of the term is a speech given in 2014 by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán. The term can be traced even earlier, however, to use by American political scientists, such as Fareed Zakaria, 
to criticize the behavior of nation states which have democratically elected governments but do not have, for example, 
liberalized market or comparable freedoms of speech and assembly. One cannot help but note the pejorative use of 
the term to imply agreement with Fukuyama’s faith in the inevitability of American style liberal democracy: “Today, 
in the fact of a spreading virus of illiberalism, the most useful role that the international community, and most 
importantly the United States, can play is […] to consolidate democracy where it has taken root and to encourage the 
gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe.” (Zakaria 24).  
123 Perry Anderson relates this trend to the publication of Marx’s 1844 manuscripts for the first time in 1932. The 1844 
manuscripts, often alluded to in shorthand as “Early Marx,” illustrated at length Marx’s development out of Hegelian 
idealism. Although the manuscripts were published in Moscow, Perry Anderson states that their publication was 
nonetheless a defining milestone in the development of what has since become known as “Western Marxism.” 
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Hegelianism later came under attack by the next generation of Marxist philosophers in the West. 
Thus Louis Althusser, for example, rejected the theory of alienation that underpinned Kojève’s 
Hegelianism (and Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness [1923]) and instead famously argued 
for a scientific Marxism derived from Marx’s late works, when Marx had allegedly definitively 
broken from Hegel: “Marxism is, in a single movement and by virtue of the unique epistemological 
rupture which established it, an anti-humanism and an a-historicism” (Althusser 268). 
As an inheritor of this legacy through Foucault, Agamben, and the tradition of biopolitics, 
Prozorov is likewise reacting against a century of Hegelianism in Marxist thought, yet his unique 
intervention is to conceptualize this “break” in political historicism as it relates to the fallout of the 
collapse of communist states in the early 1990s. Indeed, if, in the West, Althusser and others were 
pushing against teleological thinking in Marx already in the 1960s, Prozorov suggests that a similar 
process, on a larger, social scale, occurred in post-socialist political life of the 1990s. In order to 
do so, Prozorov transforms Kojève, from his relatively engrained status as a philosopher of history, 
into a philosopher who problematized the relationship between human labor and historical 
progression. 
4.2 Do Animals Work?: Oxana Timofeeva, Kojève, and Animal Studies 
As I have already illustrated in the first chapter, Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel is often 
considered an anthropological one. This, in large part, is due to his insistent claim that the historical 
process is engendered by human labor—historical time is therefore human time. When historical 
                                                 
Anderson claims further that these manuscripts played a large role in Western Marxism’s progression from “politics 
to philosophy,” paradoxically reversing Marx’s own development from idealism to materialism (52). 
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time ends, or, as Prozorov argues, is suspended, humanity would also end. This insistence on 
anthropogenic time in Kojève’s work has led to his frequent inclusion (as an object of criticism) 
in theoretical work on animality and humanism in the growing field of animal studies. 
Is humanity still human after history? Kojève suggested humans would be something 
different altogether if they were to forego the historical process and stop working: 
 If, against all odds, Man no longer negated the given or negative himself as the given or 
innate, that is no longer created anew and created himself as a “new man,” content instead 
to persist in identifying with himself and to conserve the “place” he already occupies in the 
Cosmos. Or, in other words, if he no longer lived in accordance with the future or with the 
“project” and allowed himself to be dominated exclusively by the past or “memory”—he 
would then cease to be truly human. He would be an animal, a “knowing” one perhaps and 
rather “complicated,” highly different from all other natural beings, but not essentially 
“another thing” than them. And, as a result, he would not be “dialectical.” (Introduction 
576-577)124 
Devoid of the teleological projection of a future self, the human according to Kojève would return 
to being merely an animal. In a footnote added later to the second edition of his published lectures, 
Kojève described further the “naturalization” of humanity’s actions into animality: 
                                                 
124 “Si, par impossible, l’Homme cessait de nier le donné et de se nier en tant que donné ou inné, c’est-à-dire de créer 
du nouveau et de se créer en tant qu’«homme nouveau», en se contentant de se maintenir dans l’identité avec soi-
même et de conserver la « place » qu’il occupe déjà dans le Cosmos ; ou, en d’autres termes, s’il cessait de vivre en 
fonction de l’avenir ou du « projet » et se laissait dominer exclusivement par le passé ou le « souvenir » — il cesserait 
d’être vraiment humain ; il serait un animal, « savant » peut-être et fort « compliqué », très différent de tous les autres 
êtres naturels, mais non pas essentiellement « autre-chose » qu’eux. Et, partant, il ne serait pas « dialectique ».”  
Kojève adds in a footnote: “I said, against all odds, because, according to Hegel, Man always negates sooner 
or later as long as he has not realized the total Synthesis which ‘appears’ as his definitive ‘satisfaction’ (Befriedigung). 
I personally admit the possibility of a stopping along the way. But I think in this case that Man would cease to be 
human.” 
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 If one accepts “the disappearance of Man at the end of History,” if one agrees that “Man 
remains alive as an animal,” clarifying that “what disappears is Man strictly speaking,” one 
cannot say that “everything else can remain indefinitely: art, love, play, etc.” If Man 
becomes an animal again, his art, his love, and his games must also become purely 
“natural” again. One would have to admit therefore that at the end of History, humans 
would build their edifices and works just as birds build their nests and spiders weave their 
webs, and would perform concerts just as frogs and cicadas, would play like young animals 
do, and would indulge love like adult beasts do. (509-51)125 
As I have previously illustrated elsewhere, post-Soviet culture of the 1990s frequently relied on 
tropes of animalization in order to symbolize the collapse of the social order: “cultural depictions 
of the human body fracture at the juncture of animal and non-animal,” suggesting normative 
socialization had failed in the chaotic years of economic privatization and shock therapy (Wilson 
199). Artists as diverse as Oleg Kulik, a performance artist who would inhabit the persona of a 
dog and attempt to bite gallery attendants, and Viktor Pelevin, one of the most well-known Russian 
postmodernist novelists whose works frequently include werewolves, anthropomorphic chickens, 
and other animal-human hybrids, would deploy animality as a commentary on social exclusion 
and new forms of subjectivity in the absence of Soviet models of collective social life. Kojève 
claimed to see the return to animality in the consumer culture of the United States, an “eternal 
                                                 
125 “Si l’on admet « la disparition de l’Homme à la fin de l’Histoire”, si l’on affirme que « l’Homme reste en vie en 
tant qu’animal », en précisant que « ce qui disparaît, c’est l’Homme proprement dit », on ne peut pas dire que « tout 
le reste peut se maintenir indéfiniment : l’art, l’amour, le jeu, etc. ». Si l’Homme re-devient un animal, ses arts, ses 
amours et ses jeux doivent eux aussi re-devenir purement « naturels ». Il faudrait donc admettre qu’après la fin de 
l’Histoire, les hommes construiraient leurs édifices et leurs ouvrages d’art comme les oiseaux construisent leurs nids 
et les araignées tissent leurs toiles, exécuteraient des concerts musicaux à l’instar des grenouilles et des cigales, 
joueraient comme jouent les jeunes animaux et s’adonneraient à l’amour comme le font les bêtes adultes.” 
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present” where humans no longer had to labor – newly blessed with Western consumerism, post-
Soviet depictions of human-animality were much less optimistic (510).  
Although writing much later than the original “boom” of animalistic depictions in post-
Soviet culture, the philosopher Oxana Timofeeva nevertheless has also frequently problematized 
the question of animality, history, and Hegelianism, with her work often referencing various 
elements of Soviet cultural history. Her most recent book, A History of Animals [Istoriia 
zhivotnykh, 2017], levels a particularly strong critique against what she views as anthropocentrism 
in Kojève’s philosophy of history. Timofeeva’s work seeks to reinsert the figure of the animal into 
a history of the philosophical tradition, in which humanity’s distinction from (as well as 
camaraderie with) animality has often served as the point of logical departure: 
 Philosophers have always made a distinction between humans and animals, using as criteria 
features such as thought, language, awareness of death, and so on. One can identify two 
types of classical philosophical approaches to the animal. A discourse of exclusion, or, to 
use Jean-Marie Schaeffer’s definition, human exclusivity, is based on the idea of the ethical 
and ontological primacy of humans, who are radically separated from the animal world: 
humans are exceptional, and animals are excluded and in turn have no place in the human 
world. The discourse of inclusion is based on the idea of a certain affinity amongst all 
species, permitting the possibility of communication and collaboration. In this perspective, 
open to various levels of empathy, humans represent, of course, one type of animal, yet 
something “human” can also be found in other animal species. […] Both discourses are 
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nevertheless two sides of the same coin, establishing and supporting a specific order of 
things. (22)126 
Timofeeva thus argues that Kojève’s philosophy operates at the level of anthropocentric exclusion: 
what defines us as humans is the very thing which separates us from animals. Like Prozorov above, 
Timofeeva cites the work of Georges Bataille in her criticism of Kojève. Adopting Bataille’s 
concept of “unemployed negativity,” Timofeeva questions what this negativity really has to do 
with being human altogether: “how did it happen that negativity is now associated exclusively 
with the human and his creative activity?” (117)127 
If we recall, Kojève argued that humanity is associated with negativity, because human 
action is the negation of the given — labor is the transformatory negation of something into that 
which it isn’t. Timofeeva’s intervention is to ask as a provocation: don’t animals work? Kojève 
understand the difference between animal and human action (work) temporally: “[according to 
Kojève] animal desire lives in the present, desires what is available now, what can be grasped 
immediately, whereas human desire is directed toward the future, toward what is not yet, toward 
the inexistent, supernatural, fantastic objects” (Timofeeva 119).128 Animals may desire, and 
                                                 
126 “Философы всегда проводили различие между людьми и животными, применяя в качестве его критериев 
такие характеристики, как мышление, язык, осознание смерти и т.д. Можно выделить два типа классического 
философского подхода к животному. Дискурс исключения, или, если использовать определение Жан-
Шеффера, человеческой исключительности, исходит из идеи этического и онтологического превосходства 
человека, который радикально выделен из животного мира: человек исключителен, а животное — исключено, 
и ему, в свою очередь, нет места в мире людей. Дискурс включения опирается на идею некой общности всех 
видов, допускающей возможность коммуникации и взаимодействия. В этой перспективе, открытой для 
разного уровня эмпатии, человек представляется, конечно, одним из животных, но и у других животных 
обязталельно обнаруживается что-нибудь «человеческое» […] Однако оба дискурса связаны друг с другом 
как две стороны одной медали — этой медалью человек сам награждает себя за то, что устанавливает и 
поддерживает определенный порядок вещей.” 
127 “Как же так вышло, что негативность теперь ассоцируется исключительно с человеком и его творческой 
деятельностью?” 
128 “Животное желание живет настоящим, оно желает того, что есть в наличии, чем можно непосредственно 
завладеть, тогда как человеческие желания направлены в будущее, на то, его нет, на несуществующие, 
сверхъестественные, фантазматические объекты.” 
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therefore negate, things like food, water, shelter, whereas human desire is for abstract things: 
recognition, prestige, dignity.129 Timofeeva, however, wishes to reinstate in the animal its own 
form of negativity, exemplified in its own forms of laboring in the world. 
Attempting to “reinstate the animal” in the Kojèvian theory of negativity, Timofeeva 
deploys various figures of human-animality in Georges Bataille’s philosophy.130 Bataille at first 
takes seriously Kojève’s claim that the human is radical negativity—he claims, moreover, that this 
human negativity, and its distinction from animality can be found in the symbolism of animal 
sacrifice. In his words,  
 Man has revealed and founded human truth by sacrificing: in sacrifice he destroyed the 
animal in himself, allowing himself and the animal to survive only as the noncorporeal 
truth which Hegel describes, which makes of man—in Heidegger’s words—a being unto 
death (Sein zum Tode), or—in the words of Kojève himself—“death that lives a human 
life. (“Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice” 335)131 
As Timofeeva notes, however, Bataille is more concerned with the moments that link the animal 
and the human, rather than those which separate them. She cites in particular his Tears of Eros 
                                                 
129 The specificities of this definition of desire is discussed at length in chapter two. There, I illustrate the extensive 
parallels between Kojève and Vladimir Solov'ev’s definitions of human desire. Furthermore, Solov'ev’s own 
philosophy of desire takes inspiration from a much longer, humanistic tradition within Neoplatonism of 
“hierarchizing” living things, with humans the least physical in their love and therefore the most spiritual. The most 
vivid example of this can be found in the work of Marsilio Ficino, an influential philosopher of the Italian Renaissance 
and advocate for a revival of Platonic philosophy within the bourgeoning humanistic tradition—Ficino notably coined 
the term “Platonic love.”  
130 Timofeeva has written a monograph solely devoted to the philosophy of Bataille, in which she frequently discusses 
both animality and desire: Vvedenie v eroticheskuiu filosofiiu Zh. Bataiia. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 
2009. 
131 “l’Homme a révélé et fondé la vérité humaine en sacrifiant : dans le sacrifice, il détruisit l’animal en lui-même, ne 
laissant subsister, de lui-même et de l’animal, que la vérité non corporelle que décrit Hegel, qui, de l’homme, fait—
selon l’expression de Heidegger—un être pour la mort (Sein zum Tode), ou—selon l’expression de Kojève lui-même 
— «la mort qui vit une vie humaine. »” 
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(Les larmes d’Éros, 1961), in which Bataille presents an image of the prehistoric human as still 
quite animalistic: 
 However, these men who were the first to take care of the corpses of their kin were 
themselves not yet exactly humans. The skulls they left still have apelike characteristics: 
the jaw is protuberant, and very often the arch of the eyebrows is crowned by a bony ridge. 
These primitive beings, moreover, did not quite have that upright posture which, morally 
and physically, defines us — and affirms us in our being. Without doubt, they stood 
upright: but their legs were not perfectly rigid as are ours. It seems that they had, like apes, 
a hairy exterior, which covered them and protected them from cold. (Tears of Eros, 25) 
Timofeeva argues that, for Bataille, humans cannot be seen as the only negating animal, given that 
its first “act of negation,” exemplified in prehistoric animal sacrifice, was itself done by an animal 
not yet human: “[i]n order to become the only being to negate itself as an animal, this creature first 
had to be an animal, which, suddenly, for some reason, stands on its hind legs and announces, ‘I 
am not an animal anymore’” (132).132 
According to Timofeeva, therefore, Bataille’s reconciles the “open wound” of Kojève’s 
unemployed negativity to the capacity of animals themselves to enact negation, creating therefore 
an inclusive depiction of animality in Kojève’s philosophy of history. She does so, admittedly, 
with a very generous reading of Bataille’s work—in the conclusion of her book chapter devoted 
to Kojève and Bataille, Timofeeva concedes that her interpretation is “a partisan reading of Bataille 
against Bataille himself,” in order to purge him of any residual anthropocentrism (135).133 
                                                 
132 “Чтобы стать единственным, кто отрицает себя в качестве животного, это существо должно было прежде 
всего быть животным—которое вдруг по какой-то причине встало на задние ноги и заявило: «Я больше не 
животное.»” (132) 
133 “эта фигура безработной животности вырастает из моего собственного партизанского чтения Батая вопреки 
ему самому.” 
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Nevertheless, through Bataille, Timofeeva establishes her project of a historicized animality, one 
that understands the posthistorical as the prehistorical and that endows animals with their own 
agency as negating subjects.  
This philosophical deployment has a particularly rich effect on her work on revolutionary 
communism. Timofeeva has written frequently on the Soviet novelist Andrei Platonov, reading 
into his work deployments of animality in the author’s understanding of historical time and the 
victory of communism.134 Arguing for a reading of “bare life” [bednaia zhizn'] throughout 
Platonov’s novels and short stories, Timofeeva attempts to “give a voice to our forgotten past and 
reveal ‘animality’ as a part of Platonov’s tragic dialectics of nature, expressing a unique messianic 
anticipation of the era of the October Revolution” (“Bednaia zhizn'”).135 The dialectics of nature, 
or the dialectical force that includes both humans and animals and culminates in the October 
Revolution, is tragic in that Platonov portrays humans as belonging to a miserable state of bare 
life, comparable to their impoverished and tortured animals: 
 Bare life is the life of animals and plants, but also the life of people who from this very life 
create happiness and communism. Poverty describes the specific state of the world, when 
life is the main and even only material resource, a universal “substance of existence” from 
                                                 
134 Timofeeva’s insistence for a reading of Platonov’s animals joining in revolution, and the possibility of animals’ 
participation in the historical negation, resonates with various attempts at a “dialectical” science within the Marxist 
approaches to natural history. Friedrich Engels most famously attempted this with his Anti-Dühring (1878) and 
Dialectics of Nature (1883). Whereas dialectical natural philosophies held periodic influence in Soviet science 
(notably exemplified in the Stalinist controversy surrounding the Lysenko affair), Western Marxism, including 
Kojève’s variety, is often understood to disavow belief in dialectical thought’s applicability to the natural world. See 
Loren Graham, Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972). 
135 “дать слово нашему забытому прошлому и раскрыть ‘животность’ как часть платоновской трагической 
диалектики природы, выражающей уникальные мессианистские ожидания эпохи Октябрьской революции.” 
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which, as if by alchemy, everything on earth is made. Everything great, including 
revolution, is made from this meager, weak substance.136 
Timofeeva sees in Platonov’s work an almost animism of the revolution, where, by virtue of 
humankind’s wretchedness, humanity shares its revolutionary struggle with the animals 
surrounding them: “Platonov’s communists are animals of the revolution. They literally recognize 
themselves in animals and project onto them their own revolutionary passion” (“Bednaia zhizn'”). 
For Timofeeva, then, human negativity, understood in Kojève as the propelling force of 
historical progression, is transposed onto the animal world — humans share our revolutionary 
impulses with animals in what Bataille called the “open wound” of life. Our lives are therefore 
linked in political and historical ways. Timofeeva illustrates this link in another messianic, 
revolutionary context, Noah and the flood: “God regretted what he had created, because people 
committed too much sin. He decided to destroy everything, to erase all flesh from the face of the 
earth in order to give humanity another chance. Although animals didn’t commit any sins, they too 
had to share this destiny” (“The End of the World”). As the final two Russian philosophers 
discussed in this chapter will argue, this radical negativity is at the heart of any interpretation of 
Kojève as a revolutionary political philosopher. 
                                                 
136 “Бедная жизнь — это жизнь животных и растений но также и жизнь людей, которые из самой этой жизни 
строят счастье и коммунизм. Бедность описывает определенное состояние мира, когда жизнь является 
главным или даже единственным материальным ресурсом, универсальным “веществом существования”, из 
которого, как из алхимической субстанции, производится все на свете. И все великое, включая революцию, 
тоже производится из этого скудного, слабого вещества.” 
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4.3 Revolution, Redux: Artemy Magun and Alexey Rutkevich 
At first glance, it is rather unusual to juxtapose philosophers Artemy Magun and Alexey 
Rutkevich. Other than a regular engagement with Kojève’s philosophy, the two have developed 
dramatically divergent philosophical careers. Magun’s work frequently responds to contemporary 
political developments on the left—he and Oxana Timofeeva have regularly collaborated with 
Chto Delat, a group of artists, philosophers, and activists formed in Saint Petersburg in 2003 whose 
public mission intentionally lays claim to feminist, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist cultural 
politics today.137 Rutkevich’s work, on the other hand, is more historically oriented. Rutkevich has 
been by far the most active scholar in Russian to write on Kojève’s philosophy; he edited, and 
translated, the first collection of Kojève’s Russian essays to be published in 2006, and several 
posthumous publications of Kojève’s works owe their first-time publication to Rutkevich’s efforts 
working through Kojève’s collected papers. Rutkevich has therefore spent a significant part of his 
career excavating the more obscure parts of Kojève’s career, as well as providing needed (Russian) 
context for the philosopher’s legacy. Rutkevich’s most recent work on Kojève, however, has been 
devoted to the question of Kojève and revolution. Magun, meanwhile, has employed Kojève to 
formulate a new definition for revolution suitable to the twenty-first century. This last analysis, 
therefore, discusses the use of Kojève by Rutkevich and Magun to theorize on revolutionary 
politics from both a historical and contemporary perspective. 
                                                 
137 Chto Delat’s ideological orientation is further made clear by the origin of its name—Chto Delat (“What is to be 
done”) refers to both the nineteenth-century novel by Nikolai Chernyshevskii, known for its socialist, utopian vision 
of a woman’s organizing of a seamstress worker’s collective, as well as the 1902 pamphlet by Lenin. The question 
has since become a frequent rallying cry for Russian leftist thought.  
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In my discussion of Prozorov’s work, I had argued that his analysis of the “post-socialist 
ethos” may lose its argumentative hold the further one moves from a “post-Soviet” context into 
merely “contemporary Russian” one. Magun illustrates one way in which this may prove true. His 
first book, Negative Revolution: Toward a Deconstruction of the Political Subject (Otritsatel'naia 
revoliutsiia: K dekonstruktsii politicheskogo sub''ekta, 2008) opens with a reflection on the 
historical impulse of the project. Magun claims the origin of the book as the following: 
 This book was conceived and mostly written in the years 1998-2002. Its main task lay in 
an analysis of the historical experience of the 1990s as well as in the political identification 
of my generation for which this experience was formative. Based on this task I undertook 
a philosophical reconstruction of the conditions for historicity as they appear from the 
perspective of our current era. (11)138 
A decade later, in the book’s English translation in 2013, Magun situates his work in yet another, 
broader historical context: 
 Today, after two years (2011-12) of major revolutions and protest movements throughout 
the world, there is hope and promise, on the one hand, but on the other, there is the 
awareness that, following already established patterns, protests in the developed countries 
of the “core” happen on a large scale but are innocuous for the regime, whereas protests in 
the semi-periphery lead to violent revolutions and give power to the people, only to produce 
a paralyzing split between national conservatives and the liberal Westernizers. Because 
                                                 
138 “Эта книга была задумана и в основном написана в 1998-2002 годах. Ее главная цель заключается в 
осмыслении исторического опыта 1990-х годов и в политической идентификации моего поколения, для 
которого этот опыт был формативным. Исходя из этой задачи, я предпринял философскую реконструкцию 
условий историчности, какими они предстают с точки зрения настоящей эпохи.” 
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these things happen regularly, revolutions gradually start seeming to be internal institutions 
of the current global political system and not historic breakthroughs. (1) 
Magun, presumably, has in mind at least the Russian protests surrounding the 2012 presidential 
election, the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East, and the various Occupy Wallstreet camps 
both in the United States and globally. In both English and Russian, then, Negative Revolution lays 
claims to contemporary relevance in its definition of a negative revolution. 
The Russian context, however, attracts the greatest attention. Magun’s greatest claim in the 
book is that the political events of the late 1980s through to the early 2000s, leading from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union to the establishment of the current, in his words, authoritarian, regime, 
ought to be considered a revolution in its own right. In order to do so, he establishes five defining 
aspects of a revolution: (1) the overthrow of the sacralization of the preceding regime and an 
ensuing secularization; (2) the legitimization of a new regime immanent to the society itself; (3) 
internalization of the crisis within social relations, social fragmentation; (4) the inversion of 
symbolic structures and reigning ideologies; and lastly, (5) the revolution as a political event in 
which the very question of truth itself is posed (Otritsatel'naia revoliutsiia, 18-20). As Magun 
argues, the dissolution of the Soviet regime fits this definition of revolution: it undermined a sacred 
image of the Communist Party, legitimized a new form of rule seen as emergent through society 
itself, collapsed existing social structures, and inverted preexisting ideological dichotomies of 
Western-Russian, capitalist-communist, etc. 
Perhaps most telling for our purposes is the (a-)temporal aspect of revolution Magun 
provides in his analysis:  
 Revolution bears a practical-political, as well as epistemological, character. It overturns 
our conceptions of the past and future and defines an era as completed (“The Old order,” 
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“communism”), leaving within it a large part of human aspirations. At the same time 
revolution really only rarely puts forth truly new ideas and programs. On the contrary, it 
blocks a subject’s access to its own future, and the subject no longer knows what awaits it. 
Yet as paradoxical as it may seem, it is exactly in its capacity as a hurdle and even dead-
end, as a collapse of a field of vision, revolution indirectly allows for the construction of 
the totally new and unknown—or, more specifically, defines newly appearing things as 
totally new. (20)139 
Magun, in a manner similar to Timofeeva’s animals, seeks to locate revolution as an immanent 
capacity of human life. For Timofeeva, animals are just as capable of revolutionary action, even if 
they are only capable of negating their givens and cannot conceptualize the future. Magun, 
similarly, finds in revolutions and the revolutionary subject an immediate experience of 
melancholy, disorientation, and anxiety, from which he hopes to reconceptualize revolution away 
from mere transcendental political affirmations. 
What is a negative revolution? Magun takes as his example the French revolution, where 
he sees two stages of the revolutionary period: “society first unites and destroys—almost 
unanimously—the symbolic façade of the Old order” (88).140 Following this original unification 
period, however, Magun identifies a much more understated, yet crucial, aspect of the 
revolutionary process, bound in negativity, resignation, and conflict: “the second phase of 
                                                 
139 “Революция носит практико-политический, так и эпистемологический характер. Она переворачивает наши 
представления о прошлом и будущем и определяет завершившуюся эпоху («Старый порядок», «коммунизм»), 
оставляя в ней большую часть человеческих чаяний. Вместе с тем революция сама по себе редко выдвигает 
действительно новые идеи и программы. Напротив, она как бы блокирует субъекту доступ к собственному 
будущему, и он больше не знает, чего от себя ждать. Но как ни парадоксально, именно в качестве преграды и 
даже тупика, в качестве закрывающего обзор обвала, революция опосредованным образом позволяет творить 
абсолютно новое и неизвестное — а точнее, определяет вновь появляющиеся вещи как абсолютно новые.” 
140 “Сначала общество объединяется и разрушает — почти с полным единодушием — символический фасад 
Старого порядка.” 
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revolution […] begins when society appears alone with itself: when it must found and hold popular 
power. It is precisely at this moment that sectarian conflict and political disorientation begins. This 
second phase also defines a new idea of revolution” (88).141 Magun sees a similar two-step process 
in the collapse of the Soviet regime, where solidarity against the Communist party briefly united 
various social groups, only after which did these groups enter into internecine conflicts for power. 
By now, through Kojève, Prozorov, and Timofeeva, one can already sense the trajectory 
of Magun’s “negative revolution.” Much as the Russian philosophers described above, it seeks to 
shed teleological speculation while maintaining Kojève’s definition of the human as radical 
negativity. Magun, furthermore, relies heavily on Kojève’s interpretation of the French revolution, 
and his interpretation of Hegel as the philosopher of said revolution:  
 “[t]he Revolutionary acts consciously not to establish an (ideal) World, but rather to 
destroy the given World. And he knows this—it is he who, starting from nothingness, will 
reconstruct a new World. There is therefore a Selbst which creates itself at the onset of a 
World reduced to nothingness. There is no true creation without a prior destruction of the 
given: Action = negating Negativity (Negativität).” (Kojeve Introduction 170)142  
For Magun, a new conceptualization of revolution would necessitate tarrying with the negative of 
revolutionary conflict, which has often been overlooked in an overvaluation of the “affirmative” 
aspects of social change. This, for example, is what has prevented any estimation of the social 
collapse of Russia in the 1990s as revolutionary in origin. 
                                                 
141 “второй этап революции […] начинается тогда, когда общество оказывается, так сказать, наедине с собой: 
когда оно должно создать и удержать народную власть. Именно в этот момент начинается междоусобная 
борьба и политическая дезориентация. Этот второй этап и определяет новую идею революцию.” 
142 “Le Révolutionnaire agit consciemment non pour établir un Monde (idéal), mais pour détruire le Monde donné. Et 
il s’en rend compte. Et c’est lui qui reconstruira, à partir du néant, un Monde nouveau. Il y a donc un Selbst qui se 
crée lui-même à partir d’un Monde réduit au néant. Pas de création véritable sans destruction préalable du donné : 
Action = Négativité négatrice (Negativität).” 
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In this emphasis on revolution in Kojève, Magun and Rutkevich share a common goal. 
Rutkevich also takes from Kojève the idea of two stage revolutionary process, yet, unlike Magun, 
he is not as comfortable “tarrying with the negative.” Rutkevich defines revolution to mean two 
groups of events: “(1) a violent overthrow of an existing state system, which sometimes descends 
into civil war; (2) a long-term structural change that effects the most far-flung areas of society […] 
leading to progress and even to the end of history” (“Alexandre Kojève: from revolution to empire” 
330). As a scholar devoted to the historical context of Kojève’s philosophy, however, Rutkevich 
cites the philosopher’s exposure to the worst of revolutionary violence in the twentieth-century as 
a reason for Kojève’s reluctance to therefore embrace revolution: “Revolutionaries themselves 
mostly exterminate each other in factional strife. It should be noted that Kojève’s view of 
revolution was far from enthusiastic” (338). 
Rutkevich instead stresses the post-historical Kojève, in which Kojève imagined an end to 
struggle and the establishment of a homogeneous state. All reflections on the need for 
revolutionary struggle, Rutkevich argues, are merely another reflection of Kojève’s ironic 
approach to his philosophy: 
 To understand the context of Kojève’s philosophy one must keep in mind his personal 
experience of revolution in Russia (including three days in the basement of the Cheka, 
awaiting execution), several months of prison in Warsaw (arrested as a “Bolshevik spy,” 
nearly dying of typhus), experience in Germany in the 1920s with uprisings, putsches, and 
so on, and participation in the French Resistance (barely avoiding execution by the 
Germans). His interpretation of Hegel belongs to an era of “European civil war.” Just like 
several German thinkers esteemed by him (Heidegger, Schmitt), Kojève departs from a 
philosophy of resolve and conflict toward a contemplative, ironic view of the vanity of the 
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post-historical condition. In his characterization of the postwar world one can find in his 
texts near verbatim agreement with the works of Arnold Gehlen, Ernst Niekisch, and 
particularly Ernst Jünger. The experience of millions of those serving on the fronts of the 
two wars, of the volunteers in the International Brigades in Spain or with the Waffen SS, 
of underground revolutionaries, and of counterrevolutionary victims, all was reflected in 
the philosophy of ‘risk’ and the ‘battle for recognition.’ Once that era had passed, its 
philosophy, too, lost its self-evidence.” (“‘Levoe’ gegel'ianstvo Kozheva” 126)143 
Rutkevich therefore aligns Kojève less with a radical tradition (like Magun) but instead to a 
reaction tradition within German political thought, the contours of which were discussed in the 
preceding chapter with Kojève’s exchange with Schmitt. 
In perhaps the most telling evidence of his take on Kojève, Rutkevich cites a conversation 
Kojève allegedly had with Raymond Aron in the political charged era of 1960s France: 
 Kojève’s approach to the French revolution (and to revolutions in general) is neither 
historical nor sociological: real figures, forces, antecedents, etc. do not interest him. […] 
A curious story is recounted in Raymond Aron’s memoirs. In May 1968, he visited the US 
and had a long telephone conversation with Kojève, asking him about the events in Paris. 
Kojève told him that it “wasn’t a revolution, it was a disgrace,” “no one is being killed”; 
                                                 
143 “Для понимания контекста философии Кожева нужно иметь в виду его личный опыт революции в России 
(включая три дня в подвалах ЧК в ожидании расстрела), несколько месяцев тюрьмы в Варшаве (арестован как 
‘большевистский шпион’, едва не умер от тифа), опыт Германии 20-х гг. с восстаниями, путчами и т.п., 
участие во французском Сопротивлении (едва избежал расстрела немцами). Его толкование Гегеля 
принадлежит эпохе ‘европейской гражданской войны’. Как и некоторые ценимые им немецкие мыслители 
этой эпохи (Хайдеггер, Шмитт), он отходит от философии решимости и борьбы к созерцательному 
ироничному взгляду на суету пост-исторического существования. В характеристике послевоенного мира чуть 
ли не дословные совпадения с его текстами можно найти в работах А. Гелена, Э. Никиша, в особенности Э. 
Юнгера. Опыт миллионов фронтовиков двух войн, добровольцев интербригад в Испании или Waffen SS, 
революционеров-подпольщиков и жертвенных контрреволюционеров нашел свое отражение в философии 
‘риска’ и ‘борьбы за признание’. Когда эта эпоха миновала, подобная философия утратила свою 
самоочевидность.” 
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students of the time, i.e., spoiled children of bourgeois and officials, are playing at a 
revolution, and he did not see them as people ready to fight and die fighting. (339) 
Indeed, what was originally at the heart of the challenge in reinterpreting Kojève’s legacy, namely, 
his entrenchment in a critical theory tradition that saw its rise (and fall) in the twentieth-century, 
returns in Rutkevich’s interpretation of the philosopher as skeptical, and even antithetical, to the 
revolutionary goals of the left in the France of May ’68. 
Although their political orientations differ, Magun and Rutkevich are therefore both 
attempting to rearticulate history and revolution in light of a “crisis” in Kojève’s philosophical 
project. If one can no longer think of history as teleological, how can one conceptualize 
revolutionary politics? The very same problem haunts Prozorov’s and Timofeeva’s work, and, I 
would argue, has become a larger, looming question in the practice of cultural politics today. 
Should one abandon historical models of emancipation, given their relative failure in the social 
projects of the twentieth-century, or is there some sort of theoretical excavation possible by which 
we can return to that project? As (at least) one philosophical tradition adhered to teleological 
thinking, Kojève’s philosophy sits firmly in the crossfire of this debate, yet so, too, does this 
question linger in the past century and a half of Russian intellectual history. 
Philosophy, like all tools, is transformed by the aims of the individual who wields it. As I 
have attempted to illustrate, arguably no other twentieth-century philosopher has had his or her 
legacy subject to the whims of political ideology more than Kojève. This is, certainly in part, the 
fault of Kojève himself, who in his pursuit of an absolute philosophy, capable of responding to the 
entirety of human experience as he saw it, would often contradict himself or include, within his 
own affirmations, seemingly simultaneous negations. Yet an equally impactful influence on 
Kojève’s legacy has been the transition from the twentieth-century to the twenty-first: from a 
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(more or less) concretized historical trajectory to a more obtuse understanding of history, politics, 
and power. Nowhere is this teleophobia more apparent than in the landscape of contemporary 
Russian philosophy, yet this should not therefore imply a provincial set of concerns confined 
merely to the post-Soviet intellectual landscape. On the contrary, just as Russian philosophy in 
diaspora proved more than capable of speaking to broad, universal concerns in Western 
philosophy, so, too, do the interpretations of Kojève in Russian philosophy today reflect a 
reorientation of history, power, and human agency as it is understood globally.  
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